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Abstract 
Since the Second World War, there has been a shift away from interstate warfare to a rela-
tive increase in intra-state conflict and insurgencies.  In addition, a growing number of these 
insurgencies can be described as ‘transnational’, in that they are supported by outside state 
and non-state actors and may also pursue activities beyond their borders.  This thesis at-
tempts to analyse and explain the shift from interstate warfare to the emergence of 
transnational insurgencies.  
 
This study proposes and evaluates two possible explanations.  First, interstate warfare is 
thought by many scholars to be declining in value as changing technology, economic sys-
tems, and domestic and international politics have raised the costs and constraints of 
interstate warfare while yielding reduced benefits.  Second, there is evidence that transna-
tional insurgencies are more effective and possess wider capabilities than domestic 
insurgencies by utilising transnational networks for external support, strategic alliances, and 
illicit activities.  The study evaluates whether these factors have deterred interstate warfare 
while incentivising indirect methods through the initiation or support of transnational insur-
gencies.  
 
This thesis first reviews indirect warfare and the development of insurgencies over history 
and, in particular, how they have qualitatively changed since 1945 in their transnational rela-
tionships and activities.  It then provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the changing 
value of direct interstate warfare and the strategies and calculus by which states outsource 
to insurgencies as an alternative to interstate warfare.  Third, it reviews the transnational 
networks and the changing effectiveness and capabilities of transnational insurgencies.  Fi-
nally, it concludes with a case study of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
examining the decision and outcome of state outsourcing to Afghan insurgencies (i.e. the 
Northern Alliance).   
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1  The Changing Expected Value of War and Transnational  
Insurgent Networks  
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to changing warfare 
The changing character of warfare is important to an understanding of international 
relations (IR).  Colin Gray notes: ‘A true glory of the three preeminent classics of 
strategic thought—Clausewitz’s On War, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, and Thucydides’ 
Peloponnesian War—is that they tell us all that we need to know about war’s un-
changing nature’ (C. S. Gray 2007, p. 40).  Although the nature of war may be 
unchanging, the character of warfare has changed across history and continues to 
change.  As warfare has adapted across time, international systems have also trans-
formed.  The development of advanced weapons and the emergence of superpowers, 
for example, provide a basis the neorealist notion of bipolar stability.  Hence, insight 
to the changing character of warfare is germane to understanding and applying inter-
national relations theory.  
This thesis will evaluate a particular modern change in the character of war-
fare: the emergence of indirect warfare in the form of transnational insurgencies.  
Prior to the Second World War, indirect warfare and insurgencies have been associ-
ated primarily with domestic actors and cases of intra-state conflict.  These conflicts 
have generally sought to overthrow a domestic political order, such as China’s com-
munist insurgency (1927–1937), or to expel a foreign occupying force, as 
experienced during the Boer Wars (1880–1881 and 1899–1902).  Since 1945, how-
ever, insurgencies increasingly operate at the transnational level.  Examples include 
Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, and Iranian-supported militias in Iraq. 
Transnational insurgencies can be defined as insurgencies with international 
objectives and operations, or insurgencies that are supported by outside states or non-
state actors.  In many cases, transnational insurgencies possess regional or interna-
tional goals, which they carry out through operations beyond state lines.   The 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq, for example, supports a 
version of political Muslim in the region, and Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda chal-
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lenge the legitimacy of the state of Israel and outside Western involvement in the re-
gion.  All three have objectives and operations that extend beyond a single state.  
Insurgencies also utilize transnational networks to expand their resources and exper-
tise, which are used to advance domestic, regional, or international objectives.  
Insurgencies increasingly network with outside states, other insurgencies, non-state 
actor groups, and criminal organizations such as weapons traders, money launderers, 
and drug cartels.  
The transnational insurgency is not an entirely new phenomenon.  For exam-
ple, British forces supported the Spanish guerrilla (1808–14) against the French 
during the Napoleonic Wars.  However, the emergence of transnational insurgencies 
since that time has become quantitatively and qualitatively distinct.  After World 
War II, less than one-half of all insurgencies were transnational.  By 1979, over 80% 
of insurgencies had transnational operations or activities, and by 2004, the number 
rose to over 85%.  Additionally, transnational insurgent networks have become more 
complex.  While the Spanish guerrilla acquired outside state support, modern trans-
national insurgencies increasingly engage in complex transnational networks that 
may involve multiple partnerships with outside state and non-state actors (including 
other insurgencies and criminal groups).  Furthermore, in a growing number of cases, 
insurgencies also have ambitions and operations beyond their borders.     
This thesis proposes two variables to explain the emergence of transnational 
insurgencies.  First, direct interstate warfare has declined in its overall value as its 
costs and risk have increased over time.  Second, as transnational insurgencies are 
increasingly able to execute regional and international operations and procure re-
sources and support across state lines, they are becoming more effective.  It further 
argues that as transnational insurgencies and their methods become increasingly ef-
fective, state and non-state actors will also become more likely to initiate or support 
these groups or incorporate them into their campaigns.1  
In the first case, the overall value of direct interstate conflict is thought to be 
declining for a number of reasons.  The value (or expected value) of a given direct 
                                                      
1 States may use mixed methods of direct warfare while also outsourcing to insurgencies.  Examples 
include the 2011 military intervention to support the rebels in the Libyan Civil War, and the U.S. led 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which engaged the Northern Alliance to fight the Taliban. include 
the 2011 military intervention to support the rebels in the Libyan Civil War, and the U.S. led invasion 
of Afghanistan in 2001, which engaged the Northern Alliance to fight the Taliban. 
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interstate conflict refers to the estimated net benefit (or loss) a state may expect from 
a given conflict, when factoring in the estimated costs and anticipated risk.  A num-
ber of scholars maintain that the costs and risk of direct interstate warfare are 
increasing due to advancing weapons technology, increasing domestic and interna-
tional political constraints, and rising economic costs of war and the opportunity 
costs of lost trade.  These factors render increased barriers to direct interstate con-
flict.  There are also arguments that the gains of direct interstate warfare are 
diminished by the high costs of occupations and declining benefits of conquering 
other states.  This study theorizes that, as the expected value of direct interstate con-
flict declines, states are more likely to consider partially or fully outsourcing to 
insurgencies as an alternative to direct interstate conflict.2   
Second, while direct interstate conflict is diminishing in overall value, there is 
evidence that insurgencies are becoming more effective.  Advancing information 
technology and globalization has enabled insurgencies to organise themselves into 
transnational networks.  These networks have three main advantages.  First, transna-
tional insurgencies are able to pursue objectives and execute operations beyond the 
state.  Second, transnational insurgencies are able to expand their available resources 
and expertise by networking with outside state and non-state actors.  And, third, 
transnational insurgent networks frequently consist of complex, elastic, non-
hierarchical organisational structures that are difficult to detect and disrupt.  
The remainder of this chapter analyses the emergence of transnational insur-
gencies and sets the framework for the thesis.  Section 1.2 establishes a background 
of indirect warfare, traditional insurgencies, and the emergence of transnational in-
surgencies.  Section 1.3 provides empirical evidence for the emergence of 
transnational insurgencies.  Section 1.4 sets forth a research structure and methodol-
ogy to test the proposed hypothesis.   And, finally, section 1.5 explores the benefits 
of the research and outlines the thesis.   
 
  
                                                      
2 For example, while the United States under the Reagan administration may not have wished to en-
gage the Soviet Union in a direct interstate conflict, it did engage in a number proxy wars either 
through third party support or direct intervention (Record 2007, pp. 34-5).   
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1.2 Background: Indirect warfare, insurgencies, and transnational  
insurgencies 
Both domestic and transnational insurgencies employ indirect methods of warfare.  
In the 6th century B.C., Sun Tzu describes the use of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ tactics, or 
‘zheng’ and ‘qi’ respectively (Mair 2007, p. XLVI).   The author repeatedly juxta-
poses indirect with direct tactics and forces, and refers to the art of deception and 
psychological demoralization.  In Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War, Zhang Yu describes a 
battle in 341 B.C. in which Sun Bin of Han instructed his forces to lower their fires 
each night to mislead their enemy (General Pang Juan of Wei) to believe that their 
ranks were deserting.  Yu recounts that when Pang and his forces advanced, they 
were soundly defeated by crossbow archers hiding in the darkness (Sunzi 6th cent 
B.C./2003, p. 172).   
In another such account by Zhang Yu, General Tian Dan defended the city of 
Jimo by adorning oxen with silk and paint to appear as dragons, and applying grease 
on their tails and sharp blades on their horns.  The tails were lit with fire, and 5,000 
irregular fighters followed the oxen into the enemy camp.  The enraged animals 
caused a tumult as, ‘their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous pattern of 
their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or wounded any with whom they 
came in contact’ (Sunzi 6th cent B.C./2003, p. 239).   
Throughout history, indirect methods have been applied to an almost unlim-
ited range of praxes.  Indirect warfare has been termed asymmetric warfare, irregular 
warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, and insurgent warfare.   In some cases, 
as described in Sun-Tzu’s The Art of War, indirect methods may often be incorpo-
rated with direct methods.  Indirect tactics also may involve guerrilla warfare, or 
revolutionary warfare, as employed by Moa Tse-tung, T.E. Lawrence, Ernesto ‘Che’ 
Guevara, and Vo Nguyen Giap (Giap 1937/1962; Guevara 1961; Lawrence 
1920/1968; Griffith & Zedong 1937/1978).  Indirect tactics also include urban guer-
rilla warfare (Marighella 1969), insurrectionary warfare (Blanqui 1972; Janos 1963), 
and terrorism (Enders & Sandler 1993, 1995; Hoffman 2006, 2006; Neumann & 
Smith 2007; Sandler 2003, 2005; Sandler & Enders 2004).   
Several strategies are common to indirect warfare: deception, faster mobility, 
psychological demoralisation of the enemy, and use of politics and local populations 
for support.  Sun Tsu stressed the use of deception in all forms of warfare.  Indirect 
12 
 
warfare, as employed by Mao’s ‘yu chi chan’ (guerrilla warfare), employed faster 
mobility and psychological demoralizing strategic attacks, while depending on the 
local population for support ( Griffith & Zedong 1937/1978).  Additionally, guerrilla 
strategies involve many small attacks and often avoid decisive battles.  As Clause-
witz notes:  
They are not supposed to pulverize the core but nibble at the shell and 
around the edges.  They are meant to operate in areas just outside the 
theater of war…in order to deny him these areas altogether 
(Clausewitz 1832/1976, pp. 480-1).   
The extent to which states and non-state actors incorporate or rely on indirect 
methods varies.  In many cases, indirect methods are considered a component of 
warfare.  In juxtaposing regular and irregular strategies, Sun-Tzu advocated the use 
of both regular and irregular forces.  There are many examples of forces that com-
bine both indirect and direct methods.  In the Battle of Cannae, for example, the 
Carthaginian army, commanded by Hannibal, assembled its forces deceptively in 
what seemed a conventional formation.  However, parts of the infantry were posi-
tioned in the flanks with the cavalry, and then shifted around the Roman army as it 
moved forward.  ‘While they [the Romans] imagined that they were breaking the 
Carthaginian front, they were actually pushing themselves in a Carthaginian sack’ 
(Hart 1967, p. 34).   
Insurgencies are often composed of largely irregular forces, and generally not 
directly counterbalanced with regular forces.  However, to some strategists they are a 
temporary strategy, while to others a means to an end.  Mao Zedong, as one of the 
great innovators of guerrilla warfare, developed guerrilla strategies in which insur-
gencies operated as independent units and relied heavily on indirect methods and 
irregular troops. But Mao nevertheless viewed guerrilla warfare as a transitional 
method within a larger war.  To this end Mao states: ‘These guerrilla operations must 
not be considered as an independent form of warfare.  They are but one step in total 
war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle’ ( Griffith & Zedong 1937/1978, p. 41).  
Both Clausewitz and Mao professed that irregular forces were ultimately ancillary to 
regular forces because only regular forces are able to win decisive battles.  
In other cases, such as the Cuban Revolution (1953–1959), indirect methods 
and irregular forces are strategically used for the duration of the struggle.  Ernesto 
‘Che’ Guevara believed in the eventual annihilation of the regular army by guerrilla 
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forces.  Terrorism, guerrilla terrorism, and revolutionary warfare also frequently rely 
on isolated indirect methods.  All of these forms of irregular warfare vary on the tac-
tics employed, as well as the level and manner to which indirect methods are 
incorporated.  
 
1.2.1 Defining indirect warfare 
Establishing a conceptual definition and framework in which to evaluate indirect 
warfare has challenged scholars for some time.  Difficulties arise in part because in-
direct methods can encompass a wide range of evolving tactics, and are often used in 
combination with direct strategies and conventional forces.  Additionally, some be-
lieve that indirect and direct warfare do not exist as distinct categories.  Gray asserts 
that, ‘There are no regular or irregular wars. There are only wars.’  Gray argues that 
a more realistic understanding of war can be found in the idea of ‘unrestricted war-
fare’.  The term unrestricted warfare, based on the title of Liang and Xiangsui’s 
(1999), is described by Gray as ‘anything goes’ (C. S. Gray 2007, p. 40).  While indi-
rect and direct methods of warfare are employed in warfare, distinct categories of 
direct or indirect warfare are difficult to define and, ultimately, may not exist.   
Scholars have attempted to distinguish and define indirect warfare in three 
ways.  First, some define indirect warfare according to the use of operational tactics.  
Terrorism or rural guerrilla warfare, for example, can be readily identified as indirect 
warfare.  However, while some operational tactics may be readily categorised, indi-
rect warfare involves a diverse range of operational tactics that continually evolve 
and adapt.  As Lenin commented regarding guerrilla warfare, ‘abstract formulas and 
rules…will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the 
realization of the people's aspirations.  These progressive changes in conditions cre-
ate new methods’ (Griffith & Zedong 1937/1978, p. 13).  In the case of terrorism, for 
example, methods continually change by design so that, ‘[the terrorist’s] operational 
asymmetry is derived from his ability to continuously evolve new tactics…’ (Meigs 
2003, p. 8).  Because indirect methods are diverse and continually adapt, operational 
categories do not provide a solid basis for a universal definition.    
A second approach attempts to define indirect warfare by its strategic meth-
ods, such as the use of deception or psychologically demoralising one’s enemy.  
While descriptive, a definition based on the use of strategic methods fails to distin-
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guish indirect warfare because the same strategies are often found in direct warfare 
and regular armies.  Sun Tzu, for example, refers to deception in all warfare: ‘The 
way of war is a way of deception.  When able, feign inability; when deploying 
troops, appear not to be. When near, appear far; when far, appear near’ (Sunzi 6th 
cent B.C./2003, p. 6).  Similarly, B.H. Liddell Hart supports the strategic use of the 
‘indirect approach’ for conventional armies (S Metz & Johnson 2001).   
A third approach attempts to define indirect methods by the relative asym-
metry of capabilities.  The term ‘asymmetric warfare’ denotes the use of indirect 
warfare, usually by a weaker side that cannot feasibly challenge the stronger side 
with direct methods.  However, asymmetry of capabilities may also be found in di-
rect warfare.  As Gray argues: ‘To a greater or lesser degree, all tactical operation 
and strategy is asymmetrical.  There are no identical belligerents, with identical forc-
es, who behave identically.’  He goes on to argue that ‘all of America’s wars have 
been asymmetrical contests,’ noting asymmetries between the native Americans, 
Britain, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union (C. S. Gray 2002, p. 7).    
Asymmetry of capabilities, therefore, is a continuous variable, not a categori-
cal variable; thus it is difficult to determine the point at which warfare can be 
distinguished as indirect warfare.  This definition also excludes a number of scenari-
os of indirect warfare including: a) cases in which one or both evenly paired groups 
use indirect methods; b) cases in which a weaker power uses direct methods despite 
its disadvantage; and c) cases in which a stronger power uses indirect methods de-
spite its advantage.   
A categorical framework offered by Montgomery Meigs provides a solution.  
Meigs defines asymmetric warfare as warfare that lacks an operational and tactical, 
‘common basis of comparison in respect to a quality, or in operational terms, a capa-
bility’ (Meigs 2003, p. 4).  Using this definition, Meigs maintains that the German 
attack on France in 1940, although commonly viewed as an asymmetric battle, was 
not asymmetric warfare.  While noting that the French possessed better technology 
(operational capabilities) through their more advanced tank, he states: 
Differences in degree of capability–but not asymmetries–existed be-
tween France and German units at the tactical levels as well…Yet 
none of the German weapons or technique were in any way lacking a 
‘common basis of comparison’ to those of the French (Meigs 2003, 
pp. 6-7).   
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The meaning of ‘common basis of comparison’ could add additional levels of 
semantic debate; however, defining indirect conflict at the tactical level provides a 
distinct conceptual definition of indirect warfare that accounts for a wide and evolv-
ing range of tactics.  Because direct warfare is not defined by asymmetry of 
capabilities, forces with greater or equal capabilities may use indirect methods.  
Meigs, for example, asserts that the U.S. engaged in asymmetric (indirect) warfare in 
the invasion of Afghanistan (2001) through, ‘new tactical techniques integrating an 
air operation and special forces with an indigenous formation, the Northern Alliance’ 
(Meigs 2003, p. 7).  Similarly, smaller powers may choose not to use indirect meth-
ods, as was the case with the Battle of Antietam in the US Civil War.  Finally, while 
smaller powers may be limited to the use of indirect methods when engaging a larger 
power, there may be other constraints to direct warfare that lead to the use of indirect 
methods. Nuclear parity, for example, may render direct warfare an infeasible option 
and lead to the alternative use of indirect methods.3   
 
1.2.2 Traditional insurgencies 
Indirect warfare, as defined in the preceding section, refers to the methods and tactics 
employed.  Insurgency, on the other hand, denotes a non-state actor group that en-
gages in indirect methods.  As defined here, an insurgency is, ‘a violent struggle to 
control a contested political space between a state, or group of states, and one or 
more non-state challengers.’4  Some of the earlier recorded insurgencies date back to 
the Roman Empire.  Rome’s invasion of Brittan, for example, was resisted by strate-
gic ambushes and the innovative use of chariots.  The chariots were situated behind 
the battle and threw missiles into the Roman flanks and to continually manoeuvre 
their foot soldiers.  In other cases, the larger force would utilise indirect tactics.  For 
example, during Hannibal’s march from Spain to northern Italy in 218 BC, he en-
                                                      
3 The ‘stability-instability paradox’ as termed by Glen Snyder (1965), refers potential of nuclear parity 
between states to lead to the alternative use of indirect methods. Feroz Hassan Khan (2003), and S. 
Paul Kapur (2005) contend that the stability-instability paradox between nuclear Pakistan and India 
has deterred direct interstate conflict, but it has led to ‘low-level conflict’ and the support of 
indigenous insurgencies within the respective countries. See also: Robert Jervis (1989, 2002). 
4 This definition was adapted from Gordon H. McCormick and David Kilcullen.  McCormick defines 
insurgency as, ‘a struggle for power (over a political space) between a state (or occupying power) and 
one or more organized, popularly based internal challengers’ (McCormick, Horton, & Harrison 2007).  
Kilcullen adapted McComick’s definition to include transnational actors and activities: ‘Insurgency is 
a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying pow-
ers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers’ (Kilcullen 2006, p. 112).  
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countered the Allobroges, a guerrilla group that guarded an essential portion of the 
Alpine passes.  Knowing that they left the passage unguarded at night, Hannibal lit 
fires at night and sent a smaller force to occupy the pass and defeat the enemy when 
they arrived at first light (Asprey 1994).   
While guerrilla warfare and insurgencies have existed throughout history, in-
surgencies have become a more distinct category since the 19th century.  Some 
believe that the Spanish guerrilla war (1808-14), which coined the term ‘guerrilla’ or 
‘small’ war, marked a change in the role of insurgencies in warfare.  There are a 
couple possible reasons for this.  First, while insurgencies throughout history were 
often eventually defeated, the Spanish guerrilla was able to resist Napoleon’s forces.  
Clausewitz saw the success of the Spanish guerrilla as a decisive moment in indirect 
warfare (Clausewitz 1832/1976, p. 220).  China’s communist insurgency (1927–
1937) under Mao was also a marker for the success of insurgencies and the develop-
ment and application of guerrilla tactics.  Modern insurgencies have become 
increasingly effective, and in some cases altered the course of history.  
Carl Schmitt also espouses that the Spanish guerrilla was a pivotal point in 
history for partisan warfare, or insurgencies.   It the Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt 
argues that a pronounced form of regular warfare emerged in Europe that would in-
evitably set apart and distinguish irregular warfare and insurgencies.5   
Partisans fight irregularly.  But the difference between regular and ir-
regular battle depends on the precision of the regular, and finds its 
concrete antithesis and thereby its concept only in modern forms of 
organisation, which originated in the wars of the French Revolution 
(Schmitt 2007, p. 3). 
Schmitt argues that the emergent state in Europe was empowered with the right to 
war as well as the responsibility for the rule of conduct that accompanied that right.  
In this role, states entered a distinct form or regular warfare that resembles Clause-
witz theory of a ‘duel on a larger scale.’  Unlike Gray and Liang and Xiangsui’s idea 
of  ‘unrestricted warfare’, the tactics of regular warfare were limited (at least in theo-
ry), and were thereby contrasted when utilised by the partisan.  Additionally, the 
adherence to regular warfare by states could render insurgencies more effective.  Che 
                                                      
5 For further explanation of Carl Schmitt’s theory relevance to the study of warfare, see Christopher 
Coker (2008) Ethics and War in the 21st Century, pp. 44-53. 
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Guevara (1961) for example, maintained that irregular troops always had a tactical 
advantage over regular troops.  
Since the Spanish guerrilla resistance to Napoleon, insurgencies have devel-
oped both in their effectiveness and in their range of tactics.  Increasingly, the 
indirect methods of insurgencies adapt to new terrains, populations, and adversaries, 
as well as political, social, and economic circumstances that define and drive their 
movements.  Although insurgencies employ diverse and evolving tactics, they can be 
loosely categorised in five general groups.  These include: classical guerrilla warfare, 
urban guerrilla warfare, guerrilla terrorism, terrorism, and insurrectionary warfare.   
Classical guerrilla warfare:  Guerrilla warfare, or revolutionary warfare, is 
commonly represented through Mao Zedong’s tactics in the Chinese Civil War and 
the writings of T.E. Lawrence, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevera, and Võ Nguyên Giáp (Giap 
1937/1962; Guevara 1961; Lawrence 1920/1968).  Guerrilla warfare often involves 
strategies of faster mobility, psychological demoralisation, and many small attacks as 
opposed to a decisive battle.  The role of the local population is also often a key ele-
ment of guerrilla and revolutionary warfare, as Mao Zedong famously conveyed 
when he compared the relationship of the insurgency to the local population as that 
of a ‘fish to water.’  The population provides support and resources in guerrilla war-
fare.  General Võ Nguyên Giáp of the Vietnam People’s Army during the Vietnam 
War wrote of the necessity to respect, help, and defend the people in order to, 
‘achieve a perfect understanding between the people and the army’ (Giap 1937/1962, 
p. 56). 
Rural areas were often thought to be the preferred terrain for classical guerril-
la warfare.  Clausewitz notes that a general uprising can be effective in the interior of 
a country, which must be, ‘rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forests, 
marshes, or the local methods of cultivation’ (Clausewitz 1832/1976, pp. 480-1).  
David Galula, in Counterinsurgency Warfare, also explains that the ideal situation 
for the insurgent would be, ‘a large land-locked country…with jungle-covered 
mountains along the borders and scattered swamps in the plains, in a temperate zone, 
with a large and dispersed rural population and a primitive economy’ (1964, p. 38).  
Similarly, James Fearon and David Latin argue that insurgencies will be more likely 
in states with certain characteristics: ‘On the rebel side, insurgency is favored by 
rough terrain, rebels with local knowledge of the population superior to the govern-
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ment's, and a large population.’ (Fearon & Laitin 2003, p. 76).  Although classical 
guerrilla warfare and insurgencies were thought to apply to rural environments, in-
surgencies and guerrilla warfare may also be employed in urban terrains. 
Urban guerrilla warfare: Carlos Marighella’s tactics are an example of urban 
guerrilla warfare.  Marighella was a Brazilian Communist revolutionary and comrade 
of ‘Che’ Guevara.  While Guevara engaged in rural guerrilla campaigns, Marighella 
chose to hold operations in Brazil’s cities.  In 1968 he founded the National Libera-
tion Action (ANL).  The activities of the ALA included robbing over 100 banks, 
assassinations of police and military officers, blowing up U.S. companies and offic-
es, and the kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador Charles Burke Elbrick.  In his book, 
Minimanual of The Urban Guerrilla, Marighella separates the ALA from outlaws, 
stating that the goals urban guerrilla seeks are political, not criminal, ‘targeting only 
the government, wealthy capitalists, and foreign imperialists, particularly North 
Americans’ (Marighella 1969, p. 45; 1969).  The organization would ultimately de-
cline after Marighella was assassinated in 1971.6 
Guerrilla terrorism and terrorism: Marighella’s urban terrorism is similar to, 
but not the equivalent of guerrilla terrorism.  Guerrilla terrorism has a similar strate-
gic objective to guerrilla warfare: psychological demoralization of the opponents 
military; however, guerrilla terrorism uses a more limited field of operations, so that 
attacks are made to be more psychologically damaging and involve an element of 
terror (Janos 1963).  As Janos notes, ‘if yu chi chan is the war of the weak, guerrilla 
terrorism is the war for the very weak’ (Janos 1963, p. 645).  The Algerian Revolu-
tion is an apt example of guerrilla terrorism, involving high–density urban attacks 
which proved demoralizing to the French troops.   
Although terrorism is an increasingly common method, it can be thought of 
as an extension of guerrilla terrorism.7  Terrorism differs from guerrilla terrorism in 
that guerrilla terrorism is directed at the opposing military targets, while terrorism 
may be aimed at civilian targets to psychologically impact the population.  Some 
scholars include assassinations as a form of terrorism.  Meigs, for example, compares 
                                                      
6 While Marighella’s death is in large part cited as the cause for the decline of the ALA, there were 
other factors, such as the rebounding Brazilian economy that began to improve in 1970 (Hanrahan 
1985). 
7 For more on terrorism see: Enders and Sandler (1993, 1995); Sandler (2003, 2005); Sandler and 
Enders (2004); Hoffman (2006, 2006); Neumann and Smith (2007).  
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Shiite extremists’ assassination attempts against key leaders in the 11th and 12th cen-
turies to the modern tactics of al-Qaeda (Meigs 2003, pp. 4-5).  Terrorism more gen-
generally involves targeted assassination or high-density attacks against soft targets, 
such as implemented by Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups (Enders & Sandler 
1993, 1995; Hoffman 2006).   
Insurrectionary warfare:  Finally, insurrectionary warfare, as set out by 
French revolutionary, Louise Agusti Blanqui, may be viewed as a form of insurgency 
(Blanqui 1972; Janos 1963).  The strategic objective of insurrectionary warfare, like 
guerrilla warfare and guerrilla terrorism, is the psychological demoralization of the 
opposing military.  Tactics involve selective mob violence directed against the mili-
tary or government buildings and, in some cases, forcing the military to kill civilians. 
The technique, which became effective during the industrial revolution, is considered 
by Blanqui to be an outgrowth of the emerging working class.  The tactic was used, 
for example, in Russia in the Strastnaya Square in the Moscow revolution of 1905.  
Since early insurgencies and the classical insurgencies of Mao, T.E. Law-
rence, and ‘Che’ Guevara, insurgencies increasingly utilise urban terrains for 
operations. Janos views insurrectionary warfare as a predominately urban strategy 
based on the emergence of the working class during the industrial revolution (Janos 
1963, p. 638).  Terrorism is also used in urban settings because it can reach many 
targets and is aimed at the demoralization of the population in general and not specif-
ic targets.  Guerrilla and guerrilla terrorism both target selectively, but can be used in 
urban environments.  The changing character of insurgencies is guided by both the 
strategies that they employ, as well as the many factors that drive them.  Carlos 
Marighella’s adoption of urban guerrilla tactics in Brazilian cities was a tactical ma-
noeuvre. Agusti Blanqui (1972) believes that insurrectionary warfare was, in part, an 
outgrowth of the working class, which emerged from industrialisation.   
The future character of insurgencies is also likely to be affected by the strate-
gies and the circumstances that drive them.  Stephen Graham theorises that urban 
environments are becoming the centres of conflict, both for outside invaders (e.g. 
door to door operations in Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom), and insurgen-
cies and political violence within cities (Graham 2008).  In one sense, urban warfare 
may be becoming strategically feasible in urban environments.  But, as Christopher 
Coker notes, ‘It is the cultural and social context that is likely to be more important’ 
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to the spread of metro warfare (Coker 2009, p. 130).  A number of factors such as 
rising urban populations, a lack of available work, the fragmentation of societies, and 
the imbalances in security potentially carve a path for urban warfare.  In this sense, 
insurgencies will continue to change with their environmental circumstances, their 
strategic options, and the development of new tactics.   
 
1.2.3 From domestic to transnational insurgencies 
Historically, insurgencies have been thought to operate domestically, and have been 
researched as intra–state conflicts or civil wars.  As David Kilcullen notes, the writ-
ings of the 1960’s (e.g. David Galula, Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson, Bernard Fall, 
Mao Zedong, ‘Che’ Guevara and Vo Nguyen Giap) have reinforced a view of do-
mestic insurgencies involving an, ‘insurgent challenger to a functioning (though 
often fragile) state’ (Kilcullen 2006, p. 112).   
Although insurgencies and counter-insurgency doctrines may be contextual-
ized by their time periods, insurgencies throughout history have, for the most part, 
been domestic in character.  More often than not, traditional insurgencies have: 1) 
challenged an existing order from an occupying or overruling power, as was the case 
with insurgencies under Roman rule and with colonial era insurgencies as experi-
enced during the Boer Wars (1880–1881 and 1899–1902); or, 2) challenged their 
own governing authorities, as was the case with the Chinese Civil War (1927–1937) 
and the Cuban Revolution (1953–1959).  In some cases, insurgencies have worked 
with outside groups: both the Spanish guerrilla and the American Continental Army, 
for example, received outside support.  For the most part, however, traditional insur-
gencies had both domestic cause and support.    
Since World War II, however, empirical evidence suggests that insurgencies 
are becoming increasingly transnational in character.  While traditional insurgencies 
often challenge an existing government or occupying force, transnational insurgen-
cies have objectives and strategic methods at the regional and international levels, 
and may integrate with a variety of international actors.  As Kilcullen notes, ‘To-
day’s insurgencies differ significantly–at the level of policy, strategy, operational art 
and tactical technique–from those of earlier eras’ (Kilcullen 2006, p. 111). Insurgen-
cies increasingly organise themselves into transnational networks, or ‘cross-border 
associations of groups and individuals who act and interact in the international arena 
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independently of–and frequently in opposition to–states’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2005, 
p. 7).    
Transnational insurgencies are defined here as insurgencies with international 
objectives and operations and/or insurgencies that are supported by outside state or 
non-state actors that often have international objectives.  Insurgencies with interna-
tional objectives and operations are often regional, but can be international as well.  
These insurgencies pursue interests and operations beyond their borders.  There are 
several groups that fall into this category:  
• Militia and guerrilla groups, with objectives and/or support at the interna-
tional level, and which may also support other groups, are exemplified by the 
Mehedin Army in Iraq, Qods force, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) (Felter & Fishman 2008; Galula 1964; Kaldor 2007);  
• International terrorism, which has been researched extensively through the 
international activities of al-Qaeda, but also through numerous more regional-
ly focused transnational groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP) (D Byman 2004; Crenshaw 1981; Enders & Sandler 
1995; Hoffman 2006);  
• Regional or international insurgencies that cooperate for a similar regional or 
international objectives.  The Kurdish insurgencies in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, 
for example, seek an independent Kurdish state.  These groups include: the 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the Kurdish Democratic Party of 
Iraq (KPD), the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the Free Life Party of Iran 
(PJAK), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq.   
 
Additionally, outside state and non-state actors increasingly support insur-
gencies through funding, safe havens, weapons, and troops, and may even 
incorporate insurgencies into their own campaigns.  Insurgencies with domestic, re-
gional, or international objectives may form transnational networks with a variety of 
outside actors.  Outside network actors involve the following:  
• Outside state actors–Research and empirical studies find that state actors are 
increasingly support insurgencies (Salehyan 2007, 2008, 2010), such as Cold 
War ear ‘proxy wars’ exemplified by US involvement in Nicaragua (K. S. 
Gleditsch & Beardsley 2004), and Iranian activities and influence in Iraq fol-
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lowing the 2003 US led invasion (Felter & Fishman 2008; K. S. Gleditsch & 
Beardsley 2004); 
• Outside insurgencies–Insurgent groups supported by other transnational in-
surgencies are demonstrated by the activities of al-Qaeda, which has regional 
and international objectives and operations and also partners with domestic 
insurgency movements, such as Qaeda–Iraq (Felter & Fishman 2007); 
• Non-violent non-state actors may also provide insurgencies with funding and 
support, and may include outside non-state actors, individuals, diasporas, or 
other groups that may have ties or sympathies to an insurgent movement; and  
• Transnational criminal groups such as drug trafficking, money laundering, 
and illicit weapons trade (McFarlane 2000; Williams 1994, 2001). 
Transnational insurgencies are believed to be potentially more effective that 
domestic insurgencies for three reasons:  1) they can pursue interests and operations 
that are regional or international; 2) they can gain support through transnational net-
works potentially composed of state, non-state actors (including other insurgencies), 
and criminal groups; and, 3) they are able to organise themselves in flat, decentral-
ized, transnational network structures that are difficult to detect and disrupt.   
 
1.3 Empirical evidence of a shift to intra-state warfare and transnational  
insurgencies 
Since the Second World War, there has been a shift from domestic to transnational 
insurgencies.  During this period, transnational insurgencies have increased in signif-
icance, rising to over 80% of all insurgencies in 2004.  They have also grown in 
complexity, often engaging with multiple network actors.   In addition, there has 
been a shift from interstate war to intra-state warfare, which includes domestic and 
transnational insurgencies.  These patterns may suggest that state actors are shifting 
to indirect methods by supporting insurgencies as an alternative to direct interstate 
conflict.   
This section will empirically evaluate the shift from domestic to transnational 
insurgencies in three stages.  First, it will evaluate changes in the categorical defini-
tions of warfare. Specifically, it will assess how typologies used to categorise and 
measure conflict have adjusted over the past half-century to include the role of trans-
national insurgencies.  Second, it analyses studies of casualty data to determine if 
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(and to what extent) there has been a shift from direct interstate warfare to indirect 
warfare (insurgencies).  And, third, it provides an empirical analysis of all insurgen-
cies since 1945 to determine if and to what extent transnational insurgencies have 
emerged, and how their operations have changed over time.  
 
1.3.1 Conflict Data Typologies 
A number of datasets have been compiled over the years that quantify conflict data.  
These datasets vary on their categorical typologies of conflict, general information, 
and threshold measurements (e.g. the number of battle deaths required to be counted 
as a conflict).  The conflict typologies used by each database is the basis in which to 
measure trends and changes in conflict.  Empirical research following the Second 
World War has generally viewed and categorised conflict within the following 
groups:  
• Interstate conflict, occurring between two or more states;  
• Civil (or internal) conflict, occurring between a government of a state and 
one or more internal opposition groups without outside state intervention;  
• Imperial or colonial conflict, involving a state and a colony.  
Since the creation of many conflict databases, there has been increasing concern that 
conflict data typologies do not sufficiently address the emerging complexities of con-
flict.  As Sarkes, Wayman, and Singer contend, ‘changes in the contemporary system 
are marking the end of the dominance of the territorial state as the predominant actor, 
yet the categories of conflict studies here are predominantly state-centered’ (Sarkees 
& Singer 2001, p. 21).  To address transnational non-state actors, new typologies 
have been developed for existing and new conflict datasets to reflect a need to incor-
porate non-state actors and transnational insurgencies.8   
The Correlates of War (COW) Dataset, a widely used conflict dataset found-
ed in the 1960’s, originally categorized war through the following typologies:  
• Interstate conflict, involving international wars between states;  
• Extrasystemic conflict, to demarcate colonial and imperial wars; and  
• Civil wars occurring within a state.   
                                                      
8 See: Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer (2003) ‘Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Com-
prehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997’ for a comprehensive review of data 
typologies for conflict data. 
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The COW Dataset, however, has been amended to include the role of non-
state actors both at the state and interstate levels.  The following changes have been 
incorporated:  
1. The category of extrasystemic war has been changed to extra-state war, 
which is described as a state engaged against a dependent or independent 
non-state actor.   
2. A new category of intra-state conflict now includes civil war, regional inter-
nal conflict, and intercommunal conflict between non-state actors within a 
territory. 
3. An additional category of non-state wars has been added, which includes 
non-state actors in non-state territories or across state borders.  
  
Similarly, the Conflict Data Project (UPSALA) – States in Armed Conflict 
database has also undergone moderate modifications to incorporate the role of non-
state actors in conflict.  The category for extra-state armed conflict originally includ-
ed armed conflict between a government and an opposition group or groups over a 
territory.  This category has been replaced by extrasystemic armed conflict, which 
encompasses a broader definition that includes conflict between a state and non-state 
actor group in an outside territory.9   
Other datasets have also been compiled to address what is argued to be an ex-
panded role of indirect conflict and non-state actors at both the international and 
domestic levels.  A number of databases concentrate on the role of ethnicity in con-
flict.  Examples include: Ethnic Conflicts Research Project (ECOR) Violent Conflicts 
1985–1996 (Scherrer 1999);  Ethnic Conflicts 1945–1989 (T.R. Gurr 1993; T.R. 
Gurr & Harff 1994); and PITF–State failure problem set: internal wars and failures 
of governance, 1955–2008 (Monty G. Marshall, Gurr, & Harff 2009).  Others, such 
as Major Armed Conflicts 1945–1995 (Holsti 1996) focus on emerging new patters 
of conflict centred around ideology, which Holsti terms ‘war of a third kind.’  In ad-
dition, Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan have developed the Non-State Actors 
in Civil Wars dataset (NSA) to specifically address the role of non-state actors in 
conflict (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan 2013). 
                                                      
9 The other conflict categories used by UPSALA (extrasystemic, interstate, internal, and international-
ized internal armed conflict) have not been significantly changed. 
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Both the evolving typologies within datasets and the creation of new datasets 
suggest transnational insurgencies are changing character of conflict.  These new ty-
pologies increasingly involve non-state actors that are not necessarily restricted by 
state borders and reflect the shift from domestic insurgencies to transnational insur-
gencies.   
 
1.3.2 The shift from interstate to intra-state conflict 
Although research on the shifting typologies suggest that there has been an emer-
gence of transnational insurgencies, an empirical analysis is necessary to examine 
trends in the interstate warfare, intra-state warfare, and transnational insurgencies.  
This section will determine if there has been decline in interstate conflict and a sim-
ultaneous increase in intra-state conflict.  
Prior research has evaluated the espoused shift from direct interstate conflict 
to indirect conflict.  Many quantitative studies use conflict data to assess casualty 
data to determine changing levels of warfare, as well as shifts in types of warfare.  
Scholars of the liberal tradition argue that international institutions, political regimes, 
and other factors have caused interstate warfare to decline.  Realists, on the other 
hand, argue that warfare has simply shifted in character from interstate warfare to 
intra-state conflict.  
On the side of the political realists, Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer (2003) 
conduct an empirical study that measures the number of battle related deaths over 
time based on data from the Correlates of War (COW).  The outcomes are revised to 
account for changes in relative population sizes over time.10  The study finds that war 
between great powers has diminished, but that conflict in general has not dropped.  
Instead, interstate conflict is found to have shifted (or simultaneously increased) to 
forms of intra-state and extra-state warfare, including civil wars and both domestic 
and transnational insurgencies.   
Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett (2006) directly challenge the Sarkees, Way-
man, and Singer study, arguing that their results were based on irregularities of the 
COW (Correlates of War) data.  The authors contend that the COW data measures 
intra-state conflict more sensitively than interstate conflict.  Therefore, ‘because in-
                                                      
10 Researchers referred to as the ‘likelihood of dying in a war or conflict’ when the number of battle 
deaths is calculated controlling for populations size.   
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terstate war was more common in the beginning of the twentieth century than at the 
end, recent wars appear more deadly than if consistent definitions had been applied’ 
(Lacina et al. 2006, p. 676).  Lacina, Gleditsch, and Russett use a modified dataset 
that incorporates, ‘estimates gathered by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) for the Uppsa-
la/PRIO data set on state-based armed conflicts between 1946 and 2002’ (Lacina et 
al., p. 676).  Using a modified COW dataset, they instead find U-shaped curves in 
which relative battle decline following World War II and the Cold War.   
As a result, there is general debate regarding whether intra-state conflict has 
risen since the second world war, or, more precisely, whether the number of battle 
deaths as a percentage of the population have increased or decreased (likelihood of 
dying in an intra-state conflict).  However, there is significant evidence that intra-
state conflict has risen relative to interstate conflict (or the percentage of battle 
deaths as a percentage of the population of intra-state conflict has risen relative to 
interstate conflict).  As interstate conflict has decreased, intra-state conflict has in-
creased, although there is debate as to the level (see: figure 1–1 below).  Because 
interstate warfare has also declined, it is possible that warfare is partially (or even 
fully) shifting from interstate to intra-state conflicts. 
 
Figure 1-1:  
 
Source:  Human Security Report 2012: Sexual Violence, Education and War: Beyond the 
Mainstream Narrative. Vancouver: Simon Fraser University (Figure 5.7 Trends in State-
Based Conflicts by Type, 1946–2009). 
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1.3.3 The emergence of transnational insurgencies 
While existing research has found a movement from interstate to intra-state conflict, 
the question of whether intra-state conflict is shifting from domestic insurgencies to 
transnational insurgencies requires original analysis.  This section will quantitatively 
evaluate the trends for both domestic and transnational insurgencies since 1945.  
Three areas will be evaluated: 1) the quantitative trends for domestic and transna-
tional insurgencies; 2) the proportion of domestic to transnational insurgencies; and, 
3) the complexity of transnational insurgent networks (e.g. state supported and/or 
non-state actor supported).   
 
Terminology 
The precise definitions that will be used to measure insurgencies, domestic insurgen-
cies, transnational insurgencies, and outside state and non-state actor support are as 
follows:11   
An insurgency refers to a conflict dyad between a state or group of states and 
a non-state actor or group of non-state actors involving indirect methods of conflict.  
The NSA Database measures conflicts with twenty-five casualties or more in a given 
year (Salehyan 2010, p. 5).  
A domestic insurgency is defined as an insurgency that does not have signifi-
cant outside operations or outside state or non-state actor group support involving 
either military (e.g. training, equipment, and troops) or non-military support (e.g. fi-
nances, logistics, and medical supplies).   
Transnational insurgencies are defined as insurgencies that have outside op-
erations, or outside state or non-state actor group support involving either military or 
non-military support.   
Outside operations are distinct from outside support.  An insurgency is con-
sidered to have outside operations in cases in which rebels are physically present 
within another state either through troops or bases.  Examples include Che Guevara’s 
attempt to replicate the Cuban revolution in Bolivia with the National Liberation 
                                                      
11 Terminology is based on the Non-state Actor database.  See: Cunningham, D. E., Gleditsch, K. S., 
& Salehyan, I. (2013). ‘Non-state actors in civil wars: A new dataset;’ Cunningham, D. E., Gleditsch, 
K. S., & Salehyan, I. (2009) ‘It Takes Two A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome;’ 
and Cunningham, D., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2006). ‘Codebook for The Non-State Actor Data, a Supple-
ment to the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data.’  
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Army (ELN), as well as the The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has 
troops fighting abroad in the Ferghana valley bordering Kyrgyzstan and espoused to 
also be located in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. 
State support includes what the NSA database codes as rebel groups that are 
either ‘explicitly’ or ‘allegedly’ supported by the government of foreign states 
through military means, such as military support or foreign troops, and or non-
military support.  The United Sates for example, supported the Fuerza Democratica 
Nicargüense (FDR) (a.k.a. the Contras) in Nicaragua (K. S. Gleditsch & Beardsley 
2004).   
Transnational non-state actor support is considered present when a transna-
tional non-state actor supports an insurgency.  The IRA (Irish Republican Army) 
received support from outside non-state actors and diaspora.  Insurgencies also are 
supported by outside insurgencies.  And in Ethiopia, for example, al-Itahad al-Islami 
had alleged ties to the Somali Islamic Union, or al-Ittihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), and 
al-Qaeda.   The dataset includes ‘major’, ‘minor’, or ‘alleged’ military support, and 
‘tacit,’ ‘some,’ or ‘explicit’ non-military support.  However, this analysis counts cas-
es of alleged, minor, or major military support, and cases of ‘some’ or ‘explicit’ non-
military support for insurgencies, but excludes cases of ‘tacit’ non-military support.   
 
Data and methodology 
Of the available datasets, the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars dataset (NSA) devel-
oped by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (Cunningham et al. 2013) provides 
the most relevant empirical data.  The NSA dataset is based on the list of conflicts 
provided by the Uppsala University/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
Armed Conflicts Dataset and includes data on all rebel groups active since 1945.  
The NSA dataset includes information on rebel groups, such as their relative 
strength, territorial bases, and organisational structures, as well as their sources of 
foreign support and their foreign operations.  
The empirical analysis evaluates trends in domestic and transnational insur-
gencies.  The data for the analysis has been taken from the Non-state Actor Dataset, 
and cover the period from 1945 to 2004. The number of recorded conflicts is aggre-
gated for each year to determine the annual number of domestic and transnational 
insurgencies.  Transnational insurgencies include conflicts with rebel groups that 
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have outside operations or foreign state or non-state actor groups.  Domestic insur-
gencies include conflicts in which rebel groups do not have outside operations of 
foreign supporters.  It also measures complexity of insurgencies by calculating the 
number of insurgencies connected with outside states and/or non-state actors, and 
those that occupy foreign territory.  
 
Results of the empirical analysis 
As demonstrated below by Figure 1-2, the number of overall insurgencies has risen 
from 1 insurgency in 1945 (16 in 1946) to 80 in 1992.  After 1992, the number of 
total insurgencies gradually declined to 39 in 2004.  However, as a percentage, trans-
national insurgencies have increased dramatically over this period.  Figure 1-3 
displays domestic and transnational insurgencies proportionally.  As a percentage of 
all insurgencies, transnational insurgencies have climbed from less that 50% before 
1960, to 87% in 2004.  While total insurgencies decline from 1992 onward, transna-
tional insurgencies increased as a percentage of total insurgencies.  This confirms 
that transnational insurgencies have emerged significantly since the Second World 
War.   
 
Figure 1-2: Domestic and transnational insurgencies 1945-2004 
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Figure 1-3: Domestic and insurgencies and international insurgencies as a 
percentage of total insurgencies 1945-2004 
 
 
 
Having established that transnational insurgencies have increased significant-
ly since 1945, it is also relevant to understand their qualities.  These qualities identify 
what makes an insurgency transnational.  This can include outside state support, out-
side non-state actor support, and outside operations.  Figure 1-5 divides transnational 
insurgencies by category:12   
• Outside operations (without outside support);  
• State supporters (including military and non-military support);  
• Non-state actor supporters (including military and non-military support);  
• Both state and non-state supporters.  
As illustrated by Figure 1-5, the increase in transnational insurgencies represented 
through outside operations, state supporters, transnational non-state actor supporters, 
or combinations of the three.  Until 1965, the majority of transnational insurgencies 
were supported primarily by outside state actors. However, transnational insurgen-
cies have gradually become more complex.  In an increasing number of cases, 
insurgencies involve a combination of transnational activities and or outside support.  
Additionally, the number of transnational insurgencies that rely primarily on outside 
non-state support has also risen from just one (3%) in 1975 to almost 24% in 2004.  
                                                      
12 The categories of ‘state supporters’ and ‘non-state actor supporters’ may support insurgencies with 
‘outside territories’.  In a number of cases, states supply insurgencies with safe havens and other 
forms of support.  Sympathetic non-state actors may also use the safe haven to support the insurgency.  
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Figure 1-5: Domestic and transnational insurgencies by type 
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1.4.1 Theory of causality 
The theory by which the variables ‘cause’ the emergence of transnational insurgen-
cies is based on Kurki’s (2006) theory of ‘constraint and enablement.’  Kurki’s 
theory of causality diverges from other more common IR approaches.  There are 
three root causes that theorists generally use to explain causality: 1) materialism, or 
material based explanations, which ascribes matter as a deterministic driver of cau-
sality and encompasses theories such as structuralism; 2) explanations of causality 
based human agency, in which human actors alone affect causality (Harré & Madden 
1975, p. 5); and 3) explanations of causality based on ideas and social norms, which 
are espoused by many constructivists.  Each explanation of causality on it own has 
potential limitations.  Materialism is criticized because it leads to deterministic out-
comes.  Conversely, the argument that humans are the sole casual forces can lead to 
methodological individualism.  And theories in which ideas and social norms are the 
drivers of causality may unrealistically exclude the influences of the material world 
as well as human agency.   
To establish a more inclusive theory, critical realists in Roy Bhaskar’s tradi-
tion incorporate both human agency and ideas and social norms to form a combined 
theory of causality based on constraining and enabling (Lewis 2000). According to 
the critical realist approach, ideas and social structures do not directly determine the 
outcome, but constrain and enable actors in a way that influences the outcomes.  
Causality under this framework is less direct, because ‘A’ does not directly cause 
‘B’. The human actor affects cause, but may be constrained and enabled by a number 
of factors that influence his outcome.   
Kurki expands this framework to include social structures and ideas as well 
as material factors that do not directly cause an outcome, but may constrain and ena-
ble actors.  As the author notes, this concept of causality avoids, ‘[a] complete 
rejection of material factors (exemplified by idealist strands of thinking) as well as 
the deterministic overtones often attached to more materially based explanations of 
the social world’ (Kurki 2006, p. 207).  Therefore, a framework of ‘constraint and 
enabling’ establishes a concept of causality that involves multiple causal factors, 
which are grounded in human agency.  
Given a causal theory of constraint and enabling, this thesis argues that: a) a 
declining expected value of direct interstate conflict; and, b) an increasing effective-
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ness of transnational insurgencies, affect transnational insurgencies by ‘constraint 
and enabling’ actors.  The variable of direct interstate warfare is theorized to have 
declined since the Second World War because it has been constrained by a declining 
expected value.  These constraints include: 1) the role of advancing technology and 
the existence of nuclear weapons may increase the estimated risk of direct interstate 
warfare; 2) the economic costs of conquest, occupation of a foreign territory, and lost 
trade and investment and the effect on the global market may deter interstate warfare 
(Brooks 2005; E. Gartzke & Rohner 2010); 3) domestic and international institutions 
often constrain the ability of states to engage in interstate warfare either through po-
litical costs or, at the international level, threats of the use of force, sanctions, or 
other actions, and, 4) the idea of war, has declined among major powers.   
Conversely, as transnational insurgencies become increasingly effective, state 
and non-state actors are incentivised (or enabled) to use these groups as a tactic of 
warfare.  Insurgencies have become more effective in large part because advanced 
communications technology and globalization has enabled these groups to engage at 
the transnational level.  Transnational insurgencies possess several potential ad-
vantages.  First, transnational insurgencies have an ability to organize into flexible 
and non-hierarchical structures that are highly adaptive and difficult to detect and 
disrupt (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001; W.W. Powell 1990; Smith-Doerr & Powell 2005; 
Watts 2003).  Second, transnational insurgencies may coordinate with other insur-
gencies and outside groups to expand their area of influence beyond their state lines.   
And, third, transnational insurgencies have increased access to resources and 
support through network actors including: states (Daniel Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, 
Rosenau, & Brannan 2001; Cunningham et al. 2009; K. S. Gleditsch & Beardsley 
2004; Salehyan 2009, 2010); safe havens (Le Billon 2001; Lia & Kjøk 2001); inter-
national criminal groups (Williams 2001); and other insurgencies (Felter & Fishman 
2007; Fishman 2009).  These network actors can provide a wide range of resources 
such as weapons, money laundering, financing, and geographical advantages, mili-
tary support, funding, and even troops.  As transnational insurgencies become 
increasingly effective, state and non-state actors are further incentivised to initiate, 
join, support, or incorporate these groups into their campaigns.  
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1.4.2 Research design 
The research design will employ quantitative and qualitative methods to analyse the 
emergence of transnational insurgencies.  First, a statistical analysis evaluates if and 
to what extent transnational insurgencies have emerged since the Second World War.  
Second, statistical analysis is conducted to determine international trends.  The anal-
ysis evaluates constraints to interstate warfare, including data on the expected 
political costs and risk of direct interstate conflict.  The trend analysis also evaluates 
the aggregate capabilities of insurgencies since the Second World War to determine 
if these groups are becoming more effective. Third, a medium-N study of 186 insur-
gencies since the Second World War is conducted to determine the reasons that 
insurgencies engage at the transnational level.  Fourth, a comparative case study of 
state support of insurgencies is undertaken to determine the drivers of state support 
of insurgencies.  The large-N analysis determines if there are international trends that 
constrain direct interstate conflict and enable transnational insurgencies.  The quali-
tative portions of the research then evaluate if there is a causal link between those 
trends and the emergence of transnational insurgencies.   
The theoretical and empirical sections will also examine alternative argu-
ments.  There may be, for example, alternative variables at the international level that 
explain the changes in insurgencies.  For example, Bergesen and Lizardo (2004) the-
orize that declining hegemon powers lead to increased terrorism.  Others, such as 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) maintain that increasing insurgencies are a result of a post-
Cold War international system.  And a number of scholars argue that insurgencies 
have domestic causes such as poverty and economic inequality (Abadie 2006; 
Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom 2004; T.R. Gurr 1970; Muller & Seligson 1987), and 
other domestic variables, such as political freedom, political instability, terrain, and 
population size (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Krueger & Maleckova 2002).   
 
Research question: has there been a shift from domestic insurgencies to transnational 
insurgent movements and, if so, what factors may be influencing the increase 
of transnational insurgencies?   
Hypothesis:  Contemporary changes in the international system have yielded a de-
creasing expected utility for direct interstate conflict, and an increasing 
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capacity for transnational insurgent movements that result in a higher fre-
quency and level of transnational insurgencies. 
 
There are two variables that are hypothesised to explain the emergence of transna-
tional insurgencies: 1) the expected utility of direct interstate conflict; and, 2) the 
effectiveness of transnational insurgencies.   
Emergence of transnational insurgencies:  Transnational insurgencies are 
categorized as insurgencies with international objectives and operations, or insurgen-
cies that are supported by outside states and non-state actors with international 
objectives.  Examples of insurgencies with regional or international objectives and 
operations include transnational terrorist groups (Enders & Sandler 1993, 1995; 
Hoffman 2006) and militia and guerrilla groups that operate at the transnational lev-
el, such as the Iranian Qods Force (QF) (Felter & Fishman 2008; McFate 2005).  
Insurgencies supported by outside state or non-state actors include groups such as al-
Qaeda–Iraq, which benefitted from multiple state and non-state actor supporters 
(Daniel Byman et al. 2001; K. S. Gleditsch 2007; K. S. Gleditsch & Beardsley 2004; 
Salehyan 2010). 
Variable 1—Expected value of direct interstate conflict:  The expected value 
of a given conflict refers to the net gains anticipated by a state.  It is calculated 
through a function of: a) the estimated economic and non-economic costs of a given 
conflict; b) the anticipated risk or probability of success; and c) and the expected 
benefits, such as a change in policy or acquisition of territory and resources.  The 
change in the expected value of warfare over time is evaluated in three areas: 1) 
changing economic costs of conquest and occupations, and lost trade and investment 
and the effect on the global market (Brooks 2005; E. Gartzke & Rohner 2010); 2) 
advancing technology and changing levels of risk and costs in terms of human life 
and destruction; and 3) domestic an international institutions that constrain the ability 
to engage in direct interstate conflict. 
Variable 2—Transnational insurgency effectiveness:  The effectiveness of 
transnational insurgencies refers to their aggregate effectiveness over time. Transna-
tional insurgencies are believed to be potentially more effective that than domestic 
insurgencies for three reasons:  1) they can pursue interests and operations that are 
regional or international; 2) they can gain support through transnational networks 
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potentially composed of state, non-state actors (including other insurgencies), and 
criminal groups; and, 3) they are able to organise themselves in flat, decentralized 
transnational network structures that are difficult to detect and disrupt.   
The research will involve both quantitative and qualitative methods.  It will 
triangulate a large-N statistical analysis (LNA), a medium-N study of all insurgen-
cies since 1945, and a comparative case study of state support for insurgencies.  
Because the hypothesis espouses that the variables occur at the international level, as 
opposed to domestic causes of insurgencies, a LNA component is deemed appropri-
ate to determine international trends over time.  The LNA, based in the positivist 
approach (King, Keohane, & Verba 1994), tests for trends that establish whether 
there has been a significant emergence of transnational insurgencies, whether the ex-
pected value of interstate war has declined since the Second World War, and whether 
insurgencies have become more effective.  The hypothesis is then be tested qualita-
tively through the medium-N and the comparative case study to develop a ‘deeper 
conception of cause’ by determining how and why the variables affect transnational 
insurgencies (Kurki 2006).  The qualitative chapters also check for a spurious rela-
tionship or alternative explanations.  
Large-N Statistical Analysis (LNA):  The LNA evaluates the claim that insur-
gencies have emerged significantly since the Second World War, evaluates the 
variables of a declining expected value of interstate warfare, and tests for an increas-
ing effectiveness of insurgencies.  The emergence of transnational insurgencies is 
measured by the number of insurgencies with outside interests and operations (phys-
ically located outside the state), or those with outside support (including states, 
insurgencies, non-state actors, and criminal groups).   The expected utility of direct 
interstate war is calculated from indicators of the aggregate costs and risk of war.  
Costs are assessed over time through economic costs and costs of occupations.  And 
risk is measured through relative power internationally. Finally, the effectiveness of 
insurgencies is measured through casualty data of violent non-state actors. 
Multiple data sources will be utilised for the statistical section.  The shift 
from domestic to transnational insurgencies is based on MID data from the Corre-
lates of War (COW), which has been expanded by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and 
Saleyhan (2008).  The resulting dataset, the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars dataset 
(NSA), includes information on rebel group activities since 1945, data on their for-
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eign operations, and their outside state and non-state actors’ support (Salehyan 2010, 
p. 5).  EUGene software is used to determine a quantitative indicator of expected 
utility of war (Bennett & Stam 2000).  A measure of the effectiveness of insurgen-
cies is accomplished through a measure of the number of direct participants in 
insurgencies relative to the population. 
Medium-N analysis:  The medium-N analysis evaluates how and why insur-
gencies interact at the transnational level.  In particular, it determines why some 
insurgencies have remained domestic, while others pursue transnational objectives 
and/or support.   It also determines the extent to which transnational insurgencies 
cross beyond national borderers to expand their resources and capabilities to pursue 
domestic agendas, or to pursue regional or international objectives.  
The data for the medium-N analysis is grounded in the Non-State Actors in 
Civil Wars data set (NSA) developed by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 
(Cunningham et al. 2013), but also incudes information from the Non-State Actor 
Data: Version 3.3 (NSAEX), and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia ("Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program").  The NSA data set is based on the list of conflicts provided 
by the Uppsala University/International Peace Research Institute and Oslo Armed 
Conflicts Dataset, contains data on all rebel groups from 1945 to 2004, and includes 
information on rebel groups involved in conflicts as well as their sources of foreign 
support (Salehyan 2010, p. 5).  The accompanying NSAEX provides descriptive in-
formation on the relevant history of states and governments, related insurgencies, 
and outside supporters.  The information from the NSA data set, NSAEX and outside 
sources qualitative data (consistent with the former) has been compiled into a single 
source.  
Case study:  The case study evaluates state support of insurgencies.  The case 
study reviews the US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001.  In the invasion of Af-
ghanistan, a blended-method was employed in which much of the conflict 
(particularly on the ground) was outsourced to a groups of warlords loosely referred 
to as the Northern Alliance.  The blended approach used in Afghanistan was termed 
the ‘Afghan Model,’ in which regular forces supplied information and air support, 
and irregular forces organised the Northern Alliance on the ground.  The case study 
evaluates why policy makers instead of direct methods employed indirect methods.  
It also reviews the extent to which outsourcing to insurgencies met the goals of over-
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throwing the Taliban government and established a stable state.  The overall objec-
tive of the case study is to render an empirical analysis that explains why states 
outsource conflict to insurgencies.   
The purpose of the empirical sections is to test the hypothesis.  The hypothe-
sis will be rejected under any one of four potential outcomes: 1) the statistical 
analysis does not determine an increase or shift from domestic insurgencies to trans-
national insurgencies; 2) the statistical analysis does not determine that there is an 
empirical correlation between the selected independent variables and the dependent 
variables; 3) the medium-N finds alternative or idiosyncratic causes for transnational 
insurgencies, or it fails to establish evidence that the an increasing effectiveness of 
transnational insurgencies significantly influences non-state actors to operate trans-
nationally; and 4) the comparative case study determines that the shift to 
transnational insurgencies is not significantly influenced by a declining expected 
value of direct interstate conflict (rising risk, costs, and constraints), or is caused 
more significantly by idiosyncratic/domestic explanations, such as historical condi-
tions, or cultural factors.   
 
1.4.3 Advantages and disadvantages of the research methods and data 
The empirical sections of this research employ methods and data that possess ad-
vantages and disadvantages.  These strengths and weaknesses can be found, in large 
part, through the trade-off between large and small-N studies.  Sartori (1970) de-
scribed this trade-off through the ‘ladder of abstraction’, which separates the 
‘intension’ and ‘extension’ of conceptual terms for research.  Extension denotes what 
a conceptual term may be applied to, while intension refers to characteristics that 
must be present to denote a term or concept.  Accordingly, to climb the ladder of ab-
straction, a definition must be changed conceptually to have less ‘intension’ and 
more ‘extension’ (Sartori 1970, p. 1041). 
King, Keohane, & Verba expand on this framework through what they term 
‘bias’ and ‘efficiency’.  An unbiased result is one that can be, ‘replicated across a 
large number of applications’ (King et al. 1994, p. 63).  Efficiency is based on the 
number of observations between ‘unbiased estimators’ (King et al. 1994, p. 66).  
Small-N studies offer more observations for each unit, while large-N studies cover 
more cases but possess fewer observations within cases.  In a hypothetical study of 
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conflict in in West Bank communities, the authors note: ‘We are then faced with a 
trade-off between a case study that has additional observations internal to the case 
and twenty-five cases in which each contains only one observation’ (King et al. 
1994, p. 67).  
Due to their extensive range, large-N studies enable researchers to uncover 
‘generalizations of universal scope and validity’ (Lijphart 1975, p. 172).  At the same 
time, large-N studies possess less depth of analysis within each country.  This can 
result in spurious relationships or ‘Galten’s problem’ whereby, ‘an empirical rela-
tionship found in several societies may be a true causal line, but may also be the 
result of historical learning; the linked characteristic may simply have been diffused 
together’ (Lijphart 1975, p. 171).  Furthermore, a high level of abstraction may make 
it difficult to determine which are the independent and dependent variables.  Small-N 
studies, on the other hand, can offer more robust analyses of cases and are more apt 
to determine if and how the causal relationship works between the independent and 
dependent variables.  Conversely, small-N studies are more prone to Sartori’s ‘trav-
eling problem’, or the possibility that a study lacks a universal scope, and 
‘conceptual stretching’, which refers to increasing the extension of a concept without 
diminishing the intension (Sartori 1970, pp. 1033-4).13   
One method that can address the trade-off of scope and depth is the joint use 
of a case study (or studies) with a large-N analysis.  Lieberman’s ‘nested analysis’ 
research design, for example, utilizes a large-N study to determine basic correlations, 
and then employs a case study to test and more vigorously investigate causality 
(Lieberman 2005).  This thesis offers a similar framework to Lieberman’s model.  At 
the large-N level, the study evaluates three empirical trends (since World War II): 1) 
a quantitative emergence of transnational insurgencies; 2) a declining overall ex-
pected value of direct interstate warfare; and 3) a net increase in the capabilities of 
insurgencies.  The large-N analyses evaluate trends over time and test for falsifica-
tion of the hypotheses, but do not evaluate causality between variables.  A deeper 
analysis is then conducted through a case study (and analyses of existing studies) to 
determine if an increasing expected value of war and rising capabilities of insurgen-
                                                      
13 Research design can limit the extent of these disadvantages.  For example, large-N analyses may be designed 
with greater efficiency within cases or use lag variables and other techniques to test for causality.  Small-N stud-
ies may also be designed with conceptual terms that enable a wider scope and avoid problems of traveling or 
conceptual stretching.  
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cies are linked to the emergence of transnational insurgencies, and how and why the-
se relationships exists.   
The use of mixed methods minimizes some of the disadvantages of small and 
large-N studies, but these methods remain prone to many of the same drawbacks.  
The large-N analyses are based on extensive conceptual terms that lack intensive dis-
tinctions.  The definition of transnational insurgencies, for example, includes 
insurgencies with transnational operations and interests and/or outside state and/or 
non-state actor support.  This definition examines the intended hypothesis but creates 
a broad category for transnational insurgencies.14  Similarly, the capabilities of in-
surgencies are based on the aggregate number of participants for all insurgencies in a 
given year.  This proxy measure is an optimal method in which to assess the aggre-
gate capabilities of insurgencies over time.  However, it does not include more 
intensive concepts and measures, such as the range and scope of operations and out-
side support or the extent of transnational insurgency networks.   
The data measures themselves also have strengths and weaknesses.  The 
quantitative measure of insurgencies and transnational insurgencies counts each in-
surgency within a given year equally without scaling for the size or scope of 
operations.  This more conservative measure prevents skewing data in support of a 
few large insurgencies and avoids problems of imprecise estimates of the scope and 
impact of insurgencies.  However, it may also undervalue the extent to which trans-
national insurgencies have emerged and the influence of large regional and 
international insurgent movements.   
Similarly, the expected value of direct interstate warfare is based on: 1) 
measures of asymmetry of power; 2) the congruence of preferences between state 
dyads; and 3) the levels of executive constraint within states.  These indicators have 
undergone equilibrium testing in outside studies to determine their effectiveness in 
predicting direct interstate warfare.  However, the data have limitations in that they 
do not include the impact of nuclear weapons or measures of international constraints 
(e.g. treaties).  Methodologies for measuring the casualty data and trends in conflict 
over time are also disputed by scholars.  The categories of direct and indirect con-
                                                      
14 This is addressed in part through separate analyses that break down insurgencies into subcategories.  Chapter 1 
separates insurgencies by types of outside support and operations.  Similarly, Chapter 3 combines qualitative and 
quantitative methods to categorize insurgencies by domestic, international, and regional operations and insurgen-
cy objectives. 
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flict, the methodologies for measuring casualties, and the required battle-deaths 
threshold for a conflict are debated and differ between studies.15 
While the methods and data of the empirical sections of this research possess 
advantages and disadvantages, the research design is intended to diminish weakness-
es.  The study develops unbiased conceptual terms and establishes subcategories to 
enable more in-depth analyses.  Mixed methods are also employed to enable a larger 
study of insurgencies over time, while analysing the causal variables through an in-
tensive case study and comparative analyses of existing studies.  Additionally, the 
data used is often based on robust indicators that have been tested in outside studies.  
Nevertheless, each concept, measure, and method has inherent limitations in repre-
senting accurate models of reality.   
 
1.5 Benefits of the research 
The objective of this research is to determine if the transnational insurgencies have 
international causes and to identify those causes.  Two variables are hypothesised to 
explain the emergence of transnational insurgencies: a decreasing expected utility to 
direct interstate conflict, and an increasing capacity of transnational insurgencies.  
The answers to these questions are designed to build a greater understanding of how 
transnational insurgencies function, how and why state actors engage with transna-
tional insurgencies, and how this dynamic affects warfare and international relations. 
The broader role of non-state actors that act (violently or non-violently) at the 
international level is a subject that has been researched.  Several theories exist that 
involve transnational insurgent networks, networking, and global governance.  Susan 
Strange (1996) in The Retreat of the State assesses the role of international markets 
as transferring authority away from the state.  Similarly, the increasing role of trans-
national networks, involving non-state actors, transnational insurgencies and criminal 
organisations, has led to theoretical work on global networks and the changing power 
structures of the state.   
Jessica Mathews (1997) advances the idea that, since the end of the Cold War, 
nations are increasingly ‘sharing powers—including political, social, and security 
                                                      
15 For example, the Correlates of War project (COW datasets) use a threshold of 1,000 annual battle-deaths to 
code an armed conflict, while the Uppsala dataset on armed conflict has a threshold of 25 battle-deaths (N. P. 
Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand 2002, p. 615).  Similarly, outcomes for casualty data 
analysis by Sarkees et al. (2003) differ from those of Lacina et al. (2006) regarding trends in intrastate, interna-
tionalized intrastate, interstate, and extrastate warfare due to differing methods for assessing casualties.  
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roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, 
and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOS)’ (1997, p. 50).  She goes on to explain that while the absolutes of the West-
phalian system are dissolving, ‘Nontraditional threats, however, are rising—
terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, ethnic conflict, and the combination of 
rapid population growth, environmental decline, and poverty that breeds economic 
stagnation, political instability, and, sometimes, state collapse (1997, pp. 50-1). 
 Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that the shift to global networks has ensured 
that the state no longer functions as a unitary actor, but has diffused power to net-
worked organisation: ‘States still exist in this world; indeed, they are crucial actors. 
But they are ‘disaggregated’. They relate to each other not only through the Foreign 
Office, but also through regulatory, judicial, and legislative channels’ (Slaughter 
2004, p. 5).16  Others study international insurgencies within the context of security 
studies and counterinsurgency strategy, such as network forms of governance and 
military organisation (Cebrowski & Garstka 1998; Kilcullen 2005; McFarlane 2000).   
Despite a growing literature on non-state actors, transnational insurgencies, 
and network warfare, most prominent IR security theories assume or argue for state-
centric frameworks, possibly resulting in a theoretical gap that does not account for 
the role of emerging transnational groups.17  Idean Salehyan, for example, argues 
that: ‘Theories and empirical analysis of international conflict have adopted a state-
centric bias, ignoring the substitution between direct uses of force and indirect action 
through rebel organizations’ (Salehyan 2010, p. 1).  In a similar vein, Elke Krah-
mann notes that the key theoretical approaches to security studies, ‘are based on the 
assumption that states are the primary source of insecurity to each other and that they 
are also the sole actors worthy of consideration that provide for national and interna-
tional security’ (Krahmann 2005, pp. 19-20). 
Most IR security theories still assume or argue for state-centric frameworks.  
Realism argues a state-based threat of war and deterrence (Morgenthau 1972), and 
neorealism assumes states as unitary actors within an international system of states 
                                                      
16 See also Cebrowski and Garstaka (1998), McFarlane (2000), and Kilcullen (2005) for research on 
transnational networks and insurgencies within the context of security studies and counterinsurgency 
strategy such as network forms of governance and military organisation.   
17 There are exceptions.  For example, Bergesen and Lizardo (2004) and Lizardo and Bergesen (2003) 
evaluate clusters or waves of transnational terrorism in relation to ‘world systems’, defined by declin-
ing hegemony, globalization, and empire.  See also: Elke Krahmann (2003, 2005, 2004). 
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with various explanations of balancing power, deterrence, and causes for warfare be-
tween the states (Glaser 1997; Jervis 1978; Mearsheimer 2001; Organski & Kugler 
1980; Waltz 1979).  Other rationalist theories, such as the expected utility theory of 
war, employ an analysis of the potential costs and benefits of interstate war given the 
probability of success versus failure (Bueno de Mesquita 1980).  Game theory and 
recent bargaining literature combines rationalist assumptions with dyadic analysis 
between states to predict state behaviour and causes of conflict (Fearon 1995; Fey & 
Ramsay 2007; Filson & Werner 2002; R. Powell 1999; Slantchev 2003; Wagner 
2000).   
Other prominent IR theories explain the cause of war, or avoidance of it, at 
the national level.  Liberalism contends that the types of state regimes, their econom-
ic ties with other sates, and the constraining role of international institutions affect 
war between states.  The theory asserts that democracies tend not to fight other de-
mocracies, and that economic integration and international institutions have the 
ability to deter interstate warfare (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith 
1999; Oneal & Russett 1997).  The role of state-level actors, such as leaders within 
states or the culture, is also evaluated as a cause for war between states.  For exam-
ple, poor domestic circumstances in a democratic state may lead to a ‘diversionary 
war’ to relieve domestic scrutiny (DeRouen 2000).  The tendency of new democra-
cies to go to war has been explored, as well as the types of state nationalism that may 
make war more likely (Mansfield & Snyder 1995, 2002; Mansfield & Snyder 2005; 
S. Van Evera 1994).   
The role of transnational insurgencies, if caused by changes at the interna-
tional level, has implications for warfare and international relations.  First, threats are 
increasingly being realised from non-state actors.  Addressing these emerging 
threats, which are not defined by borders, can in some ways be hindered by the sov-
ereignty of the state in which these non–state actors operate.  Many insurgencies are 
able to use state territory as a shield without the consent of the state or with the offi-
cial or unofficial consent of the state.  Furthermore, the involvement of the state with 
transnational insurgencies can be understood as an indirect method of warfare that 
has implications for international relations theory.  For example, liberals hold that 
international institutions, economic integration, and democratic regimes can deter 
warfare.  States, however, often support insurgencies covertly.  Hence, the use of in-
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direct warfare by supporting insurgencies can evade political constraints to war, and, 
in fact, those constraints may even incentivise the use of indirect methods as an al-
ternative to direct interstate conflict.  The application of indirect warfare has 
implications for other IR theories as well. 
In conclusion, the purpose of this research is to determine what has caused 
the emergence of transnational insurgencies, how transnational insurgencies func-
tion, and why and how states and non-state actors employ indirect methods through 
these groups.  The answers to these questions may also be relevant to IR theory and 
foreign policy strategy.    
 
1.5.1 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this research will evaluate if and to what extent the emergence of 
transnational insurgencies has been influenced by international changes.  The study 
will evaluate two international variables theorised to significantly affect international 
relations: a declining expected utility of warfare, and an increasing capacity of trans-
national insurgent movements, which may lead to increasing use of transnational 
insurgencies.  The proposed independent variables will be evaluated through a quan-
titative analysis, and medium-N evaluation of insurgent movements since 1945, and 
a comparative case study of state support for insurgencies.   
Chapter two evaluates the existing literature on insurgencies and the two the-
orised explanatory variables: a declining expected utility of direct interstate conflict, 
and an increasing capacity of transnational insurgencies.  The arguments for a de-
creasing expected utility of interstate conflict include: increased technology and 
nuclear weapons that may increase the risk of warfare; increased economic costs of 
conquest, occupation, lost trade and investment, and the effect on the global market; 
domestic an international institutions that constrain the ability to engage in interstate 
conflict; and, constructivist arguments that interstate conflict has declined as an idea.  
The section will also evaluate whether direct interstate conflict is declining, or shift-
ing to indirect methods.   
Additionally, Chapter 2 establishes a theoretical argument for increasing ef-
fectiveness of transnational insurgencies.  This section addresses the impact 
advancing communications technology, which are argued to enable transnational 
networks.  Transnational insurgent networks are thought to benefit from elastic, de-
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centralised, non-hierarchical organisational structures that are difficult to detect and 
disrupt.  Additionally, it is thought that transnational insurgent networks are able to 
engage with outside actors including states, other insurgencies, and non-state actors 
for increasing access to military support, financial resources, money laundering, 
weapons, and safe havens.   
Chapter 3 provides a large-N statistical analysis.  The analysis determines 
whether the expected value of interstate conflict has declined since the Second World 
War, and whether the effectiveness of insurgencies has increased during the same 
period.  The statistical analysis aggregates indicators of the expected utility of war 
including: power asymmetries (risk), cost of occupation and economic interdepend-
ence (economic costs), and the relative number of democracies and autocracies 
(political constraints).  The chapter also uses UN data to determine the level of di-
verging state interests to assess whether direct interstate conflict has declined 
because there is less political incentive.   
Chapter 4 is a review of the exiting literature and empirical studies regarding 
state foreign intervention in outside states and external support for insurgencies.  The 
chapter reviews the quantitative trends of foreign intervention since the Second 
World War.  It also evaluates the strategies and drivers of foreign intervention, and 
analyses the expansive empirical research on the reasons for foreign intervention.   
Chapter 5 reviews the theories of transnational insurgent networks, and ar-
gues that an the emergence of transnational networks has increased the effectiveness 
of insurgencies and expanded their capabilities.  The chapter reviews network theory, 
and analyses the organisational structures of transnational networks and the ad-
vantages and disadvantages, and the ability to acquire international resources and 
expertise and pursue objectives and activities beyond their borders.  The study also 
provides a medium-N study of 187 insurgent movements since 1945, quantitatively 
measures the changing dynamics of insurgencies and their aggregate capabilities 
over time, and examines why some insurgencies remain domestic, while others es-
tablish transnational objectives and/or networks with outside actors.  
Chapter 6 is a case study of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, or Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  The study develops a theoretical framework for state outsourc-
ing to insurgencies as an alternative to direct interstate conflict, or what is referred to 
as delegation (Salehyan 2010, 2010).  Additionally, this chapter reviews the methods 
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employed by states to outsource, and their specific advantages and disadvantages.  
Chapter 6 then evaluates the historical process of the decision to employ indirect 
methods instead of direct methods in Afghanistan, and how effective the indirect 
strategy was to the goals of overthrowing the Taliban government and establishing a 
stable state.  The results are used to test the relevance of a changing expected value 
of warfare and effectiveness of insurgencies, and to look for alternative or additional 
explanations.   
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2  Theoretical Framework: The Expected Value of Warfare and 
Outsourcing to Insurgencies 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The emergence of transnational insurgencies is theorised here to involve two factors: 
a declining value of interstate warfare and an increasing effectiveness of insurgen-
cies.  There is a wide range of research that examines whether the utility of warfare 
and the attitudes towards warfare are shifting, and whether those changes affect the 
impetus and ability of the states to engage in warfare.  A declining value of warfare 
is espoused to take place in a couple of ways.  The ability of states to effectively 
wage interstate wars with other states may be declining as rising costs of warfare and 
diminishing benefits render war unprofitable, as expanding domestic and internation-
al political factors constrain or obstruct war between states, and as attitudes change 
regarding the required sacrifice and risks of conflict.  Additionally, the perceived 
value of warfare may be falling as societies are becoming less interested in warfare 
as human nature, ideas, and culture evolve or are influenced by domestic and interna-
tional norms.  Accordingly, a declining value of interstate warfare may influence 
states to pursue their objectives through non-violent means, or to shift the means of 
violence to indirect methods of warfare.  This study argues that in many cases states 
are turning to indirect methods of warfare (or outsourcing to insurgent groups) to 
adapt to a declining value of direct interstate warfare.  
This chapter evaluates the theoretical arguments and studies of both a declin-
ing value of interstate warfare, and the theories and evidence that interstate warfare 
has been pacified, deterred, or has shifted to indirect methods.  Section one evaluates 
the declining value of warfare through: the impact of changing technology and eco-
nomics on the utility of warfare, a society’s willingness to engage in war, the impact 
of domestic institutions and international politics to constrain (or enable) interstate 
warfare, and the possibility of a changing moral value that societies ascribe to war-
fare.  Section two then evaluates arguments that a declining expected utility of 
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interstate warfare deters or pacifies conflict between states, or incentivizes the use of 
indirect methods, or outsourcing to insurgencies.   
 
2.2 Decline of the state and direct interstate warfare 
Many theorists argue that interstate warfare has been declining in value, or expected 
value.  The term ‘value’ can refer to different concepts.  Coker sets forth three di-
mensions of warfare.  The instrumental dimension refers to a state’s rational 
economic or political interests.  The existential and metaphysical dimensions refer to 
the meaning warfare has to humans: the existential nature of war denotes war’s 
meaning for the warrior or society; the metaphysical dimension represents a society’s 
perceived need for sacrifice (Coker 2004, p. 6).  All three are influenced by the inter-
ests of the state, the costs and constraints associated with warfare, and the attitudes 
and dispositions of societies, leaders, and warriors regarding conflict.  
A number of changing factors may influence the real or perceived value of in-
terstate warfare.  First, evolving technology and economic systems can alter the 
instrumental costs and benefits of warfare, the risk of casualties, and the perceived 
inclination or disinclination towards warfare.  Second, domestic institutions and in-
ternational politics and power may constrain (or enable) warfare by creating political 
costs (or incentives) and risks for war, and may also build common norms and identi-
ties that influence state interests.  And, third, changes in human history and culture 
can influence (and possibly negate) the impetus of societies to engage in conflict. 
Prior to engaging in warfare, societies and decision makers within states must 
assess their expected value for a given conflict.  The expected utility of war theory 
uses formal modelling to theorise a state’s decision to go to war based on: the antici-
pated benefit of a conflict (if successful), the estimated costs (economic, human, 
political, and other), and the projected risk of a given conflict.18  The term ‘value’ or 
‘expected value’ of warfare is used here to emphasise both utilitarian and non-
utilitarian interests and costs.  These elements include economic utility, loss of life 
(on both sides), risk, and attitudes and interests regarding warfare.  Some thinkers 
                                                      
18 The expected utility of war’ framework is based an a game theory approach created by Newmann 
and Morgenstern (1944) and later expanded by Bueno de Mosqiuta (1980, 1983, 1985), Bueno de 
Mesquita and Lalman (1992), James Fearon  (1995), and Bennett and Stam (2000) and others.  A 
more detailed explanation of the expected utility of war theory is developed in the proceeding chap-
ters.   
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believe that a declining value (or expected value) of warfare will serve to pacify or 
deter interstate conflict, and even pave a road to the end of war.  Others (as espoused 
here) maintain that as states become less able to engage effectively in interstate war-
fare, they increasingly adopt alternative methods of conflict.  
 
2.2.1 Technological changes and the value of interstate warfare 
Technology has always defined part of the character of warfare.  However, techno-
logical changes during 19th century warfare began to progress more rapidly, and 
became crucial to the success of armies.  Hence, evolving technology has trans-
formed and is transforming how we fight wars, the associated costs (both economic 
and human), risks, and sentiments regarding war.  Technology is argued to reduce 
the value of war through evolving weapons that increase the cost, sacrifice, and risk 
of conflict; thereby diminishing both the value of interstate warfare as a means to 
pursue objectives and societies’ inclination to use it.  Hence, some scholars believe 
that advancing technology can constrain the state’s ability and impetus to engage in 
war, and even completely deter its use.   
George Brinton McClellan, who would later fight in the American Civil War, 
was dispatched to Sebastopol to study the Crimean War.  There he would observe 
trench warfare involving high casualties, disruptions in the logistical support re-
quired for siege operations, and disease that accounted for over half of the casualties.  
Later, in the American Civil War, McClellan served as general-in-chief of the Union 
Army, but the impacting memory of Sebastopol is believed by some to have caused 
him to hesitate at key moments (Sifakis 1988).19  In a devastating example, McClel-
lan attempted to advance to Richmond by in a route between the James and York 
Rivers.  The strategy was successful, but McClellan refused to advance fully and be-
gan a siege operation at Yorktown, enabling General Johnson to bring in 
reinforcements and then withdraw: a pattern of overestimating the enemy and hesi-
tating that led President Lincoln to suspend him from command in 1862.   
                                                      
19 Other explanations exist for McClellen’s hesitation and use of siege tactics.  For example, Alan 
Pinkerton who headed McClellen’s secret service tended to overestimate the size of the Confederate 
forces.  Additionally, there were some who believed that McClellen’s affiliation to the Democrat Par-
ty made him ultimately sympathetic to the South.  For a more detailed history of the period see James 
M. McPherson’s (1988) Battle cry of freedom: The Civil War Era. 
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Jean de Bloch, a civilian war expert of the late nineteenth century, understood 
that advancing weapon technology would alter warfare: In his papers and book 
(1899) entitled: Is War Now Impossible?  Bloch examines the changing technologies 
of weapons and their impact on warfare.  According to Bloch, the magazine rifle, 
smokeless powder, the flat bullet trajectory, and the three-millimetre bore, expanded 
the range and accuracy of the artillery, which extended the distance between the op-
posing sides and led to greater use of trench warfare.  The area in between the 
opposing sides could be crossed, ‘but only with an offensive superiority of eight to 
one over the defensive. Thus, the effect of greater firepower was to separate out the 
two opposing armies and introduce long, indecisive, siege-type wars’ (Travers, 1979, 
p. 266).  Bloch notes, ‘The technical aspect of war is no longer what it was: the 
changes it has undergone are as great as those which steam achieved in inter-oceanic 
traffic’ (J. D. Bloch 1901, p. 306).   
Bloch maintained that advances in technology would ultimately undermine 
the utility and, therefore, the occurrence of interstate war.  As he states: ‘From a 
purely technical point of view, then, I hope to prove that war, as a means of deciding 
misunderstandings between nations, is no longer efficacious’ (J. D. Bloch 1901, p. 
306).  Although the technology that Bloch believed would make war obsolete was 
subsequently used in the wars that followed, his assessment of the rising costs and 
casualties of warfare (or its declining value) was largely accurate.  As B. H. Liddell 
Hart (1932) would later note, Bloch closely predicted the nature of military conflict 
in the coming two world wars.   
The events of Hiroshima and the Cold War period that followed is also con-
sidered by some to be a pivotal point in which technology significantly influenced 
the real and perceived value of warfare.  War between superpowers, particularly 
atomic war, involves high levels of risk, human suffering, and destruction, which are 
thought to render interstate warfare inefficacious and undesirable.  Many scholars 
and policy makers consider nuclear weapons to be an increasing, if not sufficient, 
deterrent to war.  Bernard Brodie in, The Absolute Weapon, made one of the early 
claims that while traditionally the objective of war was to win: ‘From now on its 
chief purpose must be to avert them.  It can have almost no other useful purpose’ 
(Brodie 1946, p. 76).  Both Churchill and Truman noted that the dangerous potential 
of nuclear weapons could also deter warfare (Gaddis 1999, pp. 1-2).  Along a similar 
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line of reasoning, in November of 1985 Reagan and Gorbachev meeting in Geneva 
noted that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought (Kaysen 1990, p. 42).   
Deterrence became the central objective of the Cold War, and the neorealist 
claim that nuclear weapons could deter major power conflicts, at least within a bipo-
lar scenario, emerged as a central theme in international relations studies.  Some, 
such as Waltz, contend that even under a multi-polar system, ‘the probability of ma-
jor war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero’ (Waltz 1988, pp. 
626-7).  The absence of major war that followed the Second World War, or the ‘long 
peace’ is based largely on the impeding risk and potential costs and destruction 
posed by nuclear weapons (Gaddis 1987, 1999; Kegley Jr 1991; Saperstein 1991).  
The idea that atomic weapons have increased the cost, risks, and unattrac-
tiveness of war is a relatively tenable (although not unchallenged) claim.20  But, like 
Bloch’s assertion that advancing firepower would gradually cause warfare between 
states to disappear, the idea the nuclear weapons can completely avert warfare (or 
lead to peace) is more contentious.  Richard Pipes (1997), for example, maintains 
that leaders within the Soviet Union believed that they could win in a nuclear battle.  
Hans J. Morgenthau (1972) in the early years of the Cold War did not view nuclear 
weapons as and end of major power war, but was instead concerned that the United 
Sates and the Soviet Union would stumble into a nuclear war.  Some also suspect 
that nuclear deterrence succeeds primarily in a bipolar environment.  John 
Mearsheimer, for example, acknowledges the risk in moving from a bipolar to multi-
polar nuclear scenario (Mearsheimer 1990).  Similarly, Alvin M. Saperstein asserts 
that ‘the regime of stability decreases as the system complexity increases,’ conclud-
ing that a shift to a tripolar world would be less stable (Saperstein 1991, p. 68). 
Other arguments assert the possibility of warfare despite deterrence.  Robert 
Jarvis notes that in some cases fighting a war with high costs and risk may remain 
the best option.  He explains: ‘It is rational to start a war one does not expect to win 
(to be more technical, whose expected utility is negative), if it is believed that the 
likely consequences of not fighting are even worse’ (Jervis 1988, p. 81).  Additional-
ly, Randolph Siverson and Michael Ward, in a study entitled, ‘The Long Peace: A 
Reconsideration’, argue that the espoused ‘long peace’ is not significant or unusual, 
                                                      
20 Some scholars, for example, argue that war is declining irrespective o technological change.  See: 
Mueller (1988, 1990, 2004); and Pinker (2011). 
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finding that: ‘Historical periods of major power peace are frequently as long as forty-
two years’ (Siverson & Ward 2002, p. 690).  While there is evidence that technology 
has increased the costs and risks of interstate warfare, it is debatable to what extent 
that increasing firepower and nuclear weapons can deter interstate warfare.   
A third area of technological development is referred to as the Revolution of 
Military Affairs (RMA).  While technology is generally considered to render warfare 
more costly and deadly, the RMA is argued to reduce the risks and casualties of con-
flict, and adversity to warfare.  The RMA began in the 1980s as Soviet general 
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov saw the potential of increasingly effective conventional 
weapons.  The US Department of Defense and Western allies continued the devel-
opment of RMA technology during and following the Cold War and expanded the 
concept to include advanced systems of military organization (Cohen 1996, p. 39).21  
RMA technology was first truly tested in Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991, 
and subsequently in Operation Allied Force Kosovo (largely through air campaigns) 
in 1999, and again in Iraq through Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. 
The RMA was made up of three key areas: 1) increasing use of air power; 2) 
advancing information systems; and, 3) networked military structures and precision 
weaponry.  Under the RMA some militaries have shifted from large slow-moving 
(platform) systems to faster more agile (networks) systems (Cebrowski & Garstka 
1998), and employ advanced weapons and information technology, or C4ISRT 
(Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Re-
connaissance, and Targeting) capabilities (Pardesi 2005, p. 1).  The evolution of 
information technology is considered central to the RMA.  ‘Systems of systems’, as 
originally termed by Admiral William Owens, denotes, ‘a world in which the many 
kinds of sensors, from satellites to shipborne radar, from unmanned aerial vehicles to 
remotely planted acoustic devices provide information…Thus a helicopter might 
launch a missile at a tank a dozen miles away…’ (Cohen 1996, p. 40).  Owens and 
others profess that the RMA has significantly altered the character (or even the na-
ture) of warfare.   
                                                      
21 There have been several revolutions in military affairs (RMAs).  As defined by Gray (2001), an 
RMA is, ‘a radical change in the character and conduct of war (e.g. edged weapons to gunpowder, 
mercenary armies to national armies, reinvention of combined-arms land warfare led by indirect artil-
lery fire in 1917–18, nuclear weapons).  
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Traditionally, the nature of warfare has been understood through Clause-
witz’s trinitarian concept of war: a chaotic interaction of violent emotions, chance 
(friction) and policy (Clausewitz 1832/1976).  Conversely, the RMA was argued to 
diminish (or even remove) uncertainty, chaos, and the ‘fog of war’ through: ‘unprec-
edented fidelity, comprehension, and timeliness; by night or day, in any kind of 
weather, all the time’ (Owens & Offley 2000, p. 14).  Hence, the more excessive 
claims of the RMA offered a new kind of warfare to societies, leaders, and warriors.  
As former Deputy Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence, Paul Dibb, 
notes: 
The expectation of relatively lower casualties, even in prospective 
higher-intensity conflicts…should bolster US confidence in its military 
commitments at a time when the general population's tolerance of cas-
ualties is declining.  With a dominant RMA force, the US will be able 
to conduct military operations with lower risks’ (Dibb 1997, p. 105).  
Furthermore, the RMA expectation of low casualties and destruction may 
threaten to remove, ‘the concept of sacrifice from the equation’ (Coker 2004, p. 130).  
While the increasing firepower of the Crimean War and the high casualties of other 
wars may have heightened awareness and public aversion to casualties (at least in the 
West), the RMA claimed to diminish loss of life on both sides.  Transforming con-
cepts of sacrifice can reorient societal expectations and attitudes towards warfare.  
Thomas A. Keaney asserts that Operation Dessert Storm not only broke new ground 
in the operational sense, but also marked a new political threshold for war: ‘…among 
them heightened Western sensitivity to casualties, both friendly and enemy’ (Keaney 
& Cohen 1995, p. 214). 
There are a number of sceptics that challenge the more extreme RMA claims 
that promise to significantly reduce risk and casualties of warfare or to even created 
zero-casualty and zero-risk conflict (Freedman 1998; Murray 1997; Michael E 
O'Hanlon 2000).  Another point of contention is whether the RMA is merely a tactic 
of war, or goes further to change the nature of war.  Gray, for example, describes 
Owens’ claims to revolutionize warfare as a, ‘hubris and general lack of respect for 
Clausewitz’s master concept of friction’ (C. Gray 2001, p. 54).  Similarly, Justin 
Kelly states:  
The resulting chaos means that each war… will change, unpredictably 
and continuously, throughout its course. This then is the immutable na-
ture of war; it is a political act—a social, cultural and political 
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phenomenon that will constantly seek to escape human control in order 
to establish an independent existence’ (Kelly 2008, p. 90). 
Some also argue that the greater claims of the RMA (the real or misunder-
stood promise of low-casualty, low-risk warfare) encourage politicians, warriors, and 
societies to be more risk-taking towards warfare.  As a result, the RMA technologies 
and strategies are thought to have an adverse affect on deterrence if decision makers 
are, ‘less constrained by their RMA-ed militaries, which would offer them the capa-
bility to take military action across the spectrum of military operations at relatively 
low costs and risks’ (Pardesi 2005, p. 25).  As Jeffrey Record explains, ‘the very 
technology that makes ‘bloodless’ war possible may also serve to encourage the use 
of force in circumstances where perceptions of stakes and risks might otherwise 
counsel restraint’ (Record 2000, p. 20).  Gray further argues that much of the West’s 
(and especially Britain and America’s) contemporary willingness to intervene in for-
eign quarrels is, ‘highly contingent on a very demanding set of military expectations 
keyed to zero–low friendly casualties’ (C. Gray 2001, p. 52)  
The expectation of low casualties may embolden the propensity to engage in 
warfare, but may also lead to risk–averse warfare.  Record traces casualty sensitivity 
in the U.S. back to the Vietnam War.22  The author submits that increasing U.S. use 
of air power and interventions in failing states is in part due to, ‘a casualty-phobic 
political and military leadership’ and ‘the availability of new military technologies 
that seem to permit effective military intervention, primarily from the air, at little 
costs in friendly military and even enemy civilian casualties’ (Record 2002, p. 5).  
This excessive casualty avoidance may undermine combat.  As Albert Palazzo ex-
plains: ‘When a nation adopts a policy of casualty avoidance it lessens its ability to 
use force in the pursuit of national goals, creates a perception that war can be waged 
without risk to personnel, and sends an ambiguous message to potential adversaries’ 
(Palazzo 2008, p. 66).  Palazzo goes on to argue that Osama bid Laden, Slobodan 
Milosevic, and Saddam Hussein were fortified by a belief in a low US casualty toler-
                                                      
22 As Record (2002) explains, casualty aversion may be ‘situation specific’, or determined by the level 
of national interest or necessity, and therefore, may not be as low as many politicians in the U.S. esti-
mate.  Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelp (2011) also argue that U.S. casualty tolerance is higher 
than thought, but hinges of the perceived importance of the foreign policy objectives. 
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ance and had an incentive to, ‘try to kill US troops in the hope that body bags would 
paralyze a superpower and force a withdrawal’ (Palazzo, p. 69).23  
Gray also warned of the false sense of low-casualty and low-risk warfare: 
‘Dazzled by our own prospective military brilliance, we can forget that a well moti-
vated and competent, if materially challenged, foe is going to be looking hard for 
asymmetrical sources of strategic leverage against us’ (C. Gray 2001, p. 55).  Gray’s 
warning foreshadowed the long, casualty intensive occupation of Iraq that followed 
the expeditious 2001 U.S. led invasion.  As Max Boot contends: ‘Many people had 
come to assume that Desert Storm (total U.S. casualty rate: 0.1 per cent) was the new 
norm.’  He goes onto note: ‘The occupation of Iraq showed how savage real war 
could be–and how little protection information technology offered against a cunning 
and ruthless foe’ (Boot 2006, p. 417).  The influence of the RMA has waned in large 
part because wars since have demonstrated limitations of technology to change the 
nature of warfare. 
 
2.2.2 Economic changes and the value of interstate warfare 
The economic gains from warfare are thought to be diminishing in part because of 
the development of increasingly destructive technologies.  In addition, economic 
changes are espoused to elevate the economic cost of severing trade and economic 
linkages while rendering conquest and occupations unprofitable.  These changes in 
the economic utility of warfare may constrain the ability of states to engage efficient-
ly in warfare, and instead encourage the use of non-violent means of pursuing 
economic objectives.   
As early as the 1800s and 1900s, several thinkers espoused the possibility that 
interstate trade could diminish interstate conflict. Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, 
Immanuel Kant, Thomas Paine, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Charles de Secondat Mon-
tesquieu, and John Stuart Mill, all believed that trade between states could deter 
warfare.  Two authors in particular argued that trade would pacify warfare, or even 
make it obsolete.  Norman Angell’s classic The Great Illusion was first published in 
the United Kingdom in 1909 under the title Europe's Optical Illusion, and espoused 
that international economic trade would diminish the value of war until it became 
                                                      
23 For more information on casualty sensitivity as well as the perceptions of Osama bid Laden, Slo-
bodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, see: Feaver and Gelpi (2011), Chapter 2. 
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ultimately obsolete (Angell 1910/1933).  Angell argued that war between states inev-
itably involves the direct costs of conflict, the opportunity costs of lost trade, and 
declining gains of conquest.  Similarly, in, England, Ireland, and America, Richard 
Cobden, who was nicknamed the ‘Apostle of Free Trade’ for his work to repeal the 
Corn Laws, argued that free trade could lead to peace while government controlled 
trade would lead to war (Cobden 1835).  For Cobden, enabling the free movement of 
people, goods, and capital through free trade would diminish the impetus for war, 
because desired resources would be readily available across state lines.   
Both Cobden and Angell believed that states could gain a higher utility from 
trade than from engaging in conflict.  Like Bloch, their arguments–particularly those 
of Angell–would be empirically refuted by the two world wars that followed.  Never-
theless, the authors set the framework for the school of international liberalism that 
would re-emerge.  Since Angell and Cobden’s writings, scholars have analysed the 
potentially pacific influence of advancing economic systems.  First, economic link-
ages, or economic interconnectedness (or interdependence), are thought to increase 
the costs of war and facilitate pacific norms between states.  And, second, the in-
creasing complexity and transnational nature of economic systems is professed to 
render conquest and occupations unprofitable.  
 
Interdependence and economic linkages 
A number of scholars in the 1970s observed increasing levels of economic depend-
ence (or interdependence) between states, and the potential influence it had on 
foreign relations and power.  Richard Cooper notes, ‘the trend toward greater eco-
nomic interdependence among countries will require substantial changes in their 
approach to foreign policy in the next decade or so’ (Cooper 1972, p. 159). The 
school of neoliberalism and a literature on transnational trade emerged to analyse the 
influence of economic dependence, interdependence and ‘complex interdependence’ 
on power relations between states (Keohane 1988, 1990; Keohane & Nye 1973, 
1974, 1987).   
Liberal thinkers argue more directly that economic interdependence alters the 
propensity and ability of states to engage in warfare.  A number of studies have re-
searched the empirical evidence for the effect of economic relations (Polachek 1980; 
Polachek, Robst, & Chang 1999).  Rosecrance (1986), for example, delineates two 
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international systems: a territorial system, which views power based on land masses; 
and oceanic trading systems, which seek free trade and reject ideas of self-
sufficiency.  The author maintains that trading systems enjoy greater prosperity and 
peace, while the costs of war and territorial systems are increasingly unprofitable.  
Other thinkers, such as John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett, and Richard Ullman have the-
oretically and empirically address the pacific role of economic interdependence in 
conjunction with liberal domestic and international institutions (Oneal & Russett 
1997; Russett & Oneal 2001; Ullman 1991).24  
While economic interdependence is thought by some to have a pacific effect 
on warfare, the particular mechanisms that do (or do not) impact interstate warfare 
are subject to debate.  Economic linkages between states may deter interstate warfare 
through one of three ways: 
a) increased opportunity costs of war through expanding trade and commerce; 
b) direct costs of severing foreign direct investment between states; and, 
c) enhanced communications and the development of common identities and 
norms.  
These factors are thought to diminish the ability of states to pursue their interests 
through warfare (at least while maintaining a positive economic utility), and to create 
mechanisms for states to better avoid the outbreak of warfare.   
Angell, Cobden, and later, Russet and Oneal, all claim that increasing trade 
between states dissuades interstate war by elevating the resulting opportunity costs of 
lost trade.  These opportunity costs, combined with the growing expense and sacri-
fice of warfare, are thought to deter conflict between states.  The validity of the claim 
is debated largely at the empirical level.  Some research demonstrates that opportuni-
ty costs alone do not impact interstate warfare (E. Gartzke, Li, & Boehmer 2001; 
Keshk, Pollins, & Reuveny 2004; Kim & Rousseau 2005).  Garzke, Li, and 
Boehmer, for example, present empirical research that while the opportunity costs of 
disrupting economic linkages between states occasionally deters minor contests, ‘op-
                                                      
24 While Oneal and Russett approach liberalism inductively and empirically, Richard Ullman (1991) 
approaches liberalism deductively.  In, Securing Europe, Ullman offers a sanguine post-cold war out-
look for security based on democratic institutions, economic interdependence, and the proliferation of 
international institutions, as well as the effects of historical social learning.   
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portunity costs typically fail to preclude militarized disputes’ (E. Gartzke et al. 2001, 
p. 391).25  
Since the late 18th and early 19th centuries in which Angell and Cobden wrote, 
expanding economic systems have prompted research on other types of economic 
relations that could influence interstate warfare.  Rosecrance and Thompson argue 
that while opportunity costs (lost trade, commerce, and portfolio investments) do not 
deter war, foreign direct investment (FDI) effectively reduces the likelihood of con-
flict because it, ‘represents a link that is costly (and time-consuming) to break 
(Rosecrance & Thompson 2003, p. 377).26  Similarly, Brooks (2005) identifies the 
multinational corporation as the glue within interdependence, asserting that multina-
tional corporations have replaced trade as the most central force of the global 
economy.  According to Brooks, however, the resulting constraint to warfare applies 
to the major powers: ‘Indeed…this global production shift is likely to have a net 
negative influence on security relations among developing countries’ because they 
have not experienced a globalization of production to the extent of the Great Powers 
(Brooks 2005, pp. 12-3).  
Interdependence may also create mechanisms of diplomacy and communica-
tions that help to avoid war and cultivate common norms and identities.  For 
Alexander Wendt (1994), increased trade creates a common identity that pacifies in-
clinations towards warfare.  Cobden, in particular, believed that interstate trade has a 
unifying and diplomatic effect through increased socialisation.  Others look at the 
specific institutional explanations.  In, ‘The Capitalist Peace’ Gartzke contends that 
the liberal peace is an outgrowth of competition and communication between states, 
and not economic opportunity costs (E. Gartzke 2007).27  Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 
(2001) also maintain that economic interconnectedness enhances communications 
and establishes ‘costly signalling’.  Therefore: ‘Political shocks that threaten to dam-
age or destroy economic linkages generate information, reducing uncertainty when 
leaders bargain’ (E. Gartzke et al. 2001, p. 418).  
 
                                                      
25 Hegre, Oneal, and Russett (2010) dispute empirical challenges to the relevance of opportunity costs, 
arguing that such studies often fail to account for distance between states and state power.    
26 Joanne Gowa (1999) and others make the reverse argument: that common interests between states 
cause the observed peace between liberal democracies.   
27 Bruce Russett (2010) in ‘Capitalism or democracy? Not so fast’ addressed the debate between capi-
talism and democracy, arguing that both deter warfare.   
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The utility of conquest 
Like interdependence, there is expanding research and studies on the changing value 
of conquest.  Angell originally theorized that while conquest may have been profita-
ble under Roman times, changing economics has rendered conquest a costly and 
ineffective means to acquire wealth.  Employing a hypothetical German subjugation 
of Europe, he explains: 
If she set out to develop and enrich the component parts, these would 
become merely efficient competitors, and she need not have undertak-
en the costliest war of history to arrive at that result.  This is the 
paradox, the futility for conquest–the great illusion which the history 
of our own empire so well illustrates (Angell 1910/1933, p. 77). 
Similarly, Brooks states: ‘Among the most economically advanced states, not only 
have the costs of war greatly increased during the post-World War II era, but it also 
appears that the potential benefits of conquest have greatly declined during this peri-
od’ (Brooks 1999, p. 667). 
Since the early 1900s, many theorists have advanced that a shift from ‘land–
based economies’ to ‘knowledge–based economies’ explains the changing value of 
conquest.  Knowledge–based economies are thought to ‘depend less on agriculture 
and raw materials than on the intricate web of skilled tasks…’ and are therefore less 
linked to geographical control (Jervis 2002, p. 6).  Van Evera (1990) describes the 
economic changes as a shift from a ‘smokestack-economy era’ to a knowledge-based 
economy.  The author contends that, since 1945, conquest in European states has be-
come unfruitful because their economies are based on access to technical and social 
information.  This access to information requires, ‘a free domestic press, and access 
to foreign publications, foreign travel, personal computers, and photocopiers,’ all of 
which have subversive potential and will need to be forbidden by the conquering 
power.  Hence: ‘The shift toward knowledge-based forms of production in advanced 
industrial economies since 1945 has reduced the ability of conquerors to extract re-
sources from conquered territories’ (Stephen Van Evera 1990, p. 14).  The author 
notes that while Germany was able to subjugate France and Czechoslovakia during 
World War II, later, the Soviet means of political control failed because they collided 
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with, ‘the imperatives of post-industrial economic productivity’ (Stephen Van Evera, 
p. 15).28 
The transnational nature of economic relations may also eclipse the relative 
effectiveness of the state.  Susan Strange, for example, argues that the, ‘forces of 
world markets, integrated over the post-war period…are now more powerful than the 
states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to 
belong’ (Strange 1996, p. 4).  Similarly, the transnational nature of multinational 
corporations, investment, and foreign direct investment may hinder the ability of 
states to capture or develop economic gains through conquest.  As Brooks explains: 
‘When much of the wealth of an economy was based on agriculture or industrial 
manufacturing, a conquering power could literally move a significant portion of the 
vanquished country’s economic surplus…back to the conqueror’s homeland’ 
(Brooks 1999, p. 657).  In a knowledge-based economy, however, the value of many 
assets (e.g. machinery) is attached to the skills of workers, of which only a small 
number can realistically be relocated.29  Brooks (1999) also submits that ‘geographic 
dispersion’ detaches the value of corporations from a geographical state, and inter-
firm alliances integrate innovation across borders, so that only a portion of the value 
and technology may be captured by a conquering power.  Financial assets also trans-
cend borders.  Rosecrance (1999), for example, notes that the Iraqi government was 
unable to confiscate many financial resources in Kuwait because many Kuwaiti bank 
accounts were simply transferred during the Iraqi invasion.30  
For many proponents of the declining benefits of conquest thesis, nonvio-
lence is an increasingly beneficial option relative to conquest.   While relative costs 
of conflict and conquest disincentivize war, the competitive benefits of peace, ‘i.e. 
the benefit from production and exchange, or peaceful migration of people, capital, 
technology, and knowledge,’ incentivizes non-violence (McGuire 1990, p. 7).  Citing 
a high U.S. ownership or control of the largest Canadian corporations, Brooks states: 
‘American MNCs already own or have significant control over much that is worth 
                                                      
28 Kaysen (1990) notes that Alan Milward in a study of economics of the Second World War entitled, 
War, Economy, and Society, 1939-1945, similarly finds that Germany’s occupation of France was 
profitable (Milward 1977). 
29 Brooks distinguishes his theories from liberalism because he addresses how the changing benefits 
of conquest affect state power, not only economic utility (Brooks 1999, p. 649). 
30 See also: Brooks (1999) and Rosecrance (1996). 
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having in Canada.  This helps to explain why American willingness to conquer Can-
ada now is zero’ (Brooks 1999, p. 666).  
The political nature of conquest may also stifle profitability in a knowledge-
based economy.  Brooks (1999) cites the role of the ‘commitment problem’.  The 
commitment problem describes a dilemma in which the political authority that holds 
power to protect assets must also be constrained from confiscating those assets 
(Haber 2002; North & Weingast 1989; Olson 1993).  In a modern economy, the 
threat by a foreign power to seize assets deters both financial investment and innova-
tion.  Brooks’ makes a second argument based on the Principal Agent Theory (PAT) 
(Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991; Spence & Zeckhauser 1971), which espouses that di-
verging interests between a principal and an agent will require increased monitoring.  
Excessive monitoring incurs additional costs and may also suffocate innovation.31  
Local populations may also resist occupying conquering powers through vio-
lent or non-violent means, or what has been termed the ‘quagmire perspective’.32  
Proponents of the quagmire perspective, such as Robert Gilpin (1983), Klaus Eugene 
K. E. Knorr (1975), and Richard Rosecrance (1986), argue that, in large part due to 
nationalism, a local population will resist a conquering or occupying; the conqueror, 
in turn, must commit resources to supress local uprisings.  Additionally, the local 
population in a knowledge-based economy may be able to deny economic gains to 
the conquerors through strikes, sabotage, and intentionally slow economic progress.  
Most theories of a declining utility of conquest incorporate the quagmire perspective.  
Conversely, Brooks, contends that advanced states since the Second World War have 
transformed their economies to such an extent, ‘that conquest now is unlikely to pro-
duce significant gains even if the vanquished country’s populace does not engage in 
extensive popular resistance’ (1999, p. 652).  
Peter Liberman provides a strong counterargument to both the quagmire per-
spective and the declining benefits of conquest thesis.  Liberman argues that modern 
societies, ‘can be mobilized intensively in the short run or controlled and ‘farmed’ in 
the long run’ if the conquering power is sufficiently ruthless (Liberman 1996, p. ix). 
The author contends that while the post-industrial knowledge based economy in-
                                                      
31 For more information on monitoring costs and the Principal Agent Theory (PAT), see: Kiewiet and 
McCubbins (1991); and, Spence and Zeckhauser (1971).  
32 Peter Liberman (1996), although a critic of the theory, termed the ‘quagmire perspective’, to identi-
fy several theories that argue that local resistance can render occupations increasingly costly.  
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volves advanced technologies, such as communication and transportation technolo-
gies, those same instruments may also be employed by the conqueror for the 
purposes of suppression.  Additionally, Liberman argues that modernisation has led 
to the centralisation of coercive resources: ‘Tyrants can more easily monopolize co-
ercive resources within their borders because the division of labour in modern 
societies grants the state a real monopoly on violence, legitimate or not’ (1996, p. 
26).  For Lieberman, modernisation has increased the ability of ruthless states to 
profitably engage in conquest and foreign occupations.   
Furthermore, a declining economic utility of warfare may not ultimately deter 
its use.  As John J. Mearsheimer argues: ‘The main flaw in this theory is that the 
principal assumption underpinning it–that states are motivated primarily by the de-
sire to achieve prosperity–is wrong…states operate in both an international political 
environment and an international economic environment…’ (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 
44).33  In a similar vein, Erik Gartzke and Dominic Rohner (2010) maintain that 
much of the literature on conquest ignores the tendency for states to engage in con-
flict to influence policies.  The authors theorize and empirically test the degree to 
which states engage in warfare to ‘conquer or compel’ other states.  They find that 
that developed countries are less inclined to seek to control territory: ‘At the same 
time, developed countries may be even more interested in seeking to shape how na-
tions behave, and how they interact’ (E. Gartzke & Rohner, p. 6).  Hence, while 
states may be affected by a declining economic utility of warfare, they may well 
have political or ideological objectives that outweigh the costs.   
 
2.2.3 Domestic and international constraints to interstate warfare 
Domestic and international institutions and politics are also theorized to constrain (or 
facilitate) interstate warfare by generating ‘political costs’ (or incentives) for conflict 
between states, as well as establishing domestic and international norms.  Eight-
eenth-century thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant and Humphrey (1795/2003) and 
Thomas Paine (1776/2004), and later, in the nineteenth century, Alexis de 
                                                      
33 Mearsheimer (1990) also argues that economic liberals ignore concepts of relative gains inherent in 
anarchy, stating that states may ‘reject even cooperation that would yield an absolute economic gain, 
if the other state would gain more of the yield, from fear that the other might convert its gain to mili-
tary strength, and then use that strength to win by coercion in later rounds’ (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 44).  
He also notes that economic interdependence can result in friction between states, as well as blackmail 
and brinkmanship (Mearsheimer 1990, pp. 44-5).   
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Tocqueville, Mansfield, and Winthrop (1835-1840/2002), believed that democratic 
states are less likely to engage in warfare, and that warfare was unlikely between 
democracies.  Theories of the pacific affect of democracies (or pairs of democracies) 
resurfaced following the First World War through Wilsonian Idealism, which includ-
ed the idea of deterring and pacifying interstate warfare through international institu-
institutions (at that time promoted through proposals for a league of nations).  Later, 
the Kantian peace, termed by Oneal and Russett, contends that three international 
elements work together or ‘triangulate peace’: economic interdependence (discussed 
in the prior section), democratic institutions, and international organisations (Oneal 
& Russett 1997; Russett & Oneal 2001).  Additionally, realists and neorealist es-
pouse that international power and alliances also serve to deter warfare.   
 
Democratic politics 
As the number of democracies in the world has increased, researchers have contin-
ued to develop theories and test for a relationship between democracy and war. Some 
empirical studies find that democracies are more pacific by nature (Benoit 1996; Ray 
1995; Rummel 1983); however, most studies advance the claim that democracies are 
unlikely to fight other democracies (Levy 1988; Maoz & Abdolali 1989; Oneal & 
Russett 1997; Russett & Oneal 2001).34  Domestic institutions (and international in-
stitutions) can affect warfare either by altering the ability of states to go to war 
through political structures or by influencing the impetus to do so through common 
norms and identities.   
One reason for the espoused pacific nature of democracies (or liberal democ-
racies or republics) is that they decentralize power–both within the government and 
through public participation–in a way that can constrain warfare or better enable its 
avoidance.  Kant believed that the majority of a population would only go to war in 
self-defence, and Paine argued that kings were more prone to go to war while repub-
lics were not.  Democracies are understood to restrain their leaders from initiating or 
engaging in warfare, unless sufficiently aroused by a significant issue, because their 
citizens ultimately pay the costs of warfare and bear the sacrifice of warfare (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 1999; Morgan & Campbell 1991; Rummel 1983, 1985).  Accord-
                                                      
34 For empirical evidence against the claim that democracies are less likely to go to war, see: (Spiro 
1994) 
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ingly, democratic leaders are threatened with the removal from office and, therefore, 
are expected to engage in warfare conservatively and to only initiate wars they ex-
pect to win (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Goemans 2000). 
The political mechanisms within democratic governments may also deter ex-
ternal conflict.  Democratic political systems possess institutional structures that are 
theorized to both constrain the impetus and ability of states to engage in warfare.  
Rudolph J. Rummel (1983, 1985) argues that liberal states (characterised by individ-
ual rights, civil liberties, and open elections) are also less likely to fight other liberal 
states.  This is the case, he explains, because power in libertarian states is diversified 
to, ‘multiple, often conflicting, elites, whose interests are divergent and segmented, 
checked and balanced’ (Rummel 1983, p. 28).  Others argue that democratic institu-
tions often diffuse power through, ‘multiple veto points and groups that could block 
war’ (Jervis 2002, p. 4).35  
Democratic institutions’ structures may also be better equipped to avoid an 
outbreak of interstate warfare.  For example, more advanced information flows can 
enable better signalling to avert war (Fearon 1994) and to avoid stumbling into wars 
through severe internal errors (R. K. White 1990).36  Gartzke, in, ‘The Capitalist 
Peace’, contends that the liberal peace is an outgrowth of competition and communi-
cation between states, noting that while democracy ‘cohabitates with peace’ it does 
not, ‘by itself, lead nations to be less conflict prone, not even toward other democra-
cies’ (E. Gartzke 2007, p. 167).37  Also, as Moaz and Russett explain, democracies 
take longer to go to war because they must gain the support of the general public, 
legitimize the war through necessary government bodies and bureaucracies, and even 
address special interest groups.  Therefore, pairs of democracies (or groups of de-
mocracies) will have a greater window to find a non-military solution to a potential 
conflict (Maoz & Russett 1993, p. 418).  
Finally, Kant and, later, Michael W. Doyle argue that liberal democracies de-
velop more pacific norms and cultures, or what Maoz and Russett refer to as the 
                                                      
35 Although the restricting nature of checks and balances in democracies is well accepted theoretically, 
Jervis notes that some accounts of the Cold War by Soviet leaders portray Russian General Secretary 
Brezhnev as more constrained regarding arms control (Jervis 2002, p. 4). 
36 The evidence that democracies do not go to war with other democracies is stronger when studied in 
dyadic relationships (Oneal & Russett, 1997). 
37 Bruce Russett (2010) in ‘Capitalism or democracy? Not so fast’ addressed the debate between capi-
talism and democracy, arguing that both deter warfare.   
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‘normative model’ (Doyle 1986; Maoz & Russett 1993).  Political competition in 
democracies is peaceful and may only be a temporary setback for losers; conversely, 
competition in autocracies is often an all-or-nothing game with more permanent con-
sequences, which is argued to engender mistrust and fear domestically and 
internationally.  The normative model, however, may only apply to pairs of democ-
racies; confrontations between democratic and non-democratic states may force the 
former to, ‘adapt to the norms of the international conduct of the latter lest it be ex-
ploited or eliminated…’ (Maoz & Russett 1993, p. 625).     
There are a number of counterarguments to the democratic peace theory.  
First, some challenge the empirical data that democracies are less prone to war in 
general.  Dean Babst (1972) raised an early challenge to the alleged pacific nature of 
democracies, asserting that democracies are only peaceful to other democracies.  His 
claim was later empirically supported by Small and Singer (1976) and others (Chan 
1984, 1997; Weede 1984).  Since then, many liberal scholars have focused on the 
much more substantiated empirical claim that democracies do not fight one another, 
while detractors argue that democracies are just as likely to go to war, even with oth-
er democracies (Farber & Gowa 1995; Layne 1994; Spiro 1994).  Additionally, just 
as Siverson and Ward (2002) discredit the ‘long peace’ as statistically insignificant, 
John M. Owen asserts that ‘wars are so rare that random chance could account for 
the democratic peace’ (Owen 1994, p. 88).38  Mearsheimer reinforces the point, not-
ing, ‘several democracies have come close to fighting one another, which suggests 
that the absence of war may be due simply to chance’ (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 51).  
For example, the Fashoda Crisis of 1898 nearly brought the United Kingdom and 
France to war over a disputed territory dispute in Eastern Africa.   
Mearsheimer also makes two additional counterarguments. First, the author 
asserts that democracies are unable to ‘transcend anarchy’ because other democracies 
may backslide into autocratic governments.  Because political institutions are not 
guaranteed over time, ‘Liberal democracies must therefore worry about relative 
power among themselves, which is tantamount to saying that each has an incentive to 
consider aggression against the other to forestall future trouble’ (Mearsheimer 1990, 
p. 50).  Mearsheimer also challenges the assumptions that leaders are not subject to 
high costs of war and that democratic citizenries are resistant to war.  He argues that 
                                                      
38 For a statistical analysis of the random possibility of the Long Peace, see: Spiro (1994). 
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French national enthusiasm for the Napoleonic Wars, for example, demonstrates that 
‘mass publics, whether democratic or not, can become deeply imbued with national-
istic or religious fervour, making them prone to support aggression, regardless of 
costs’ (Mearsheimer, p. 50).  
 
Diversionary warfare 
While many critics of the democratic or liberal peace argue that democratic institu-
tion do not deter (or significantly deter) warfare, theories of diversionary warfare 
(and opportunism) contend that democratic institutions can lead to increased conflict. 
The diversionary war literature proposes that leaders may engage in external con-
flicts to increase their chances of remaining in power when domestic conditions are 
unfavourable (Levy 1989; A. Smith 1996).  The diversionary war literature does not 
entirely contradict the democratic peace thesis because it is also possible for autocra-
cies to be swayed to foreign adventurism for domestic reasons, such as local 
uprisings or public unrest (Oneal & Tir 2006, p. 758).39  However, a number of 
thinkers believe democratic leaders are uniquely prone to diversionary warfare 
(Gelpi 1997; Hess & Orphanides 1995, 2001).  As Christopher Gelpi contends, 
‘democratic leaders will respond to domestic unrest by diverting attention by using 
force internationally…authoritarian leaders are expected to repress the unrest direct-
ly, and these acts of repression will make them less likely to use force 
internationally’ (Gelpi 1997, p. 255). 
There are a number of domestic factors that in theory may invite leaders to 
engage in foreign conflict.  Poor economic conditions at home may encourage lead-
ers to divert attention through foreign adventurism (Hess & Orphanides 1995, 2001; 
Oneal & Tir 2006; Ostrom & Job 1986).  Oakes (2012) asserts that political turmoil 
leads to the use of diversionary tactics.  Morgan and Campbell (1991) maintain that 
high public support is an incentive to foreign opportunism, but that low public opin-
                                                      
39 A number of additional studies evaluate the propensity for diversionary war in autocracies.  Downs 
and Rocke (1994)  evaluate both autocracies and democracies.  Ross A. Miller argues, ‘All other 
things being equal, if autocratic leaders expect to incur fewer domestic political costs for the use of 
force, they should be more willing than their democratic counterparts to employ diversionary tactics’ 
(R. A. Miller 1995, p. 767).  Pickering and Kisangani find that not all autocracies and democracies 
divert: ‘Mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are the only regime 
types prone to this type of force’ (Pickering & Kisangani 2005, p. 23).  And Levy and Vakili also as-
sert that because legitimacy and internal unity are common problems of autocracies, they are more 
prone to diversionary force than democracies (Levy & Vakili 1992, p. 122).    
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ion within the party in power may lead to efforts to create a ‘rally around the flag 
effect’ (Morgan & Bickers 1992).  And Leo Hazelwood (1975) submits that the 
probability of external force initially increases with political instability, but dimin-
ishes as dissatisfaction continues to increase.  Other scholars also maintain that 
domestic instability or strife leads to involvement in external conflicts (Davies 2002; 
Enterline & Gleditsch 2000; Mansfield & Snyder 2005).  
Gelepi (1997) and others, although supporting the diversionary war thesis, 
concede that the empirical evidence is not as resounding as the theoretical claim.  
Oneal and Tir analyse whether poor economic performance leads to the initiation of 
outside adventurism by leaders of democracies.  Their empirical study finds that 
‘economic conditions do affect the likelihood that a democracy, but not an autocracy, 
will initiate a fatal militarized dispute, even against another democracy’ (Oneal & Tir 
2006, p. 775).  However, the authors conclude that the magnitude of the impact of 
economic conditions on the initiation of outside conflict is too small to negate the 
democratic peace theory.   
A number of studies also cast doubt on the correlation between internal strife 
(or instability) and the initiation of foreign conflict (Kegley, Richardson, & Richter 
1978; Russett 1987; Salmore & Salmore 1978).  In a statistical study by Chiozza and 
Gomans, for example, the authors find that democratic leaders that initiate an exter-
nal conflict are more likely to loose office and, therefore, are less likely to engage in 
foreign adventurism (Chiozza & Goemans 2003, p. 443).  Gleditsch, Salehyan, and 
Schultz also challenge the claim that domestic strife (defined as civil conflict) leads 
to diversionary warfare.  The authors argue and present empirical evidence that while 
domestic strife is often observed with international conflict, it is more often motivat-
ed by factors related to the intra–state conflict, such as outside state support for rebel 
groups (K. S. Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz 2008, p. 480).   
 
International constraints 
Within the liberal school of thought, international institutions are also theorized to 
inhibit and pacify interstate warfare through the creation of political constraints and 
by engendering international norms.  International constraints are argued to exist ei-
ther through the neoliberal perspective of international institutions or neorealist 
concepts of power and alliances.  International institutions are understood to create 
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norms through a common identity, influence state interests, and coerce norm-
breakers (Keohane 1988, 1990; Martin & Simmons 1998; Russett & Oneal 2001).  
Conversely, international power and alliances (with or without formal institutions) 
can constrain states through the threat or possibility of reprisal.  
The ability of international institutions to create formal rules and enforce 
norms is thought to establish a direct constraint to the use of interstate conflict.  For 
example, as Russett and Oneal explain: ‘Alliances such as NATO and the former 
Warsaw Pact also may act coercively.  They are directed against states outside the 
alliance, of course, but in the interests of solidarity, they may operate to suppress 
violent conflicts among their members, too’ (Russett & Oneal 2001, p. 163) The es-
tablishment of international norms may also pacify interests in warfare.  For 
example, Robert Axelrod (1986) and James Lee Ray (1989) champion an ambitious 
argument that international norms can eventually efface war between states in the 
same way that slavery has become effectively abolished much of the world. 
Political constraints can operate through formal institutions, or informally 
through state relations.  Salehyan states, ‘In addition to direct costs, initiating a vio-
lent conflict can invite international condemnation and foreign sanctions’, as well as 
‘invite the intervention of the state’s allies…’ (Salehyan 2010, p. 11).  Neorealists, in 
particular, argue that the international distribution of power and the creation of alli-
ances maximise the costs and sacrifice of conflict and ultimately constrains interstate 
warfare.  Hence, the neorealist approach challenges institutional theories by reassert-
ing anarchy, self-help, and power  (balance of power, relative power, or defensive 
power) as the defining characteristics of the international systems (Grieco 1988; 
Mearsheimer 1994).40  As Mearsheimer explains: ‘For realists, the causes of war and 
peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror 
the distribution of power in the system’ (Mearsheimer 1994, p. 13).  Accordingly, 
power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an inter-
vening variable in the process.  More severe critics, such as Richard Betts contend 
that security regimes can, ‘worsen military instability’ by escalating minor conflicts 
into larger ones (Betts 1992, p. 7).  
 
                                                      
40 For major realist and neorealist works see: Aron (1966); Art (1980); Carr (1940); Gilpin (1975, 
1983); Morgenthau (1972); Walt (1987); Waltz (1979, 2001).   
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2.2.4 A moral aversion to war 
The preceding arguments explore the effect of changing technology, economics, and 
political systems that are thought to alter the utility, political costs (and incentives), 
and interests of states and their members regarding warfare.  Arguments on the moral 
aversion of warfare, or what John (Mueller 1990) refers to as the ‘obsolescence of 
war,’ centre on potentially changing interests in warfare (at least between major 
powers).  As John Keegan declares in, A History of Warfare: ‘War…may well be 
ceasing to commend itself to human beings as a desirable or productive, let alone 
rational, means of reconciling their discontents’ (Keegan 2004, p. 59).  The idea that 
human nature and societies are transforming toward an end of war falls into a con-
structivist school of cultural evolution, and a psychological school of human 
evolution. 
Constructivist arguments often acknowledge the role of advancing weapons, 
democracy, and economic interdependence as relevant factors, but only in building 
an ‘idea’ or ‘common identity’ that is averse to warfare (Risse-Kappen 1995; Wendt 
1999).  For some, an evolving cultural and ideological aversion to warfare is respon-
sible for the decline in conflict between major powers and may enable war to 
‘disappear altogether’ (Mueller 2004, p. 1).  Accordingly, war is declining not be-
cause of changing technology, economics, or political institutions, but through the 
changing nature and interests of societies.  This evolving pacific nature within socie-
ties and groups of societies is thought to alleviate the impetus for warfare. John 
Mueller in The Remnants of War describes war as an idea or an institution that is be-
ing considered no longer desirable: 
The decline of war...stems chiefly from the way attitudes toward the 
value of the efficacy of war have changed, particularly during the last 
century.  The key lies in the machinations of idea entrepreneurs, not in 
wider-ranging social, economic, or technological developments or in 
the fabrication of institutions, trade, or patterns of interdependence, 
which often seem to be more nearly a consequence of peace and a ris-
ing war aversion (Mueller 2004, p. 2). 
Mueller contends that both duelling and slavery were once considered acceptable, 
but have been eradicated through sociological evolution, as war has been between 
major states.  In contrast to the rationalist approach of neorealism, Mueller argues 
that nuclear weapons are not the driving cause for the avoidance of major war after 
World War II: ‘They [nuclear weapons] do not seem to have been necessary to deter 
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World War III, to determine alliance patterns, or to cause the United States and the 
Soviet Union to behave cautiously’ (Mueller 1988, p. 56).  
Stephen Pinker also contends that warfare, or violence in general, has been in 
decline.  Like Mueller, Pinker denies the relevance of technology, in particular nu-
clear weapons, noting that the risk of developing technology has been thought to 
deter warfare since the invention of dynamite, but has failed (Pinker 2011, p. 268).41  
Instead, Pinker espouses that violence has been declining over the course of history 
on a parallel track with increasingly benevolent human nature.  The author interprets 
several changes in the human evolution over history: the rise of agrarian cultures (the 
Pacification Process); a fall in the homicide rate in the mid-Middle Ages to the early 
20th century (the Civilization Process); the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment and 
a fall in social sanctioned violence (the Humanitarian Revolution); the post-World 
War II decline in major power war (the Long Peace); an espoused fall in post-Cold 
War organized conflicts (the New Peace); and the more recent rise in human rights 
(the Human Rights Revolution).  However, unlike the constructivists’ argument that 
warfare is declining as an idea, Pinker argues that violence and warfare are on a 
downward trend based on cultural evolution: 
Some of these faculties incline us towards various kinds of violence.  
Others–‘the better angels of our nature,’ in Abraham Lincoln’s words–
incline us towards cooperation and peace.  The way to explain the de-
cline of violence is to identify the changes in our culture and material 
milieu that have given our peaceable motives the upper hand’ (Pinker 
2011, p. xxiii).  
The belief that war is becoming obsolete is in part based on the assumption that war-
fare can be removed from human behaviour.  Keegan writes that Mueller, ‘is a 
disbeliever in the proposition that man is biologically disposed towards violence, one 
of the most fiercely contested issues in the behavioural science, from which most 
military historians prudently distance themselves’ (Keegan 2004, p. 59).42  
Another contentious issue for both Mueller and Pinker is the increasing high 
number of conflicts outside the ‘long peace’ in the West, and the rising occurrence of 
intra-state conflict.  The statistical likelihood of dying in a war has declined since the 
Second World War; however, the occurrence of smaller civil wars has risen propor-
                                                      
41 See also James Lee Ray (1989), pp. 429-430.   
42 Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seasbury in War: Ends and Means also make a counterargument argu-
ing that war is both a function of human nature and holds a positive value by resisting injustice.   
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tionally to the decline in interstate conflict.  Critics also note that disenchantment 
with warfare (which is not necessarily a continuing trend) may lead to small wars 
and humane wars.  Mearsheimer (1990) considers limitations of the obsolescence of 
war thesis put forward by Mueller and Kaysen.  The author notes that: 
Proponents of this theory assume that all conventional wars are pro-
tracted and bloody wars of attrition, like World War I on the Western 
front.  However, it is possible to score a quick and decisive victory in 
a conventional war and avoid the devastation that usually attends a 
protracted conventional war (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 30).43   
Since Mearsheimer’s article, which was published at the tail end of the Cold War, 
there have been a number of limited wars that support the author’s argument; per-
haps most notably the Gulf War, waged against Iraq about a year after the 
publication of his article.  The full invasion saw less than 400 U.S. military dead, and 
less that 150 of those were battle deaths.  Coker explains a continuing dichotomy be-
tween limited and total warfare.  The author describes the two world wars as a period 
of total war, which has been followed by a shift to limited warfare (since 1989), 
marked by the emergence of limited commercial and humanitarian conflicts.  This 
shift, he notes, was not so much an intentional change, but came largely through so-
ciety and the, ‘transformation of the reasons that people went to war’ (Coker 2001, 
pp. 8-9). 
 The emergence of humanitarian warfare, such as the NATO invasion of Ko-
sovo, US operations in Somalia, and to some extent the Gulf War in Iraq, is 
particularly significant to moral dispositions regarding warfare.  Humanitarian war-
fare may reorient seemingly pacific societal values back to conflict through the 
promise of humane means and ends.  ‘Western societies (we are told) not only fight 
humanitarian wars; they do so in a ‘humane’ fashion (Coker 2001, p. 2).  As dis-
cussed earlier, the RMA is thought to reduce the risk associated with warfare; 
however, is also espoused to be a more humane form of warfare by limiting casual-
ties and even damage to infrastructure.  The RMA is theorised to detach society, as 
well as warriors, from the realities of warfare by enabling low casualties and by vir-
tual technology and precision air power that abstracts the reality of warfare.  Hence, 
‘removing human operators from their actions by mediating reality technology’ 
threatens to render reality unreal (Coker 2001, p. 151).  As Michael Ignatieff writes 
                                                      
43 See also Mearsheimer (1983). 
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in reference to the NATO invasion of Kosovo, ‘If war becomes virtual–and without 
risk–democratic electorates may be more willing to fight, especially if the cause is 
justified in the language of human rights and even democracy itself (2001, pp. 179-
80).   
While small or limited wars may preclude public disillusionment with war-
fare, the emergence of ‘humane warfare’ or ‘humanitarian warfare’ may create a 
moral justification for war.  As postmodern society has abandoned metaphysics, ‘we 
have put humanity back in the centre of our philosophical and ethical thought–hence 
the interests in humanitarian warfare, and the importance of humanity in the wars we 
now fight’ (Coker 2001).  Eric A. Heinze exemplifies the view, noting: ‘humanitari-
an intervention stands a reasonably successfully chance of doing more good than 
harm’ (Heinze 2009, p. 5).  The author asserts several cases that are likely to maxim-
ize human security involve large–scale human rights violations, such as genocides, 
ethnic cleansing, and war crimes.  
A number of scholars debate the veracity of both the espoused means and 
ends of humanitarian warfare.  At the moral level, humanitarian warfare presents on-
ly a short-term value directed at the net conservation of human life and suffering, but 
fails to define values or historical objectives, particularly if they require an overall 
sacrifice of human life.  As Coker elaborates: ‘Unfortunately, humanitarian interven-
tion loses any meaning if it becomes autonomous from politics, or detached from a 
project’ (Coker 2001, p. 128).  Additionally, a number of analysts question if the end 
results of humanitarian warfare are indeed humane (Krauthammer 1999; Roberts 
1999).  The authors assert that Operation Allied Force in Kosovo resulted in substan-
tial casualties on the opposing side, high levels of collateral damage (in part due to 
the skewed use of air power), and was ultimately ineffective in protection of the Ko-
sovar Albanians.  Nevertheless, despite potential drawbacks, the perception and 
promise of humanitarian warfare has the propensity to engender warfare.   
 
2.3 Outsourcing warfare to insurgencies 
The literature on the declining value and frequency of interstate warfare, covered in 
the preceding section, explained several elements.  These include: a) global techno-
logical and economic changes that may increase the costs and risk of war while 
diminishing the potential benefits; b) expanding domestic and international political 
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constraints and barriers to interstate warfare; and, c) an evolving moral value of war-
fare and changing attitudes regarding the costs and sacrifice of war.  To the extent 
that these factors do affect the value and frequency of interstate warfare, they primar-
ily function in two ways:  
1) Pacific influences: A number of factors may influence state interests, atti-
tudes, and values in a way that reduces the impetus to engage in warfare.  
Pacific influences include an evolving moral aversion to warfare, the devel-
opment of pacific domestic and international norms, and an increasing ability 
to reap economic benefits without the use of conflict.  These factors may 
serve to diminish warfare by influencing the interests held by states.  
2) Constraints and deterrents:  Other factors may reduce the ability of states to 
engage in interstate warfare.  These factors include: a declining utility of war-
fare through changing costs, benefits, risks, and human sacrifice; expanding 
domestic and international constraints; and changing perception of warfare 
and sacrifice that undermine the ability to engage in warfare (e.g. high-
casualty sensitivity).  Constraints and deterrents to interstate warfare can in-
centivise states either to pursue their objectives through non-violent means or 
to adopt alternative methods of warfare (i.e. outsourcing to insurgencies). 
Most and Starr (1984) set forth a framework in which foreign policies can vary with 
circumstances.  Accordingly, a declining value of interstate warfare may influence 
state actions in different ways.  In some cases, states may abstain from conflict and 
pursue goals through non-violent means.  In other cases, states may employ indirect 
methods such as low–intensity warfare or outsourcing to insurgencies, as alternatives 
to interstate warfare.  
Evidence exists for both a decline in interstate warfare and a shift from direct 
interstate warfare to outsourcing to insurgencies.  Within the debate over the ‘long 
peace’ that has followed World War II (Gaddis 1987; Waltz 1997), empirical analy-
sis finds that while the occurrence of interstate warfare has declined, there has been a 
proportional increase in the number of intra-state conflicts.44  The extent of this shift 
is often empirically measured using casualty rates as a percentage of the overall pop-
                                                      
44 Statistical information on trends in warfare and battle death is reviewed in Chapter 1.  See also: 
Human Security Research Group, ("Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2012: 
Sexual Violence, Education and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative"  2012). Vancouver: Simon 
Fraser University. 
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ulation.  Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer (2003) present empirical evidence that war-
fare has not declined, but instead shifted to intra-state conflicts.  Conversely, Lacina, 
Gleditsch, and Russett (2006) demonstrate that, while intra-state conflict has risen, 
interstate warfare has contracted.  Additionally, there is evidence that states are in-
creasingly outsourcing to insurgencies.  In 1945, 8 insurgencies were supported by 
outside states, while in 2004, 21 insurgencies benefitted from outside state support.45  
Hence, the decline in interstate warfare that followed the Second World War may not 
simply represent the pacification of warfare, but in large part a shift in strategic 
methods of conflict from direct interstate warfare to indirect tactics of outsourcing to 
insurgencies.  
A body of literature and empirical studies also supports this trend.  In what is 
referred to as the ‘displacement thesis’, great power warfare in this period has been 
transferred into or replaced by other types of warfare in peripheral regions.  Hence, it 
is argued that peace between Great Powers may have resulted in an expansion of in-
tra-state conflict, also referred to as ‘new wars’ (T.R. Gurr & Harff 1994; Holsti 
1996; M.I Midlarsky 1989; Snow 1996) or ‘third world wars’ (M.G. Marshall 1999).  
Studies on the displacement thesis outline three methods in which states may cir-
cumvent the rising costs, risks, and barriers to interstate warfare through outsourcing 
to insurgencies.  Hence, as the costs, risks and aversion to interstate warfare are 
thought to be rising, and the benefits declining, states may be shifting from direct 
interstate warfare to indirect methods of outsourcing to insurgencies.   
In many cases, outsourcing to insurgencies may capacitate states to engage in 
external conflict, while yielding a higher expected value.  First, states may engage in 
proxy wars to avoid the high costs and risk of total war or nuclear war.  Second, by 
outsourcing to third party insurgent groups, states can transfer part or all of the asso-
ciated costs and risks of warfare, and in some cases may increase the overall 
efficiency of a conflict.  And, third, states may outsource to insurgencies covertly or 
with partial anonymity to mitigate or avoid institutional (and possibly economic) bar-
riers to warfare, as well as domestic and international reprisal. 
 
  
                                                      
45 See: Chapter 1, Figure 1.3. 
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Avoiding Major War/Nuclear War 
States have incentives to avoid major wars with formidable powers that threaten a 
prolonged conflict as well as nuclear confrontations.  The theoretical argument pre-
sented here maintains that states may outsource to insurgencies to avert the high 
costs, risk, destructive nature, and public adversity of major or nuclear war. Howev-
er, much of the corresponding literature (and historical evidence) addresses the 
avoidance of war with nuclear powers, which became a central theme during the 
Cold War.   
At the end of World War II, Gregory Bateson, a member of the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) (the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency) pre-
dicted that direct methods of conflict would be severely diminished.  He noted that 
‘the existence of the nuclear bomb would change the nature of warfare, forcing na-
tions to resort to indirect methods of warfare.’  In anticipation of this change, 
Bateson argued that the United States should begin to utilise indirect methods of de-
fence (McFate 2005, pp. 30-1).   
Bateson’s prognosis appears to be supported by historical events.  The Cold 
War that followed the Second World War was marked by a number of ‘proxy wars’, 
in which two major powers (often the U.S. and U.S.S.R.) intervened on opposing 
sides of an outside intra-state conflict (Dunér 1981; K. S. Gleditsch & Beardsley 
2004).46  As Hans J. Morgenthau states: ‘Instead of confronting each other openly 
and directly, the United States and the Soviet Union have chosen to oppose and 
compete with each other surreptitiously through the intermediary of third parties’ 
(Morgenthau 1967, p. 427).  Examples of proxy wars include the Greek Civil War, 
the Nicaraguan Civil War, the Laotian Civil War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, 
and the Afghan–Soviet War.  
Some scholars also suggest that nuclear parity does not always deter warfare, 
but instead can lead to increased use of indirect methods (and low-level conflicts). 
As Hart notes, ‘to the extent that the H[hydrogen] bomb reduces the likelihood of 
full-scale war, it increases the possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local 
aggression’ (Hart 1960, p. 23).  Similarly, in a quantitative study of conflict, Robert 
                                                      
46 Proxy wars are not entirely unique to the Cold War period.  The Greek Civil War, for example, is an 
early proxy war.  However, the term ‘proxy war’ became more commonly used by scholars during the 
Cold War, and is therefore often associated with that period.   
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Rauchhaus (2009) finds that while nuclear weapons support strategic stability, they 
increase the probability of low intensity conflicts.47   
The shift from nuclear deterrence to low-level conflict is what Glen Snyder 
(1965) and Robert Jervis (1989) term the ‘stability–instability paradox’.  The ‘stabil-
ity–instability paradox’ submits that states constrained from engaging in an interstate 
conflict by nuclear deterrence may instead utilise ‘lower levels of conflict’ as a less 
costly and risky alternative.  As Jervis explains:  
[…] the common realization that all-out war would be irrational provides 
a license for threats and the use of lower levels of violence…the fact that 
war would be the worst possible outcome for both sides does not auto-
matically lead to uncoerced peace, let alone to a security community 
(Jervis 2002, p. 7).   
A number of scholars apply the stability–instability paradox to India and Pakistan.  
The authors contend that nuclear parity between Pakistan and India has deterred di-
rect interstate conflict, but it has led to ‘low-level conflict’ and the support of 
indigenous insurgencies within the respective countries (Ganguly 1995; Ganguly & 
Wagner 2004; Kapur 2005; Khan 2003).   
Although the literature on proxy wars and the stability–instability paradox 
both address the role of nuclear powers or nuclear parity, there are a number of ex-
amples of non-nuclear states that also outsource to insurgencies including regional 
powers, such as Iran, which supported a number of insurgent movements within the 
region, and neighbouring states, such as Thailand’s support for Khmer Issarak in 
Cambodia and the Lao Issara in Laos.  In the Case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, both 
(non-nuclear) states supported insurgencies in the other during the territorial dispute 
that followed Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia (K. S. Gleditsch et al. 2008, p. 
484). 
 
Outsourcing costs and risks 
States may also avoid the costs, sacrifice, and declining benefits of direct interstate 
warfare by outsourcing those costs and responsibilities to insurgencies.  Salehyan 
holds that a state that wishes to enter a conflict with another state will have four op-
tions: ‘They can do nothing, attack with their own forces, entirely delegate the 
                                                      
47 For additional writings on the stability–instability paradox see: Krepon (2005); and, Waltz and Sa-
gan (2003). 
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conflict to a rebel organization, or pursue a ‘blended strategy’ where conflict occurs 
through direct and indirect means’ (Salehyan 2010, p. 11).  The nature of outsourc-
ing, and its espoused benefits and drawbacks, has been researched through what is 
known as the principal–agent theory (PAT).48  Accordingly, the principal is the out-
sourcing party and the agent is the surrogate.  For the principal, outsourcing may 
reduce its direct costs, risk, and casualties, and may benefit from the specialized 
skills and knowledge of the agent.  The agent, in return, receives compensation or 
support (G. J. Miller 2005; Salehyan 2010).  Outsourcing to insurgencies may in-
crease the expected utility of warfare by offsetting rising costs, declining benefits, 
constraints, and risk of warfare.   
States may use indirect methods of outsourcing to avoid three areas in which 
the value of warfare may be declining: 1) direct interstate warfare; 2) indirect war-
fare and occupations; and, 3) adversity to sacrifice and the direct use of violence.  
First, as direct interstate warfare rises in economic costs of war, severed trade links, 
and increasing casualties that result from evolving technology, outsourcing is a way 
in which the state may displace both human and economic costs.  As Salehyan notes: 
‘Governments that can expect high casualties and considerable resource expenditures 
may find direct warfare to be too costly.  Such regimes are more likely to avoid these 
costs by supplying rebel organizations instead’ (Salehyan 2010, p. 16).  In some cas-
es, states may even avoid economic costs of lost trade and severed economic links.  
Additionally, depending on the specialised knowledge and skills of the third party 
insurgent group or groups, outsourcing may be a more effective overall means of 
warfare.     
States may also avoid the asymmetric conflicts in warfare as well as the costs 
of occupations.  As Gray notes, asymmetric threats pose a credible risk to states with 
RMA technologies (C. Gray 2001, p. 55).  Given the potential of a declining value of 
conquest and the rising costs of occupations, states may wish to avoid the risk of 
both asymmetric battles and costly and sometimes bloody occupations (or subjuga-
                                                      
48 PAT was originally employed to evaluate outsourcing models in organisations and government bu-
reaucracies model (Holmstrom 1979, 1982; Shavell 1979, 1979; Spence & Zeckhauser 1971; 
Weingast 1984; Weingast & Moran 1983).  It was later applied to security studies to explain the rela-
tionship of an electorate and president regarding external force, (Downs & Rocke 1994) applied the 
theory to explain outsourcing to private military companies by Avant (2005) and less directly by P. 
W. Singer (2005), and finally used to theorize state outsourcing to insurgencies Idean Salehyan 
(2010). 
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tions) particularly if there is a perceived or real decline in the value of conquest.  In 
many cases, outsourcing or mixed–methods can also be used to displace many of the 
liabilities of warfare while empowering the surrogate through air power or other 
means.  The 2011 military intervention in Libya, for example, enabled a multi-state 
coalition to successfully overthrow the Qadhafi regime without a single NATO casu-
alty, and at a reduced risk and cost than could be expected from a full invasion, oc-
occupation, and potential resistance.   
Additionally, as states become less willing to kill or incur sacrifice–what 
Luttwak (1995, 1996) describes as ‘post heroic warfare’–the ability to transfer sacri-
fice and violence to outside groups may render conflict more acceptable, particularly 
to Western societies.  Coker explains the increasing trend to private military compa-
nies and small wars, noting:  ‘Limited warfare is now the only way in which a 
postmodern society can use war as a political instrument’ (Coker 1999, p. 95).  Just 
as outsourcing to private military companies can offset disillusioned societies and 
soldiers, outsourcing to insurgencies and low intensity conflicts may also become a 
growing way of warfare for many societies.  Record explains that casualty aversion 
requires methods of outsourcing to insurgencies.  He states: ‘A more promising ap-
proach to the strategic problem posed by force-protection fetishism would be a 
greater U.S. cultivation of and reliance on local surrogates to assume the costs and 
risks of ground combat’ (Record 2000, p. 10).  
Outsourcing warfare to insurgencies has a number of advantages as well as a 
number of potential drawbacks.  The PAT theoretical literature illuminates many 
such considerations to outsourcing.  A state may incur greater costs and risks under 
delegation through two scenarios.  First, states and surrogates may have diverging 
interests, or what is referred to as ‘moral hazard’ (G. J. Miller 2005).  The greater the 
moral hazard, the more the state must incur costs to incentivise and monitor the rebel 
group, and the higher the risk that the interests of the state will be compromised.  Se-
cond, as a state partially or fully relinquishes operational control to an insurgent 
group or groups, it may find that the skills and abilities of the insurgents (agent) are 
relatively lower than those of the state (principal).  Such a scenario may result in a 
loss in the overall benefits for the principal or, in more extreme cases, mission fail-
ure.  Hence, as both the comparative skills and interests of the rebel group diverge 
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from those of the state, delegation will become a relatively more costly and risky 
strategy.   
Additionally, as is explored further in Chapter 6, while outsourcing to insur-
gencies may offset the costs and risk of warfare, achievable policy goals may be 
rangebound.  As Record notes, ‘our new way of warfare may be of limited value in 
situations requiring the conquest, occupations, and administration of territory’ 
(Record 2002, p. 20).  These and other limitations may either temper strategies of 
outsourcing to insurgencies, or serve to inform its specific tactics.  For example, Op-
eration Falcon Freedom in Libya and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
both employed mixed-methods that incorporated conventional air power with sup-
port of local insurgents, while decision makers employed a strategy of direct warfare 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Andres, Wills, & Griffith Jr 2006).  
 
Secrecy and partial anonymity 
Outsourcing to insurgencies also offers states another potential advantage: to engage 
in conflict covertly or with a diminished presence.  Partial or full anonymity offers a 
number of advantages.  States may avert domestic political costs and constraints, in-
ternational backlash from other states or international institutions, regional 
retaliation, and local outrage and resistance within the target state (Salehyan 2010, p. 
16).  States may secretly (or openly) support insurgencies with troops, military assis-
tance, financing, and safe havens.   
Full secrecy or covert support for insurgencies enables states to avoid reprisal 
from other states and international organisations, and may evade domestic political 
constraints and disaffection.  The Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, for example, as well 
as U.S. support of the Permesta rebels against the communist government of Indone-
sia under Sukarno, were both covert operations that likely would have attracted 
international resistance (or reprisal) if done openly.  The United States’ support for 
the Contras against the Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction government in 
Nicaragua was conducted covertly in large part to circumvent domestic adversity and 
political constraints.  Bordering states, in particular, are able to provide territory to 
(or even initiate) rebel groups, while claiming that the territory has been occupied 
against the state’s will.  In 1986, for example, the Movement for Togolese Democra-
cy (MTD) attempted a coup against the government of Togo.  The MTD leadership 
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resided in Ghana, where Togo has alleged that the rebels originated from, and were 
supported by Ghana: a claim that government of Ghana denied.  
Partial anonymity also enables states to operate with a reduced presence that 
may be less likely to invites reprisal internationally, arouse disapproval at home, and 
may even be less objectionable to the target state and its neighbours: 
Because rebels are “domestic” actors with local ties, causal ambiguity 
about the origins of the insurgency, as well as uncertainty about the na-
ture of foreign direction and support, does not establish clear culpability 
in the same manner as border violations. Secrecy can be advantageous, 
so assistance is often given covertly, hiding information from disapprov-
ing international and domestic audiences (Salehyan 2010, pp. 11-2).    
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan provides an example.  Although the 
war effort was open, the ground operation was outsourced to the Northern Alliance 
in part to diminish the foreign presence in the war, under concerns of domestic and 
regional retribution.  The benefits of outsourcing to insurgencies depend on the inter-
ests and objectives of the state, the costs and constraints of interstate warfare, and the 
potential of existing surrogates and outsourcing strategies.  As interstate warfare be-
comes increasingly costly, restrained, and unattractive, the option of employing 
indirect warfare through surrogates may be rising in value as an alternative.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
A number of factors may affect a states impetus and ability to engage in interstate 
conflict.  A declining value of interstate warfare may represent shifting norms, or 
common identities, or an evolving moral aversion to warfare that may pacify states.  
Other factors represent a reduced ability of states to effectively engage in direct in-
terstate warfare.  Such factors include: a declining utility of warfare through 
changing costs, benefits, risks, and potential casualties; expanding domestic and in-
ternational constraints; and changing perceptions of warfare and sacrifice that 
undermine the ability to engage in warfare (e.g. high-casualty sensitivity).  
As states experience a declining ability to engage in interstate warfare, they 
may either pursue their objectives through peaceful means or engage in other meth-
ods of conflict.  There is increasing evidence that states, as they engage in interstate 
warfare less often, are increasingly outsourcing to insurgencies.  In many cases, out-
sourcing to insurgencies may offer a number of benefits that can circumvent 
obstacles and disincentives to warfare, and offer a higher overall expected value.  
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States may avoid major war with other powers through proxy wars or low-intensity 
indirect warfare, outsource part of the costs, risks, and sacrifice of warfare, offset 
aversions to casualties or conflict within the state or diffuse low enlistment numbers, 
and operate covertly or with a limited presence to avoid domestic and international 
reprisal.   
The following chapters analyse the theoretical framework in which a chang-
ing value (or expected value of direct interstate warfare may lead to increased 
outsourcing to insurgent groups as an alternative method to direct interstate warfare 
and the strategies that states may employ.  Additionally, the proceeding chapters will 
evaluate the changing character and effectiveness of insurgencies, which may impact 
both the capabilities of insurgencies as well as their potential value to outsourcing 
states.      
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3  Expected Utility of War and Transnational Insurgencies: 
Statistical Analysis 
 
 
 
The previous chapters have established a theoretical framework for a declining value 
of interstate warfare and an increasing effectiveness of insurgencies.  This chapter 
goes further to evaluate how state and non-state actors assess and choose methods of 
conflict, and to what extent (if any) the value of direct interstate warfare and the ef-
fectiveness of transnational insurgencies has shifted in a way that may affect these 
decisions.  The first section develops a theoretical framework in which state and non-
state actors rationally assess relative values of direct interstate warfare and transna-
tional insurgencies. This theoretical structure is based on the expected utility theory 
of war, but expands the concept to include non-state actors and both direct and indi-
rect warfare.  The second section then quantitatively measures the trends in relative 
values of direct and indirect strategies since 1945 to determine if there is evidence 
that the value of interstate warfare is declining and/or that transnational insurgencies 
are becoming more effective.   
 
3.1 The value of direct and indirect methods 
The value of warfare refers to the net benefits that can be gained through a conflict, 
while factoring in the estimated associated costs, sacrifice, and risk.  Hence, the val-
ue of interstate warfare may be changing in three areas: interests, costs, and risk.  
First, the interest (or preferences) that states have in changing the status quo and their 
willingness to use force may change the demand for war.  Second, the costs of war in 
terms of economic commitments, required loss of life and political constraints, and 
that state’s sensitivity to (or acceptance of) these costs, affect the real and perceived 
value of war.  And, third, advancing weapons and shifting power structures, relative 
power, and alliances may alter the estimated risk and uncertainty of interstate war-
fare. This risk and uncertainty is either amplified or muted by the risk-adverse or 
risk-accepting dispositions of actors.   
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Within this framework, there are a number of reasons why many scholars ar-
gue that interstate warfare may be declining in value and that transnational 
insurgencies may be increasing in effectiveness.  Technological changes are thought 
to inflate the costs, loss of life, and risk of war, while economic changes are often 
theorised to render war less profitable (or unprofitable).  Additionally, some believe 
that societies (particularly in the West) are becoming increasingly disillusioned the 
rising risk and casualties (both friendly and foe) from warfare.  These changes are 
agued to diminish the will and ability of states to engage in war.  At the same time, 
insurgencies may be growing in strength and effectiveness, largely through transna-
tional networks.  Transnational insurgent networks are able to conduct international 
operations, expand their resources and expertise through outside state and non-state 
actor support, and harness organisational advantages gained from the use of flat, 
flexible network structures that are difficult to detect and disrupt.   
The expected utility theory of war establishes a conceptual framework in 
which to evaluate the costs and benefits of interstate warfare.  This study uses the 
assumptions and concepts of the expected utility theory to build an expanded analy-
sis that incorporates both state and non-state actors and direct and indirect methods 
of warfare.  Therefore, actors that wish to change the status quo may evaluate the 
means of violence and non-violence, as well as methods of warfare (i.e. indirect or 
direct warfare).  States may choose to outsource to insurgencies as an alternative to 
direct interstate conflict to avoid major wars, reduce and/or pass on many of the costs 
and casualties of war, and avoid international reprisal and domestic and international 
political constraints to war.  Similarly, as transnational insurgencies become more 
effective, both domestically and internationally, non-state actors may be increasingly 
incentivised to initiate and/or support insurgent groups as a means to pursue their 
domestic and international interests.   
Hence, the decision to engage in non-violent influence, direct interstate war-
fare, or indirect methods of outsourcing to insurgencies depends on the interests and 
values and goals of the actors and the specific costs, constraints and risk of a poten-
tial conflict.  These factors may be influenced by changing values (and relative 
values) of direct and indirect methods of warfare.   
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3.1.1 The expected utility of war 
The expected utility of war literature develops a theoretical framework to explain 
how states estimate the value of engaging in war (Bennett & Stam 2000; Bueno de 
Mesquita 1980, 1983, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992).  There are several 
components of the expected utility theory that will be used here to develop a new 
theory of the expected value of direct and indirect methods.  First, the expected utili-
ty theory establishes a rationalist approach to interstate war based on the assumption 
that states will seek to maximize utility (or to move as closely as possible to their 
ideal set of preferences).  Second, it establishes concepts that may guide those deci-
sions.  These include their preferences and objectives (i.e. outcomes), the associated 
costs including economic factors, loss of life, and political constraints, and the levels 
of risk and uncertainty associated with a given strategy.  Third, scholars of the ex-
pected utility theory often construct game theory models to develop possible violent 
and non-violent options and outcomes.  And, fourth, the expected utility of war ap-
proach in many cases employs formal modelling to represent how states evaluate the 
expected value of warfare against alternative outcomes.   
One of the central assumptions of the expected utility theory is that state actors 
are rational utility maximisers.  The concept of utility maximization does not neces-
sarily refer to power or economic gain.  The expected utility approach denotes that a 
state’s preferences are its ideal outcomes, and the utility is the extent to which those 
preferences are realised.  The expected utility theory only specifies that rational ac-
tors are able to know their preferences, order them transitively with an understanding 
of the intensity of those preferences, consider alternatives of achieving those ends, 
and devise relevant strategies (Bueno de Mesquita 1989, p. 144), as well as make 
rational estimations of risk and costs.   Hence, while the expected utility model em-
ploys rationalist assumptions for state behaviour, it incorporates a wide range of 
potential state preferences, such as ideological ambitions.  As Stanley Hoffman 
notes, ‘Power is a means toward any of a large number of ends (including power it-
self)’ (Hoffmann 1960, p. 31; Manus I. Midlarsky 1989).  Similarly, Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita states:  
Expected-utility theory shares the view that focusing on power alone is 
not enough.  It takes into account power through the estimation of 
probabilities of success and failure, but it also takes into account val-
ues and purposes through the estimation of utilities (Bueno de 
Mesquita 1989, p. 154). 
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Assuming a wide range of possible state interests, the preferences and objec-
tives of a state are critical to assessments of war.  A state’s interests are comprised of 
the weight of its preferences and the extent to which they diverge (or conform) with 
the preferences of another state or states.  The extent and weight of disagreement be-
tween states or groups of states determines the impetus for a state to change the 
status quo.  Accordingly, a state’s objectives represent a position between the status 
quo and its ideal preferences, or a potential outcome.  The utility of this outcome is 
based on the extent to which it changes the status quo in the direction of desired 
preferences of the state or states.  This is what Bueno de Mesquita defines as ‘utili-
ties’ between states or groups of states.  He assigns a positive (1) utility in cases in 
which states have matching weighted preferences and ordering of those preferences, 
and negative (-1) in cases in which states or groups of states hold conflicting policy 
portfolios.  A positive utility presents policy agreement between states, while a nega-
tive utility suggest diverging interests and a higher possibility of coercion through 
violent (or non-violent) means.   
Additionally, the expected utility theory maintains that states assess their an-
ticipated costs, risk, and uncertainty for a given conflict.  The term costs can refer to 
a range of factors including foreseen economic losses (versus gains), the estimated 
loss of life that will be required for a given conflict, and domestic and international 
constraints (or political costs).  Cost may be affected by technology, relative power, 
economic changes that diminish the benefits of conquest, or domestic and interna-
tional political costs (i.e. domestic political systems and international institutions or 
alliances).  States will also consider the risk and uncertainty associated with a con-
flict.  Risk is also influenced by technology, relative power and international 
alliances, and other factors, such as the likelihood that other states or groups may 
join the fight.  Uncertainty is similar to risk, but is distinguished as the extent to 
which, ‘the objective probability values attached to alternative outcomes is un-
known’ (Bueno de Mesquita 1980, p. 918).   
The assessment of costs (economic, human, and political) and risk and uncer-
tainty are relative to the value in which societies, and leaders ascribe to them.  Risk 
acceptance, for example, can vary between societies and may also be affected by 
technology such as increasing firepower, nuclear weapons, and the RMA.  For ex-
ample, Bueno de Mesquita (1985) incorporates ‘risk–adversity’ and ‘risk–taking’ 
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predispositions of states in the quantitative assessments of the expected utilities of 
war.  Other factors such as casualty aversion (on both sides) and changing attitudes 
towards warfare may alter the perceived costs of conflict.49  Thresholds of casualty 
tolerance differ in different societies, can be influenced by the technology that exacts 
those casualties, and may also vary by the objective.  Record (2002) traces casualty 
sensitivity in the U.S. back to the Vietnam War, noting that both the roles of societal 
values and history influence casualty sensitivity for ones own side and even for the 
opposing side.   
Additionally, the conflict itself may influence societal thresholds for casual-
ties.  As Record (2002) explains, casualty aversion the may be ‘situation specific’, or 
determined by the level of national interest or necessity.  Similarly, Peter D. Feaver 
and Christopher Gelpi (2011) also argue that the U.S. public’s tolerance casualty is 
higher than generally thought, but hinges on the perceived importance of the foreign 
policy objectives.  Additionally, the emergence of humanitarian warfare and limited 
warfare implies growing casualty sensitivity, particularly among Western democra-
cies, for both sides of a given engagement.  As Thomas A. Keaney asserts, one of the 
results of Operation Dessert Storm was to circumvent unease with casualties: ‘Just as 
important as the operational thresholds crossed in this war were the political thresh-
olds, among them heightened Western sensitivity to casualties, both friendly and 
enemy’ (Keaney & Cohen 1995, p. 214). 
Using these rationalist assumptions and concepts of preferences, costs, risk, 
and uncertainty, a number of scholars model the framework in which a state evalu-
ates decisions to engage in conflict (or to negotiate or acquiesce) with another state 
or group of states.  John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) in Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior develop a game theory approach that established 
much of the basis for expected utility theory.  Bueno de Mesquita (1980, 1983, 
1985), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), and James Fearon  (1995) use this 
structure of rational game theory to evaluate the expected utility of war as a mathe-
matical concept represented through formal modelling.50  The resulting models vary, 
                                                      
49 Risk adversity is not empirically measured in most studies of the expected utility of war, and will 
not be estimated here due to lack of data.  However, the value that decision makers and societies asso-
ciate with sacrifice is relevant at the theoretical level as a factor that influences the expected value of 
warfare.   
50 Other approaches to formal modelling and the expected value of warfare evaluate terrorism, institu-
tions, civil war, bargaining, and other studies of conflict.   
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but conceptually assess the expected utility of war between two states (or groups of 
states).  
Formal modelling of the expected utility of war can be as complex as the 
game theory formation, but often involves a comparative function between a dyad or 
groups of dyads (A and B) that weighs the expected utility of the most preferred out-
comes against the estimated probability of success (or failure) and the anticipated 
costs.  For example, James Fearon compares the expected utilities of two states (A 
and B) through their utilities for an outcome (𝑢! 𝑥 ), the associated costs (𝑐), and 
risk, or probability of success (𝑝) and the probability of failure (1− 𝑝) (Fearon 1995, 
p. 387): 
(Eq. 1) expected utility of war, Fearon, x ∈ a, b , 𝑢! 𝑥 ≥ 𝑝 − 𝑐!  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑢! 1 − 𝑥 ≥ 1 − 𝑝 − 𝑐!; 
where ‘x’ is the outcome most preferred by A, ‘uA(x)’ is A’s perceived utility for its preferred outcome, 
‘p’ is the is the estimated probability that A will win a given a conflict, and ‘CA’ is the costs for A in a 
given conflict.  Conversely, ‘uB(x)’ is B’s utility for its preferred outcome, ‘1 – p’ is the is the proba-
bility that A will loose given the use of force, ‘CB’ is the costs for B in a given conflict.   
Fearon theorises that both states will accept negotiated agreements in which 
the utility exceeds the anticipated costs and risk of conflict.  However, if the value of 
an outcome (x) falls below the value of the costs and risk of conflict, a result of war 
is expected. These ranges of bargaining and war are represented as follows in figure 
3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1:  The Bargaining Range 
 
Source: Fearon, J. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organiza-
tion, 49(03), 379-414, p. 387. 
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Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) model the expected utility 
of war for pairs of states (or groups of states): ‘i’ and ‘j’.  The theory compares state 
interests, or the desired change to the status quo (𝑈! ∆𝑆𝑄!" ) versus a function of the 
costs associated with a given conflict and the projected risk of failure (𝜙 1− 𝑃! 𝑈!"! ) 
(see: Equation 2).  If the expected utility of war exceeds 0, then the assessed benefits 
of war exceed the projected costs, loss of life, and constraints.  This condition is a 
necessary for war but does not guarantee the outcome.  Bueno de Mesquita and Lal-
man (1992) represent their approach to the expected utility theory of war through 
formal modelling as follows: 
(Eq. 2) expected utility of war, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, Ε! 𝑈!" = 𝑈! ∆𝑆𝑄!" −   𝜙 1 − 𝑃! 𝑈!"! ; 
where 𝛦! 𝑈!"  is the expected utility of war for state ‘i’ against ‘j’, 𝑈! ∆𝑆𝑄!"  is state the expected 
benefit of a change in the status quo for ‘i’ relative to ‘j’, and 𝜙 1 − 𝑃! 𝑈!"!  represents the costs and 
risk associated with the conflict. 
The expected utility of war framework has been tested by a number of empirical 
studies that evaluate its ability to predict interstate conflict.  Bueno de Mesquita 
(1983, 1985) in The War Trap and ‘The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected 
Utility Model’, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) in War and Reason, and later, 
Bennett and Stam’s (2000) ‘A Cross-Validation of Bueno De Mesquita and Lalman's 
International Interaction Game’, all find statistical evidence that the expected utility 
of warfare is a predictor of actual war between states.   
The study presented here, however, incorporates the rationalist assumptions, 
the conceptual theories of preferences, costs, risk, and uncertainty, and the game the-
ory and formal modelling approach into an expanded model.  This model, referred to 
as the ‘expected value of direct and indirect warfare’, includes both state and non-
state actors, and direct and indirect methods of warfare.  The purpose of this model is 
to understand how states evaluate and assess indirect methods (i.e. non-state actors 
and transnational insurgencies), incorporate indirect methods into their strategies, 
and may be affected by changing relative values of direct and indirect methods.   
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3.1.2 The expanded expected value of warfare  
The term ‘expected value of warfare’ is used here to emphasise the inclusion of in-
terests beyond power and economic utility, as well as perceived costs based on 
attitudes towards risk, sacrifice, and conflict.  As noted earlier, the expected utility 
theory allows for a diverse range of state preferences and different assessments of 
costs and risk.  Therefore, states may consider potential gains in power or economic 
utility, and may also include the role of ideas and purpose, including the interest in 
power to preserve other purposes.  Non-utilitarian explanations of declining conflict 
can be found indifferent schools of thought, such as the cultural approach that war is 
declining in expected utility as an idea (Mueller 1988, 1990, 2004), or the school of 
evolutionary psychology, which argues that human nature is evolving away from 
violence (Pinker 2011).  Other theories contend that preponderance of power is ef-
fective for the avoidance of conflict and longer lasting alliances based on common 
ideas and interests (Organski & Kugler 1980; Wohlforth 1999).  While Bueno de 
Mesquita and others allow for perceptions and attitudes towards sacrifice and risk, 
the approach offered here stresses societal attitudes towards warfare in general, sacri-
fice (on both sides), and predispositions to risk and uncertainty.  
The second, and more important, theoretical modification is the expansion of 
the expected utility model to include non-state actors and both direct and indirect 
strategies of warfare.  As investigated in the preceding chapter, much of the existing 
theoretical analysis is centred on direct interstate conflict.  Similarly, existing empir-
ical research on the expected utility of war is based on state-centric assumptions.  
These studies primarily measure the expected utility of direct interstate conflict be-
tween state dyads and the ability of the model to predict the outbreaks of interstate 
war.  However, outsourcing conflict to insurgencies may mitigate costs and risks of 
interstate warfare and, in some cases, could offer a higher expected.  For example, 
the NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, or Operation Enduring Freedom, creat-
ed a model of warfare which outsourced much of the ground operations to the 
Northern Alliance, to reduce the risk, costs, and sacrifice, while accelerating the 
speed victory (Andres et al. 2006).  Similarly, Iranian backed insurgent networks 
have been effective in Iraq and elsewhere (Felter & Fishman 2008; K. S. Gleditsch & 
Beardsley 2004).  Furthermore, as transnational insurgencies network with a range of 
state and non-state actors, including outside insurgencies, non-state actors, and illicit 
90 
 
groups (Felter & Fishman 2007; McFarlane 2000; Williams 1994, 2001) they be-
come more effective and offer a greater overall expected value to both state and non-
state actors.   
This study considers the potential outcomes of both direct interstate warfare 
as well as indirect methods involving insurgencies.  The theoretical outcomes are 
established in the game theory model (or categorical assessment).  The game theory 
models created by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), and employed by Bennett 
and Stam (2000, 2000, 2000), for example, theorise that states will pursue their ob-
jectives through violent means (interstate conflict) or non-violent options (see Figure 
3-2).  In particular, they hypothesise several potential outcomes between two states 
(‘A’ and ‘B’): 1) acceptance of the status quo; 2) either A or B acquiesce; 3) A and B 
negotiate a settlement, 4) either A or B capitulate under the threat of force; and 5) 
either A or B go to war.  Most other studies often similarly espouse similar catego-
ries of ‘interstate war’ and ‘non-violent solutions’.  As such, most of the expected 
utility theory and research is state centric.  Hence, high costs and risk of direct inter-
state conflicts are thought to constrain warfare under this model.  By incorporating 
the option of indirect methods, rising costs, risks, and constraints of interstate war 
may lead to non-violent means as well as alternatives of indirect warfare.   
 
Figure 3-2:  International Interaction Game 
 
Source: Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Lalman, D. (1992). War and Reason: Domestic  
and International Imperatives: Cambridge University Press. 
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In order to expand the expected value of war framework to include indirect 
methods, it is necessary to begin with a decision theory model (or game theory ap-
proach) that includes options of indirect methods.  In a study of third world 
interventions by the U.S., Mi Yung Yoon (1997, pp. 585-6) creates a useful decision 
theory model that includes options of direct and indirect conflict (see Figure 3-3).  
The author operationalizes the concept of ‘intervention’ as an ordinal variable that 
establishes categories four options: 1) no intervention; 2) non-military intervention; 
3) direct military intervention; and, 4) indirect military intervention.  
 
Figure 3-3:  Categories of Intervention 
 
Source: Mi Yung Yoon (1997), Explaining Us Intervention in Third World Internal  
Wars, 1945-1989. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(4), 580-602, p. 586.  
 
Figure 3-4 integrates both the game theory approach of Bueno de Mesquita, 
B., & Lalman, D. (1992) with Yoon’s (1997) categories of direct and indirect con-
flict to generate a revised model for the expected values of direct and indirect 
warfare.  This model incorporates an ordinal variable of ‘influence’, and the options 
of direct or indirect methods as well as non-violent options.  Influence refers to a 
state decision to compel another states through either violent or non-violent means.  
Nonviolent means may include the threat of force (sabre rattling), diplomacy, negoti-
ations, sanctions, or other methods.  This study considers two means of violent 
influence: direct interstate warfare and indirect conflict involving the initiation 
and/or support of insurgencies.  Within direct and indirect methods, there are also a 
number of potential tactics.  For example, a state might support an insurgency or en-
gage in an integrated strategy of air support and special operations, each of which 
present different costs, benefits, risk, and potential sacrifice.  Additionally, while 
non-state actors may not consider direct interstate conflict, they may consider violent 
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or non-violent options of influence, which may offer increasingly effective methods 
and tactics.  
 
Figure 3-4:  Categories of Intervention: Direct and Indirect Methods 
  
 
According to Figure 3-4, actors that seek to influence another state or states have 
several possible outcomes: 
1. Accept the status quo;  
2. Influence the state or states through non-violent means (i.e. negotiations, 
sanctions, international institutions, etc.);  
3. Influence the state or states through direct conflict (i.e. a direct invasion 
or military action); and, 
4. Influence the state or states through and indirect strategy (i.e. outsourcing 
to insurgencies).   
When evaluating options of conflict, decision makers are expected to assess 
the net benefits (or losses) of direct and indirect methods.  As presented below, this 
assessment may include the evaluation of direct methods independently and by com-
parison of the methods against each other:  
(Eq. 3) expected values of methods, 𝐸!"#! ⋁!" ≥ 0        𝑎𝑛𝑑          𝐸!"#! ⋁!" ≥ 0          𝑎𝑛𝑑        𝐸!"#! ⋁!" ≤ 𝑜𝑟 ≥ 𝐸!"#! ⋁!" . 
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where 𝛦! 𝑈!"  is the expected value of direct interstate war for state ‘i’ against ‘j’, 𝐸!"#! ⋁!"  is the 
expected value of indirect warfare between for state ‘i’ against ‘j’. 
 
Finally, direct and indirect methods often involve multiple tactical choices 
that may be considered by decision makers.  Interstate wars, for example, may be 
fought through large-scale campaigns (i.e. total war) or limited warfare, as exempli-
fied in Kosovo through the heavy use of airpower under Operations Allied Force.  
Similarly, indirect methods may include a range of tactics.  In some cases, states 
have initiated insurgencies in outside states.  For example, Rwanda created the Lib-
eration of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) to counter attacks by the Interahamwe (a Hutu 
paramilitary organization) and the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) from refu-
gee camps in Zaire.  Other tactics may involve financial support, the provision of 
safe havens, weapons support, training, and the provision of troops.  Tactics may al-
so involve mixed-methods, which combine direct methods (often air-power) and 
indirect methods (i.e. outsourcing to insurgencies), as was the case in the Libya un-
der Operation Unified Protector.  
(Eq. 4) expected values of tactics, 𝐸!"#! ⋁!" ,𝐸!"#! ⋁!" …   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸!"#! ,𝐸!"#! ⋁!" … 
Hence, while outsourcing to insurgencies may yield different estimated costs, 
the specific tactic may also yield separate expected values.  For example, a state se-
cretly providing a safe haven to a neighbouring insurgent group or groups may 
render separate costs, risks, and benefits from a tactic of providing weapons and 
training or even troops.  While separate tactics will generally adjust the expected 
costs and risk associated with a conflict, the choice of method–whether to partially or 
fully outsource conflict–will yield distinct estimated costs and projected risks.   
By including direct and indirect methods of warfare, we can theorise about 
the changes that will influence their use or abstention.  Both direct interstate warfare 
and indirect strategies of outsourcing to insurgencies have different advantages as 
relative options for state actors, and as possible tactics for non-state actors.  The ex-
pected value for interstate warfare is high when the states have significant interests in 
changing the status quo, expect low costs, and anticipate a high probability of suc-
cess (or low risk).  As the probability of success decreases (or risk is elevated) and 
the expected costs of interstate warfare rise, the expected value declines.  Similarly, 
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the expected value of initiating or supporting insurgencies is higher when the risk is 
low, the probability of success high, and the costs are low.  Hence, the direction of 
the variables changes the expected utility equations for direct interstate conflict and 
indirect conflict as follows: 
(Eq. 5) high expected value of direct interstate warfare, ↑ 𝐸!"#! ⋁!"   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   ↑ 𝑈 ∆𝑆𝑄 , ↑ 𝑃!"#! , 𝑎𝑛𝑑   ↓ 𝐶!"#! ; 
(Eq. 6) low expected value of direct interstate conflict, ↓ 𝐸!"#! ⋁!"   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   ↓ 𝑈 ∆𝑆𝑄 , ↓ 𝑃!"#! , 𝑎𝑛𝑑   ↑ 𝐶!"#! ; and, 
(Eq. 7) high expected value of indirect warfare (outsourcing), ↑ 𝐸!"#! ⋁!"   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   ↑ 𝑈 ∆𝑆𝑄 , ↑ 𝑃!"#! , 𝑎𝑛𝑑   ↓ 𝐶!"#! ; 
where, 𝐸!"#! 𝑈!"  and 𝐸!"#! 𝑈!"  are the expected utilities of direct interstate conflict and indirect con-
flict respectively, 𝑈 ∆𝑆𝑄  is state A’s utility to change the status quo with another state, 𝑃!"#!  and 𝑃!"#!  
is the probability of state A to win using direct and indirect methods respectively, and 𝐶!"#!   and  𝐶!"#!   is state A’s estimated costs. 
It is argued that the relative expected value of indirect methods has been in-
creasing since the Second World War, while the expected value of direct interstate 
warfare is espoused to be falling.  These changes are brought about by technological 
developments, economic changes, power displacement, changing domestic and in-
ternational institutions, and increasing societal adversity to war, casualties, and risk 
that makes interstate warfare less advantageous and desirable.  At the same time, 
transnational insurgencies are thought to be growing in effectiveness domestically 
and internationally, and make possible a form of warfare that is more effective for 
state and non-state actors, and diminishes the costs, sacrifice, risk, and uncertainty of 
direct interstate warfare.  These changes, which will be tested in the following sec-
tion, suggest that the expected value of indirect methods is rising in value relative to 
direct interstate warfare, and state and non-state actors may be more willing to initi-
ate and/or support insurgencies as a strategy of warfare.  
While there is evidence of this trend, there are a number of considerations.  
First, the expected value of direct and indirect warfare is highly dependent of a given 
situation.  As Most and Starr (1984) assert, specific circumstances lead to different 
foreign policy outcomes.  For example, in some cases secrecy may be an essential 
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element that renders direct interstate warfare impossible.  U.S. support of the 
Permesta rebels against the communist government of Indonesia under Sukarno dur-
ing the Cold War was an operation that would have likely been met with 
international resistance or sanctions if done openly.  Conversely, if leaders are en-
gaging in a diversionary war to increase their chances of remaining in power (Levy 
1989; A. Smith 1996), then a covert operation would no longer provide a benefit.  
Therefore, while the relative values of direct and indirect methods may be changing 
and the use of transnational insurgencies increasing, their expected values and direct 
applications remain specific to each case.   
A second consideration is that the objectives of conflict may change when a 
state incorporates indirect methods of warfare.  While the costs and sacrifice may 
decline with indirect methods, a state may be forced to forgo some of its preferences.  
For example, if a state wishes to promote democracy in a another state, or ensure that 
it acts pacifically in the future, then direct interstate warfare may be more appropriate 
to ensure the attainment of the objectives.  As Record notes, the strategy of combined 
airpower and outsourcing to local surrogates (e.g. insurgencies)  ‘may be of limited 
value in situations requiring the conquest, occupations, and administration of territo-
ry’ (Record 2002, p. 20).  These and other limitations may temper strategies of 
outsourcing to insurgencies, or guide the use of tactics.   
Relative costs, risk, and uncertainty (real or perceived) for indirect warfare 
can also rise beyond expectations.  While in many cases indirect methods may lower 
costs and mitigate risk, there some unique costs and risks associated with outsourc-
ing conflict to insurgencies.  As Heraclides elaborates, external involvement is 
constrained by ‘economic, domestic and international political considerations and 
consequences’ (Heraclides 1990, p. 354).  Financial support may prove draining, par-
ticularly in cases in which a state becomes engaged in a regional and neighbouring 
state that may be less prosperous or even poor.  And strategies that involve troops 
may also include levels of risk.  In a similar line of thought, Hans J. Morgenthau ar-
gues that state perceptions often overestimate the potential of external intervention, 
stating, ‘both the need for intervention and the chances for successful intervention 
are much more limited that we have been led to believe’ (Morgenthau 1967, p. 103).   
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3.2 Trends in the expected utility of direct interstate conflict 
This thesis proposes that the value (or expected value) of direct interstate warfare has 
been falling since 1945, while the expected value (or effectiveness) of transnational 
insurgencies has been rising.  This section evaluates the trends in the value of inter-
state warfare and insurgencies since the Second World War to determine if trends 
confirm the hypothesis of a declining value of interstate war and rising potency of 
transnational insurgencies.  This empirical analysis employs a study of data over 
time from existing databases on the expected utility of war and insurgencies.  This 
chapter first operationalizes variables that are used to measure the expected values of 
direct and indirect methods and then tracks the trends of these of these variables over 
time.   
The study evaluates indicators of war in several areas.  First, the extent to 
which the preferences of states diverge are measured in the aggregate.  Aggregate 
utility (of the divergence and convergence of state preferences) reveals the overall 
impetus for warfare in any given year and its trends over time.  Changing relative 
preferences may occur as the interests of states change due to events or evolving 
preferences, or may be due to sifting alliances and power structure as well as ideas 
and attitudes to warfare.  Second, the constraints, costs, and risk and uncertainty of 
interstate warfare are assessed from 1945 onwards to determine those trends.  These 
include: a) the relative capabilities of powers (increasing or decreasing asymmetries 
of power), b) the costs and risk of war measured by the probability of success given 
relative strength of states and their allies; and, c) the domestic political constraints 
that limit the powers of decision makers to go to war.  These factors are evaluated 
together to assess the trends in the expected value of direct interstate warfare.  And, 
third, the aggregate strength of insurgencies over time will be calculated to determine 
if their overall strength has increased or decreased since the Second World War, and 
the extend of the change.  
The results illuminate if and to what extent the expected value of interstate 
warfare and the effectiveness of insurgencies have changed since 1945, the drivers of 
these changes, and their overall trends over time.   If direct interstate conflict is be-
coming more risky and costly while indirect methods are becoming more potent, 
then it is possible that more insurgencies may be initiated and that state and non-state 
actors may support insurgencies more frequently.  Additionally, a rising effective-
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ness of insurgencies since 1945 will indicate the possibility that transnational insur-
gencies are an increasingly effective tool for both state and non-state actors.  This 
analysis does not include all theoretical components of the expected value of war and 
the effectiveness of transnational insurgencies.  However, it establishes indicators by 
which to assess the trends of both direct warfare and intra-state conflict since 1945.  
 
3.2.1 Data 
The concepts and measures of this study will be developed in two areas: the expected 
value of war and the effectiveness of insurgencies.  Many studies on the expected 
utility theory also provide quantitative research that has developed indicators in 
which to measure the specific elements of the expected utility of war.  These studies 
create measures of relative state preferences (the interest of states to change the sta-
tus quo with another state or states) and estimated risk and costs of conflict.  The 
approach by (Bueno de Mesquita 1983, 1985) and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
(1992)  both establishes theoretic formal modelling of the expected utility of war and 
devises quantifiable variables that form the basis for much of the empirical research 
for the expected utility of war.  Their approach is applied to alliance research and 
other areas.  The authors (and subsequent researchers) operationalize the measures of 
state preferences, costs, and risks of war through the creation of proxies to measure 
state utilities (preferences), estimated costs, and probabilities of success for given 
conflicts.   
Empirical studies also statistically measure the relationship between the ex-
pected utility of conflict and the occurrence of conflict between state dyads.  Bueno 
de Mesquita and Lalman empirically test the model through a Probit statistical analy-
sis to measure the reliability if the expected utility of conflict as a predictor of actual 
conflict.  The original Probit models of expected utility by Bueno de Mesquita, in 
The War Trap, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, in War and Reason and ‘The War 
Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model’, used data for European states 
based on available information from 1815 to 1979.  The analysis found a statistical 
correlation exists between the expected utility of conflict and actual conflict between 
European powers.  
More recently, Bennett and Stam (2000) have expanded Bueno de Mesquita 
and Lalman's (1992) original research to include the international system using in-
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creasingly available data and computer-generated techniques.  The authors found that 
under the larger data domain the expected utility of conflict is a predictor of actual 
conflict, but only when testing for politically relevant states or states ‘in which the 
two states are contiguous, or where one member is a major power’ (Bennett & Stam 
2000, p. 547; Maoz & Russett 1993, p. 627).  Maoz and Russet posit that politically 
relevant dyads may demonstrate stronger statistical results because they posses a re-
alistic capacity to enter into conflict (Maoz & Russett 1993). Models of expected 
utility vary, but utilize rationalist assumptions of conflict, are often based on similar 
variables, and use a game theory decision model to describe the choices available to 
a state or group of states.  
The data for the following study will be taken from two sources: EUGene 
(the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program) and the Non-State 
Actors in Civil Wars data set (NSA) (Bennett & Stam 2000).  EUGene is a program 
for the creation of expected utility data, based on the models created by Bueno de 
Mesquita (1980, 1983, 1985) and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992).  The data-
base provides global data over time for directed-dyad-year, non-directed-dyad-year, 
and directed-dispute-dyad-year as the units of analysis for variables relevant to the 
expected utility of war.   
The second primary source of data for the empirical section, the Non-State 
Actors in Civil Wars data set (NSA), was developed by Cunningham et al. (2008, 
2009).  The NSA data set is based on the list of conflicts provided by the Uppsala 
University/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo Armed Conflicts Dataset, 
contains information on all rebel groups active since 1945, and includes information 
on rebel groups involved in conflict as well as their sources of foreign support. The 
NSA data set records the activities of non-state actors at the intra-state and transna-
tional levels, as well as the role of outside support for insurgencies and the estimated 
strength of each insurgency in a given year. 
 
3.2.2 Concepts 
State interests: Preferences, objectives, and interests, can be delineated as follows: 
Preferences refer to a states ideal outcomes; objectives refer to the target outcome 
established by an actor or actors; and interests denotes the difference between the 
status quo and a set objective or desired outcome.  The utility of conflict for a state is 
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based on the preferences that a state holds regarding potential conflict with another 
state.  And the interests of a state are defined here as the difference between the sta-
tus quo and a states objective.  The utility between two states or groups of states is 
the difference between both groups’ ideal outcomes, or preferences, and the weight 
of those preferences.  States that have similar preferences have limited incentives to 
influence the other group.  However, states with divergent interests over issues of 
importance will likely associate a higher the utility for a change in the status quo that 
favours their preferences. 
Economic Costs and Constraints:  Economic factors may also affect the ca-
pacity for international conflict.  Economic constraints may render the relative cost 
of war greater if the utility rendered from economic trade is greater than the potential 
gains of war (K. Knorr 1966; Rosecrance 1986) or create an opportunity cost in lost 
trade given the presence of conflict (Baldwin 1980; Cooper 1972; Keohane & Nye 
1973, 1974).  Direct interstate conflict is also theorised to have increasing operation-
al costs with declining potential gains as states move more from land based 
economies to those of skilled labour (Jervis 2002, p. 6).  Finally, in cases of occupa-
tion, the increasing possibility of insurgencies or long protracted guerrilla warfare, 
what Liberman (1996) termed the ‘quagmire perspective’, may also increase ex-
pected costs to direct interstate conflict.   
The costs of direct interstate conflict are theorised to decrease through out-
sourcing of conflict to third party non-state actors.  These costs may be reduced at 
the operational level, including a potential occupation, if conflict is outsourced to a 
transnational insurgency (Salehyan 2010).  Additionally, if the state is not openly 
involved in the conflict, trade relations for both state and non-state actors may not be 
significantly disrupted.  Therefore, the trajectory over time of interdependence of 
trade, costs of operation of war, and risk of occupation, should increase over time 
with the occurrence of indirect methods at the international level.  
The expected operational economic costs of direct interstate conflict can be 
operationalized through a measure of the relative strength of dyads, calculated 
through a function of the relative probability of success between dyads over time 
(Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992, pp. 297-8).  Although there is data on the actu-
al estimated costs of conflict, relative probabilities of success render an estimate of 
the expected costs, regardless if war is adverted or not; therefore, relative probability 
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of success is a more accurate measure of anticipated costs.  Finally, in some cases 
states that invade and occupy another state may face a risk of guerrilla warfare.  
Long sustained guerrilla warfare, or the quagmire perspective, is argued by Brooks to 
produce additional associate operational costs for cases in which there is a risk of 
local insurgencies (Brooks 1999).  Increasing threats and costs of guerrilla warfare to 
occupying states can be estimated as a function of the capacity of insurgencies over 
time.  If insurgencies are increasing in capacity over time, it would suggest that 
states, such as the U.S. and the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, would expect higher 
costs or risk proportionally.  
Risk and Uncertainty:  Risk (or the probability of failure) is largely contin-
gent on estimates of the relative power, resources, and alliances of the other state or 
states.  Therefore, the risk and uncertainty of a potential conflict are ultimately esti-
mated through indicators of relative capabilities and the provability of success (see 
below).  However, it is notable that the τb indicators (for state utilities) were revised 
in ‘The War Trap Revisited’ to include the factors of risk and uncertainty (Bueno de 
Mesquita 1985).  Previous calculations of the utility assumed a linear relationship 
between dyads that resulted in a zero sum game, as a positive utility between dyads 
would cancel out when reversed.  The amended indicator assumes that states vary in 
risk adverse and risk taking behaviour.  A tendency for a low overall expected utility 
implies that the state is altering policies to avoid the potentiality of conflict with the 
dyad, while acceptance of higher expected utilities would imply risk taking behav-
iour, resulting in risk taking and a unique measure of risk for each dyadic 
relationship (ri).  The ri formulation is applied to the utility function to establish a 
convex or concave curved utility function for each dyad member that accounts for 
risk taking or risk adverse behaviour.  Hence, overall expected utility of all non-
directed dyads will not be zero.  
Uncertainty, like risk, also plays a theorised role in the calculations of the ex-
pected utility of conflict:  
Leaders may be uncertain about the costs of conflict or the capabilities 
of their adversaries.  They may be uncertain about a foe’s preferences 
for alternative outcomes.  They may be uncertain about the beliefs 
their rivals have about them […] a principal source of uncertainty in 
international politics has to do with how a nation will respond to risky 
choices (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992, p. 298) 
Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman measure the variance for European states, and Ben-
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nett and Stam expand the data area to include the international system as a whole 
from 1816 to 1984, measuring uncertainty through risk variance yearly by region.  
Notably, while Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman find a statistical relationship between 
high uncertainty and a greater risk of war (when controlling for other variables), 
Bennett and Stam found ‘mixed results’ regarding the role of uncertainty as a predic-
tor of conflict (Bennett & Stam 2000, p. 558). 
 
3.2.3 Measures 
The empirical analysis will build on the framework data created by Bueno de Mes-
quita and expanded by others for measurements of the expected utility of conflict, as 
well as using conflict data from the NSA data set.  The existing data developed on 
the expected utility of conflict is often based on theory originally proposed by Bueno 
de Mesquita and Lalman, although often expanded and altered.  The statistical analy-
sis will operationalize and measure five variables:   
1. State preferences relative to the preferences of another state or group of 
states.     
2. State capabilities relative to another state or groups of states to determine 
the aggregate asymmetries of power internationally. 
3. The expected risk and cost of war measured by international power dis-
tributions that account for international alliances and distances between 
states.  
4. Domestic political constraints measured by the ratio of democracies to 
autocracies over time, and by an indicator of executive constraint that 
measures the level to which decision makers limited by thier institutions 
regarding decision of war (e.g. the requirement of congression-
al/parliamentary authority).  
5. The effectiveness of transnational insurgencies developed here, as an ag-
gregate measure of all insurgencies’ capacity of indirect conflict at the 
international level, will be measured through the capacity of transnational 
insurgencies over time, as well as an indicator for the risk of the guerrilla 
warfare. 
Measures of state preferences: In order to operationalize state utility of con-
flict with another state, without assumptions of preferences, utility of conflict is 
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measured by United Nations data on the relative similarities and differences in the 
foreign policy portfolios between states.  Therefore, utility is not measured by a cer-
tain expected benefit of conflict, but by the similarities of foreign policy portfolios of 
dyads of states or groups of states.  These portfolios may be caused by rationalist as-
sumptions of power, purposes and ideas, or the objectives of ideas through power.  
Tracking the alliance portfolios over time may be used to determine if there are 
trends toward declining utilities of conflict between states.  There are two indicators 
that may be used to measure trends in preferences, which ultimately measure the ag-
gregate impetus for influence (and potentially conflict).   
The Utility of Conflict (Kendal Tau-b Correlation):  The expected utility of 
conflict as defined modelled by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman are quantitative as-
sessments that measure the interest of a state or group of states to change the status 
quo with another state or group of states in a given dyad based on game theory out-
comes (Bueno de Mesquita 1980, 1983, 1985).  Therefore, according, a dyad 
consisting of state A and state B, state has three possible outcomes: a) achieving ones 
demand, 𝑈! ∆𝑆𝑄! ; b) giving the other side its demand, 𝑈! ∆𝑆𝑄! ; and, c) maintain-
ing the status quo,  𝑈! 𝑆𝑄  (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992, p. 286).  To 
measure states preferences, alliance data is used.  Alliance data yields quantitative 
data that is replicable and is not altered by hindsight or qualitative assignment of val-
ues.  The similarities and differences of alliance portfolios are considered reasonable 
predictors of the utility of conflict between states.   
The metric used to measure alliance portfolios’ relative similarities is named 
the Kendal Tau-b (τb).  This metric was conceptualised by Bueno de Mesquita (1975) 
as a measure for the utility of conflict.  The Kendal Tau-b correlation has become a 
standard for research on expected utility theory and research on alliance patterns and 
conflict.  τb is based on United Nations alliance data that dates back to 1816.  The 
indicator measures the strength of association for ordinal variables, yielding values 
from 0 to 1: 0 representing completely different alliance portfolios; 1 representing 
equivocal alliance portfolios.  The data evaluates available patterns of commitments 
of pairs of states through their portfolio agreement.  The portfolio agreement calcula-
tion is based on defence pacts and non-aggression or neutrality pacts between states, 
weighted on the strength of the agreement, and ranked according to the autonomy of 
decision makers.   
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The τb proxy for utility has advantages including a wide area of available 
standardized data that is not biased by interpretation.  The τb proxy for utility also 
has limitations.  Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman note that τb does not measure other 
indicators of state relations including ‘economic exchange, cultural transactions, de-
fensive military activities’ (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman 1992, p. 289).  The 
authors maintain that the required data is not available to create a more robust indica-
tor.  Although τb is widely used, there are also concerns that a categorical measure is 
more prone to error and incorrect coding of alliance information. 
The utility of conflict (S–score):  In an effort to create what may be consid-
ered a more reliable indicator of utility, Signorino and Ritter (1999) have developed 
the S–score (S) indicator, which is includes a wider range of data and incorporates 
different methods than traditionally offered by τb.51  There are four significant differ-
ences with the τb and S indicators:  First, S employs alliance data used in the τb 
variable, but also incorporates additional indicators including data on states’ foreign 
policy positions, UN voting, diplomatic missions, trade, and foreign aid between dy-
ads.  Second, Signorino and Ritter contest the effectiveness of ordinal methodology 
to yield accurate information on foreign policy positions because it only measures 
categorically ranked similarities between ordinal data.  They instead standardize the 
indicators and use a spatial method of measurement to calculate the extent to which 
policy commitments correspond and converge.  Third, the authors argue that some 
dyads register non-alliance scores though τb, implying diverging policies, when in 
actuality the dyads may be politically irrelevant to one another.  Therefore, the au-
thors include only policy relevant dyads.  Finally, the authors develop an indicator of 
capability (Sc) to weight the alliances based on state capabilities and to differentiate 
the strength and importance of an alliance.   
The development of S poses potential advantages.  The indicator is able to 
control for irrelevant political dyads that do not act as a true indicator of low utility.  
Additionally, the use of alternative data sources helps to reduce the potential error of 
recording implicit alliances between states that do not have or require formal allianc-
es.52  The spatial method of measurement and capacity for weighting based on state 
capabilities are also potential advantages.  Conversely, Bennett and Rupert measure 
                                                      
51 Additionally, Gartzke (1998) creates an indicator of utility based on UN voting patterns. 
52 Signorino and Ritter (1999) cite the relationship between the United States and Britain prior to 
World War I as an example of an understood implicit relationship between states.  
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and compare the results of both τb  and  S as an equilibrium predictor for the conflict, 
and find that: ‘Reanalysis of an important expected utility theory of war shows a 
stronger relationship between equilibrium predictions and conflict when S is used 
versus τb’ (Bennett & Rupert 2003, p. 115).  Hence, there may be concern that S may 
bias results by excluding states that are not politically relevant.   
Relative capabilities and the probability of success:  The theoretical frame-
work set-forth in Chapter Two established the case for a declining expected utility 
for direct interstate conflict, and, therefore, the emergence of indirect methods in-
volving non-state actors.  These theoretical claims will be empirically tested in the 
following section.  The first claim is that since the Second World War, the emer-
gence of major powers and nuclear weapons through advancing technology has made 
direct interstate conflict both more risky and more costly.  Asymmetric power rela-
tionships between states are argued to render direct interstate conflict less viable.  
Additionally, nuclear parity is argued to restrain the capacity for direct interstate con-
flict through the ‘stability-instability paradox’ (Jervis 1989, 2002; Snyder 1965).  
This section, however, will only test for diverging capabilities and overall asym-
metry of power.   
Relative Power and Expected Costs and Risk:  The trend over time for in-
creasingly destructive technology is apparent, particularly in the case of nuclear 
weapons.  However, it should be tested to what extent there are trends over time to-
ward regarding asymmetry of power.  If states are increasing in power at similar 
rates, then the relative power is not affecting greater asymmetries; however, if states 
are diverging in their power capabilities over time, then a greater tendency toward 
indirect methods may be expected.  Therefore, the section will test for the aggregate 
disparities of strength between all states over time.  The calculation is based on the 
Correlates of War (COW) CINC scores–a composite of the total population, urban 
population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and 
military expenditure.  The combined index of these scores yields an indicator of ca-
pabilities, and the resulting relative capabilities are calculated as a ratio from 0 to 1.  
The smaller the relative size of State A compared to State B, the greater the risk (or 
the lower the probability of success) and the higher the expected costs of a given 
conflict. 
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The probability of Success (PA): The probability of success measure (PA) is 
often used as a more accurate proxy for the estimated costs and risk of a given con-
flict because it accounts for relative power, but also incorporates distances between 
states and alliance patterns.  Accordingly, (PA) accounts for third party states that 
may influence the capability ratio of dyads through their expected participation in a 
given conflict.  PA scores are the sum of states capabilities and is weighted for the 
intensity of the preferences.  The distance between states is also factored into the 
probability of success.  The geographic distance between states was not originally 
factored into Bueno de Mesquita’s research because the studies only included Euro-
pean powers.  The expanded study of expected utility by Bennett and Stam and 
EUGene data include a calculation for the distance between states in the probability 
of success.53  Furthermore, the estimated operational costs of conflict are considered 
to be included within the relative probabilities of success between dyads.  Hence, the 
relative capabilities of states and the probability of success are also considered an 
indicator of expected costs of a given conflict.   
Political Costs and Constraints:  Political costs and structural constrains are 
also theorised to limit a state’s use of force, as well as potentially lead to the use of 
indirect methods to avoid these costs and constraints.  The Kantian peace theory con-
tends that economic interdependence, democratic institutions, and international 
organisations work in conjunction for what Russett and Oneal (2001) term ‘triangu-
lating peace’.  Although the impact of political constraints is debated, there are 
potential constraints to indirect conflict through both international and domestic in-
stitutions.  International institutions are thought to limit direct interstate conflict by 
establishing formal and informal rules, creating a common identity, affecting state 
interests, and coercing norm-breakers (Keohane 1988, 1990; Martin & Simmons 
1998; Russett & Oneal 2001).  Domestic politics are also theorised to constrain direct 
interstate conflict.  The popularity of a war domestically may constrain or enable the 
state to varying levels given the influence of domestic factors (Morgan & Campbell 
                                                      
53 Distance is calculated using latitude and longitude of international cities based on national capitals, 
except for the United States and Russia, for which multiple cites are used (Bennett & Stam 2000, p. 
550). 
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1991), and domestic structural limitations, such as veto points and institutional con-
straints, may also reduce the ability of leaders to go to war (Jervis 2002, p. 4).54  
This section tests if increasing political costs and constraints, while limiting 
the use of direct interstate conflict, may contribute to the use of outsourcing conflict 
to outside actors to avoid political constraints or costs.  Salehyan (2009, 2010) theo-
rises that state delegation to non-state actors can be done with partial or full anonym-
anonymity; such secrecy is theorised to either avoid or offset the political costs of 
direct interstate conflict through potential international condemnation, domestic dis-
satisfaction with a given conflict, and local outrage.  For example, following the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, Iranian networks were influential in part through secrecy 
(Felter & Fishman 2008).  Similarly, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was partially 
delegated to local groups, in part to create a lighter local footprint that would offset 
the possibility of local and regional outrage and a prolonged guerrilla war (Andres et 
al. 2006).  Hence, indirect warfare may be a method for state and non-state actors to 
avoid the political costs and risk associated with direct interstate conflict.   
The study will empirically test a variable of political constraint over time to 
determine the trends of political influence.  Quantitative estimates of international 
political constraints are difficult to estimate, and can be idiosyncratic to the conflict 
itself.  However, an estimate of executive constraint is quantifiable and comparable 
across cases.   A measure of executive constraint will be used to determine if con-
straints on decision makers have been increasing over time.  Increasing constraints 
over time would favour a strategy of delegation or partial delegation, while declining 
constraints to decision makers would favour direct warfare a viable option.   
Effectiveness of Insurgencies:  Thus far, the costs, constraints, and risk of di-
rect interstate conflict may stimulate the use of indirect methods as an alternative.  
Additionally, the effectiveness of those methods may also affect the expected utility 
of indirect methods as an alternative.  While the costs and risk of outsourcing con-
flict are theorised to be lower than direct interstate conflict, transnational 
insurgencies are also theorised to be escalating in effectiveness through several 
means.  Technological capacity is argued to have increased transnational insurgency 
effectiveness through increased digital communications that enable greater commu-
                                                      
54 Democracies, which have more public influence and greater stakes in a given conflict are often 
argued to posses more constraint for the decision to go to war.  For counterarguments see, for exam-
ple, Richard Betts (1992).   
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nication and operational effectiveness (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001; Castells 2000; 
Watts 2003).  Additionally, in the same way that Mao Zedong used greater speed and 
the local population for resources ‘like a fish to water’ ( Griffith & Zedong 
1937/1978, pp. 92-3), transnational insurgencies are argued to organise into flexible 
and elastic organisational structures (Powell, 1990) and to form transnational net-
works that expand their resources and capabilities.  Resources are thought to be 
available through outside supporting states (Daniel Byman et al. 2001; Lia & Kjøk 
2001), transnational criminal networks such as drug trafficking, money laundering, 
and illicit weapons trade (Castells 1996; McFarlane 2000; Williams 1994, 2001) 
(Williams 1994, 2001; Castells, 1998; McFarlane, 1999), ‘war economies’ and war-
lord activities (Cilliers & Dietrich 2000; Duffield 2002; Kaldor 2007; Le Billon 
2001, 2001), and other transnational insurgencies. 
It is possible to measure transnational insurgency networks, resources, and 
strength qualitatively.  For a statistical analysis for the strength of insurgencies is 
based on the aggregate number of participants and not the average size of insurgen-
cies.  This approach has been taken because transnational insurgencies often benefit 
from complex integrated networks; therefore; it is common to have a large number of 
smaller transnational insurgencies rather than a small number of large transnational 
insurgencies.  Therefore, the overall capacity of transnational insurgencies will be 
calculated as the strength of all insurgencies in each year, controlling for increasing 
population growth.  Estimated strength of all insurgencies per year will be calculated 
using the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars data set (NSA). 
 
3.2.4 Empirical analysis of global trends 
The prior chapter determined that there has been a shift in conflict from direct inter-
state conflict to transnational insurgencies from 1945 to the present.  As 
demonstrated by figure 3-5, the reported battle deaths since 1946 from state–based 
conflicts (controlling for population growth) has generally diminished.  This chapter 
has developed both the theoretical and qualitative variables inherent in the argument 
for the expected utility of war.  There are several theoretical concepts for analysis: 1) 
that the expected utility of direct interstate conflict has been rising since World War 
Two; and, 2) that indirect methods at the international level pose reduced costs and 
risk; and 3) the indirect conflict at the international level has experienced increasing 
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capacity.  Given these arguments, and assuming a constant level of international dis-
satisfaction with the status quo between dyads and groups of dyads, an expected 
value theory of warfare that includes options for both direct and indirect methods at 
the international level, it can be expected that rational shifts in strategic methods may 
occur when expected utilities change though costs, risk, and effectiveness of the 
methods.  Therefore, the costs, constraints, probabilities of success, and capacity of 
transnational insurgencies are measured over time. 
Utility of direct interstate conflict:  Utilities between states is a measure of 
state alliance portfolios.  The data used here is the unweighted S-score of state undi-
rected dyads from 1945 to 2000.  The use of the S-score yields alliance data and 
utilities based on more varied information and continuous measurement for a truer 
estimate of utility than the Tau-b indicator.  The S-score also only utilises politically 
relevant dyads, so that alliance data of states that are separated by large distances or 
lack the ability to realistically act against one another are not counted.  By tracking 
the mean S-scores for each year, the data shows that utilities for conflict have de-
clined moderately but consistently since 1949.  Decreasing aggregate utilities for 
conflict globally would support that that changing values and ideas or structural 
power relationships may in part be responsible for a decline in direct interstate con-
flict (see Figure 3-6).  
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Figure 3-5: Reported battle deaths from state–based conflicts, 1946–
2008/09 
 
Source: Human Security Research Group (2012). Human Security Report 2012: Sex-
ual Violence, Education and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative. Vancouver: 
Simon Fraser University. 
 
Figure 3-6: Aggregate mean state utilities for conflict 
 
 
Relative capabilities:  Relative capabilities has been measured from 
over the years 1945 to 2003 to determine if states are converging or diverging 
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in relative power, and thereby decreasing or increasing costs and risk of war-
fare respectively.  The analysis demonstrates that states are shifting to more 
asymmetric formations.  The data uses a measure of CINC scores between all 
dyads for each year tested.  Therefore, rising capacities and power will not in-
crease aggregate mean relative capabilities if nations rise at similar levels.  
However, diverging capabilities between dyads will yield higher scores, sug-
gesting greater asymmetries.  Figure 3-7 yields results of relatively level 
aggregate scores until approximately 1975, at which point scores increase by 
over four hundred per cent by 2003.  These results suggest increasing polarisa-
tion of capabilities.  Additionally, the results do not include the presence of 
nuclear weapons, which may also create both asymmetries of power interna-
tionally as well as significant constraints to direct interstate conflict (see Figure 
3-7).   
  
Figure 3-7:  Aggregate mean relative capacities 
 
 
Probability of success (PA):  The probability of success is measured using 
Bennett and Stam’s EUGene data, based on the work of Bueno de Mesquita and 
Lalman.  The variable includes state capabilities based on CINC scores, but also in-
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cludes data for alliances to estimate the allied groups for a given conflict and the 
probability of success.  The probability of success demonstrates convergence and 
divergence of power, risk, and estimated costs of a given conflict, accounting for al-
liance partners and geographical distances.  This (PA) formulation if often used as a 
measure for expected utility theory of war calculations as an indicator of costs and 
risk.  The outcome of the probability of success indicator over time is less stark than 
the relative power of individual states, as it is moderated by potential alliances.  
However, the results do demonstrate increasing costs and risk associated with direct 
interstate conflict since the Second Word War and up to the 1990s (see Figure 3-8). 
 
Figure 3-8:  Aggregate mean relative probabilities of success 
 
 
Political costs and constraints:  Political costs and constraints are measured 
here through the level of domestic political constraints.  Figure 3-9 is a Polity IV 
measure of democracy and autocracy scores over time (taken from the Center for 
Systemic Peace).  The figure suggests that there has been an increasing trend from 
autocracy to democracy.  This would support the theory of increasing domestic polit-
ical constraint, assuming the theoretical argument that democracies create greater 
constraint to direct interstate conflict than autocracies (see Figure 3-9).  However, 
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review of other Polity III data (variable name: EXCONST) from EUGene for the 
variables of executive constraint measure the level of constraint that the executive 
branch of government has from other parts of government (see Figure 3-10).  This 
measure ranges from zero to seven: zero representing the least constraint; and seven 
the most constraint.  This data was altered to control for highly negative data entries 
for outlier states.  Having noted this, the results demonstrate that executive constraint 
has risen since World War Two, although it has varied.  As the number of autocra-
cies peaked in the mid-1970s, the indicator for executive constraint fell to a low in 
1978, but has risen with the growing number of democracies.  Therefore, the trend 
suggests that it is possible that domestic constraint has deterred the use of direct war-
fare.     
 
Figure 3-9:  Democracy versus Autocracy 
 
Source: Center for Systemic Peace. Global Conflict Trends (1947-2012). 
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Figure 3-10: Executive constraint 
 
 
Capacity of transnational insurgencies:  The capacity of insurgencies has two 
purposes.  First, it measures if and the extent to which indirect warfare is becoming a 
more or less effective means of conflict at the international level.  Second, it creates 
an estimate of the risk of guerrilla warfare and local unrest that states may face dur-
ing an invasion or occupation.  The data for the level of insurgency effectiveness is 
taken from the NSA Data set. Figure 3-11 illustrates the total number of insurgencies 
and transnational insurgencies.  The graph illustrates a rising absolute number of in-
surgencies until its peak in 1991.  The total number of insurgencies declined since 
then, but the overall percentage ratio of transnational insurgencies to domestic insur-
gencies rose to about 87 per cent in 2004. Figure 3-12 illustrates the estimated size of 
all insurgencies from 1945 to 2010.  The measure is then divided by the total popula-
tion to control for global growth over time, and presented as a fraction of a 
percentage of the total population.  The data shows that from 1950 to the late 1990’s, 
rebel group size as a percentage of total population has increased by more that a fac-
tor of four, and slightly declined from 1998 to 2010.  However, while the aggregate 
number for rebel groups has increased, the number of rebel groups has also increased 
so that the size of the groups is not growing, but actually slightly decreasing.  These 
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results are in keeping with network theory of insurgencies, in which groups attain 
organisational advantages through flexibility and coordination with multiple other 
groups.  The results would also support concerns the thereat of escalation costs to 
strategies of direct interstate conflict that involve invasions and occupations. 
 
Figure 3-11: Domestic and transnational insurgencies 1945–2004 
 
 
Figure 3-12: Strength of transnational insurgencies 
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3.3 Conclusions 
Until now it has been largely theorised that the expected utility of conflict is declin-
ing due to changes in technology, the costs and economics of war, and human and 
societal attitudes toward war and conflict.  The purpose of this chapter has been to 
quantify and measure these patterns over time, as closely as can be done by repre-
sentative measurements, and to establish their observable trends over time.  
Additionally, this section has sought to determine if these trends suggest a scenario 
in which actors may choose indirect methods of warfare at the international level to 
avoid the costs, constraints, and risk of direct interstate conflict.   
The results have shown that while state utilities for conflict (or the extent to 
which states are in disagreement) may produce a partial decline in direct interstate 
conflict, the increasing costs, constraints, and risks of direct interstate conflict are 
also rising.  This study finds that rising disincentives (and barriers) to direct interstate 
conflict include trends towards diverging capabilities of states, increasing expected 
costs given those shifts, and the higher risk of guerrilla warfare in situations of state 
occupation.  Furthermore, this research finds that the capacity of transnational net-
works has, on the whole, been increasing since the Second World War through 
increasing numbers of insurgent groups that may receive support from outside state 
and non-state actors.  
This empirical analysis finds support for a declining expected value of direct 
interstate warfare and increasing aggregate effectiveness of insurgencies; however, 
there are limitations to this research.  This chapter has not established direct causali-
ty.  While crucial to the theory, these trends over time do not establish a scientific 
correlation with indirect conflict at the international level.  Additionally, while these 
trends may constrain and enable direct and indirect methods in the aggregate, the 
choice of methods varies from case to case.  Finally, while this study finds trends for 
a declining value of direct warfare, this overall trend can change in the future.  The 
following chapters review the causes of these trends in greater depth.   
Nevertheless, the trends of increasing costs, constraints, and risk to direct in-
terstate conflict, and increasing capacities of transnational insurgencies fit the 
hypothesised shift from direct interstate conflict to indirect methods of indirect con-
flict.  Russian development of New Generation Warfare is an example of a shift from 
direct to indirect methods to occupy and overthrow external states. Using Russian 
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military press documents, Jānis Bērziņš identifies eight stages of New Generation 
Warfare.  They include the use of political warfare (including bribing targeted offi-
cials, economic sanctions, and propaganda), the deployment of special operations 
forces within the target state, and the possible us of air power to establish a no fly 
zone.  As the author notes: ‘The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploy-
ing hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military 
and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government 
and country’ (Bērziņš 2014, pp. 5-6).   
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4  Foreign Intervention and Outside State Support  
for Insurgencies 
 
 
 
Outsourcing to insurgencies (as well as outside governments) has become a rising 
phenomenon that has developed a body of literature to explain outside intervention 
by states.  This chapter evaluates two wide themes of outsourcing to insurgencies and 
foreign intervention.  First, the presence or emergence of insurgent movements can 
elevate affective (e.g. affective or ideological) interests within the state, universal 
motivations, such as humanitarian goals, and security concerns regionally or interna-
tionally.  Second, insurgencies in an outside state can also present opportunities for 
states to support (or oppose) insurgent movements in order to advance their instru-
mental and non-instrumental interests within the state, regionally, or globally.  This 
chapter evaluates the conditions that incentivise states to intervene regarding insur-
gent movements, the calculus these states employ in evaluating opportunities and 
tactics of intervention, and the specific strategies and interests that they may promote 
by supporting and opposing insurgent moments in external states.   
 
4.1 Introduction 
Outside state support for insurgent movements is not an entirely new phenomenon of 
warfare.  France, for example, supplied large quantities of muskets to the Continental 
Army.  The French muskets were eventually referred to as ‘Charlevilles,’ named af-
ter the most commonly provided French musket: the Charleville Model 1763.55  The 
French navy, in particular, supported the Continental army with funds, troops, and 
even provisions such as clothing.56  Similarly, the Spanish guerrilla from 1808–14, 
the origins of the term ‘guerrilla war’, drew support from the British forces already 
engaged with the French in other theatres of the Napoleonic Wars.  ‘The Spanish in-
surgents provided the British excellent intelligence on French forces, and the British 
                                                      
55 National Museum of American History, French Charleville Model 1763 Flintlock Musket, Sur-
charged "US". The Price of Freedom: Americans at War.  
56 See: Record, J. (2007). Beating Goliath: Why the Insurgencies Win. Potomac Books, Inc. 
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in turn provided the insurgents direct and indirect military assistance’ (Record 2007, 
p. 35).  As Hans J. Morgenthau noted in 1967, ‘Intervention is as ancient and well-
established an instrument of foreign policy as are diplomatic pressure, negotiations 
and war.  From the time of the ancient Greeks to this day, some states have found it 
advantageous to intervene in the affairs of other states on behalf of their own inter-
ests and against the latters’ will’ (Morgenthau 1967, p. 425).  Thucydides, for 
example, in his historical accounts of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.), de-
scribes external states allying with rebellions, as such Athens’ support of Corcyra in 
its civil war against Corinth (Thucydides 431 B.C./1961).   
Despite its historical roots, the increased level of outside state support for in-
surgencies is a phenomenon, which, like the frequency of intra-state warfare, has 
increased after the Second Word War.  In 1945, just eight insurgencies received out-
side state support.  While the number of insurgencies varied since the Second World 
War, the percentage of insurgencies that receive outside state support has risen to 
well over half.  This trend peaked in 1991, at which time 47 insurgencies received 
outside state support (see Figure 4-1).  Although the absolute number of intra-state 
conflicts declined from 1991 to 2004 from 82 to 40, insurgencies with outside state 
actor support continued to grow as a percentage of all insurgencies.  Prior to 1960, 
insurgencies received outside state support in less than half of the cases; however, 
outside support for insurgencies has since climbed to over 50% since 1960, and may 
exceed 60% if we assume that a portion of insurgencies with outside support receive 
it with the approval of the state, or are secretly sanctioned by the state but con-
demned publically.57  Hence, while the number of insurgencies and the levels of 
outside state support have varied, state actor support of outside insurgencies has 
emerged as a common and significant factor following the Second World War.58  As 
Alexis Heraclides notes in ‘Secessionist minorities and external involvement’, we 
                                                      
57 In many cases, states covertly support insurgencies by ‘looking the other way’ when insurgencies 
use foreign territory to conduct their operations.  Figure 4-1 establishes a separate category for insur-
gencies with outside territories in states that do not provide open political or military support, and are 
not included in the number of state supported insurgencies.  
58 Daniel Byman et al. (2001), for example, argue that outside state support for insurgencies has de-
clined since the end of the Cold War.  They state: ‘Indeed, state support is no longer the only, or 
necessarily the most important, game in town.  Diasporas have played a particularly important role in 
sustaining several strong insurgencies.  More rarely, refugees, guerrilla groups, or other types of non-
state supporters play a significant role in creating or sustaining an insurgency, offering fighters, train-
ing, or other important forms of support’ (Daniel Byman et al. 2001, p. xiii). 
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may be tempted to conclude that, ‘involvement rather than non-involvement is the 
rule’ (1990, p. 352).59   
Outside support for insurgencies after the Second World War expanded at the 
beginning of the Cold War.  While the history of the period is characterised by the 
superpowers, the period of external intervention began with major powers engaged in 
colonial conflicts.  Following the Second World War, a number of late-held colonies 
by Portugal, France, and the United Kingdom resulted in intra-state conflicts.  French 
colonies or occupied territories after 1945 involved ten insurgent movements in 
Laos, Madagascar, Tunisia, Morocco, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Cameroon, and Algeria.   
The United Kingdom experienced violent decolonisation in Kenya, Cyprus, Borneo, 
South Yemen, Oman, and Maya (Malaysia).  The Netherlands clashed with the Indo-
nesian People’s Army in Indonesia, and Portugal faced insurgencies in Mozambique, 
Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. China also faced the Lhasa uprising in Tibet as well as 
the violent riots in Taiwan.60  
Many of these insurgencies were supported by outside states.  As Jeffery 
Record asserts: ‘There are few examples of colonial or post-colonial insurgencies 
that prevailed without foreign help’ (2007, p. 23).  Following the Second World War 
major powers sometimes faced insurgencies that received outside support from the 
U.S.S.R., the U.S., China, and Cuba, as well as neighbouring (or nearby) states.61  
For example, insurgent efforts to expel the French in the First Indochina War were 
supported militarily by the U.S.S.R. and China, which supported the Viet Minh in 
Vietnam.  Neighbouring Thailand supported Khmer Issarak in Cambodia and the Lao 
Issara in Laos.  Angola and Mozambique both received outside support in their anti-
imperialist conflict against Portugal.  And Congo, Zambia, Tanzania, Algeria, Zaire, 
Guinea, and Senegal also backed insurgencies in Angola.   
                                                      
59 ‘Foreign intervention’ is used here to describe state actor involvement on either side of a conflict (or 
both in cases of peacekeeping missions), while ‘outsourcing to insurgencies’ (or ‘outsourcing’) refers 
to state support of insurgencies or rebel groups.  ‘Intervention’, however, is often used to address a 
wide range of state actions including non-military support, support of governments against an insur-
gency or insurgencies, peacekeeping missions, and full military interventions (e.g. Kosovo). 
60 Although the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico is loosely classified as a colo-
ny/occupation, the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party also made an unsuccessful move for independence 
through riots and an attempted assassination of United States President Dwight Eisenhower.   
61 Historical records suggest that Russia became involved in colonial disputes in opposition to West-
ern imperialism, to exhaust democratic Western powers and to potentially gain future allies (Feste 
1992).  
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As the Cold War progressed, the major powers eventually became less in-
volved in support of outside insurgencies, while the involvement of the two 
superpowers increased.  Although insurgencies were often supported by a variety of 
outside actors, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (and often China) emerged as the primary ac-
tors.  Much of the literature on outside support for or against insurgencies from this 
period refers to ‘proxy wars’ where both sides intervened on opposing sides of an 
outside intra-state conflict (Dunér 1981; K. S. Gleditsch & Beardsley 2004).62  ‘In-
stead of confronting each other openly and directly, the United States and the Soviet 
Union have chosen to oppose and compete with each other surreptitiously through 
the intermediary of third parties’ (Morgenthau 1967, p. 427). 
The Greek Civil War (1946-9) was the earliest proxy war since the Second 
World War, in which Britain and the U.S. backed the Democratic Army of Greece 
(DSE) and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria supported the military branch 
of the Greek Communist Party (KKE).  Britain sent 40,000 troops and financial aid, 
while the US supported the DSE under the Truman Doctrine and through the Mar-
shall Plan.  Other examples include conflicts in Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, El 
Salvador, Lao, Korea, and Vietnam.  Although the U.S, the U.S.S.R., and often Chi-
na were the primary interveners, additional states were often involved.  Cuba, for 
example, supported a number of outside (pro-communist) insurgencies, including 
sending military advisors to support the MPLA (People's Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola) in Angola (Feste 1992, p. 150; Nuri 1987).  
It could be expected that the end of the Cold War would lead to a decline in 
state outside support of insurgencies.  Evidence suggests, however, that the trend of 
foreign intervention continued after the Cold War.63  In a study of 975 third-world 
interventions on the side of ethnic insurgencies, Deepa Khosla finds that from 1990 
to 1998 external support did not diminish, but increased from 141 to 151 (Khosla 
1999, p. 1145).64   
                                                      
62 The term ‘proxy war’ is used differently in the literature.  It is used here to specify competition be-
tween states that is waged through a third party.  Hence, outside support for insurgencies within 
competing power (e.g. Pakistan and India’s support of insurgencies within the other state), or the use 
of surrogate powers (e.g. Cuban support for outside insurgencies as a perceived extension of the Sovi-
et Union) are not included here.   
63 See, for example, Shahram Chubin (1991) ‘Third world conflicts: trends and prospects’, p. 154. 
64 Intervention, as defined by Khosla, employs ‘an inclusive notion of intervention that covers actions 
ranging from diplomatic support to economic aid and military assistance’ (Khosla 1999, p. 1154).  
However, when the author controls for military interventions, the results are similar.  
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The author states: ‘contrary to expectations, the end of the Cold War has not 
led to a significant change in either major power or regional power interventions.’  
He goes on to note: ‘Over one-half of all interventions are undertaken by states lo-
cated in the region where the conflict occurs’ (Khosla, p. 1143).  These regional state 
actors include: regional powers (e.g. India, Pakistan, China, Iran, and Turkey) with a 
strong influence in the region,65 neighbours (bordering states), and states that are in 
the region but neither border the state with an intra-state conflict nor rise to regional 
powers status.   
Data from the Non-state Actor Data base suggest that the initial emergence of 
external intervention involved major powers, followed by the dominance of the su-
perpowers and, finally, the increased external support by regional actors, while major 
powers (and former super powers) remained significantly involved.  Khosla, for ex-
ample, notes: ‘During the bipolar rivalry, the actions of these states were often 
circumscribed by the superpowers, which were usually their allies or provided them 
with substantial political, economic and military support because of the ideological 
nature of the challenges they faced’ (1999, p. 1148).  Some scholars (particularly ne-
orealist thinkers) view the trend to more localized geographical foreign intervention, 
or a least the emergence of intra-state warfare, to be a result of the end of the Cold 
War.   
Since 1945, the type of state actors that intervene for (and against) insurgen-
cies has changed, as well as international factors that guide state interests and tactics.  
However, the propensity to intervene and, in particular, to outsource to insurgencies, 
has emerged after the Second World War and, thus far, has remained a factor in the 
majority of insurgencies.  Within the larger scope of foreign intervention in external 
conflicts, this chapter evaluates why states support or oppose insurgencies in foreign 
states.  The proceeding analysis first evaluates the conflicts, interests, and conditions 
that are more likely to result in foreign intervention.  It then builds a conceptual 
framework for the decision to intervene in states with insurgent movements.  Finally, 
it reviews the specific instrumental and non-instrumental interests and strategies that 
states employ through outsourcing to insurgencies or foreign intervention more gen-
erally.  
                                                      
65 Khosla defines China as a regional power due to its primary orientation and actions within the re-
gion (Khosla 1999, p. 1147).  
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Figure 4-1: State support for insurgencies 1945 to 200466 
 
 
 
4.2 Actors, conflicts, and conditions of intervention 
Since the emergence of increased transnational state support for insurgencies, a 
number of studies have evaluated the impetus and effects of foreign intervention in 
outside states intra-state conflicts, and provide a wealth of research on this subject.67  
Over 40 years ago, Christopher Mitchell (1970) developed a ‘transnational theory’ of 
foreign intervention.  His theory holds that outside state intervention is influenced in 
large part by: a) the characteristics of the intra-state conflict; b) the characteristics of 
the intervener; and c) transnational linkages between the inventor and parties within 
the conflict; and d) the international system.  Over the years, an increasing number of 
studies have evaluated the external actors, the intra-state conflicts themselves, and 
the conditions that increase the likelihood of foreign intervention.68  
                                                      
66 ‘Insurgencies with outside state military support’ refers to all forms of military support including 
funding, training, the provision of weapons and supplies, safe-havens (outside territories in which the 
state openly supports the insurgents) and the use of state troops.  ‘Insurgencies with outside territories’ 
refers to insurgencies with troops in outside states, but the state does not openly support the insurgen-
cy.  In these cases is its difficult to determine if state support is non-existent or covert in nature.  And 
finally, the residual ‘all other insurgencies’ refers to insurgencies that are either domestic or receive 
support from non-state actors (including other insurgencies).   
67 This thesis evaluates state actor outsourcing to insurgent movements.  However, because foreign 
intervention on behalf of insurgencies and government are often similar and included in much of the 
literature, the wider concept of foreign intervention is included here.   
68 A number of studies also evaluate the effectiveness of foreign intervention.  For example, Khosla 
(1999, p. 1147) reviews the conditions when foreign intervention is likely and successful, while others 
evaluate the effect of outside intervention on the duration of intra-state conflicts (Balch-Lindsay & 
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Analyses that gravitate to the characteristics of the intra-state conflict and the 
state intervener and is referred to by Michael G. Findley and Tze Kwang Teo (2006) 
as the ‘phenomenon-centric’ and ‘actor-centric’ approaches to foreign intervention.  
Studies that employ the phenomenon-centric approach examine explanations of for-
eign intervention that reside in the conflict itself.69  For these authors, the type of 
intra-state (e.g. secessionist, irredentist, moves for autonomy or political change), 
and the groups involved and their linkages (e.g. ethnic, religious), influence the like-
lihood of outside support (Carment, James, & Rowlands 1997; Carment & Rowlands 
1998) and the severity of the conflict.  Many such studies are concerned with the fac-
tors within the conflict itself that influence or even drive foreign intervention.  
The types of intra-state conflict can vary widely.  A number of authors group 
interstate conflicts as follows: 1) secessionist conflicts that seek to ultimately suc-
ceed from a state; 2) efforts for internal change within the state, such as greater 
autonomy (or reduced economic or ethnic discrimination), increased representation 
and pro-democracy movements, violent overthrow of the government, or some other 
objective that alters the political dimensions within a state; and, 3) irredentist con-
flicts involving territorial disputes within a state (or entity) involving a group (often 
ethnic or religious) that is a minority within the state, but is a plurality within the re-
gion.  Ted Robert Gurr (1992) argues that intra-state conflicts that seek greater 
autonomy or secession are likely to receive outside support, while Suhrke and Noble 
(1977) and Heraclides (1990) note that outside support for state sovereignty and ter-
ritorial disputes is often tempered by fear of establishing a precedent for intervention.    
Irredentist conflicts also pose a unique synthesis of transnational ethnic link-
ages and territorial issues.  Irredentism can be defined as: ‘territorially-based 
minorities contiguous to a state controlled by their co-ethnics’ (Esman 1990, p. 83).  
Carment and James (1996) note that irredenta do not technically require ethnic-based 
claims on territory, as defined by Vasquez (1993, pp. 310-1).  ‘In reality, however, 
many irredenta are mixed and disputed about the nature of the claim usually involve 
                                                                                                                                                         
Enterline 2000; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce 2008; Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000; Fearon 2004; 
Rasler 1983; Regan 2002).  
69 Some authors employ both the characteristics of the phenomenon and the actors in their analysis.  
Khosla (1999) evaluates actors types and conflict types and conditions, while Lemke and Regan 
(2004) argue that major powers and colonial powers are more likely to intervene in conflicts where 
they have historical (colonial ties), or to sever intra-state conflicts characterised by high casualties or 
refugee problems.   
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mobilization of groups on the basis of the principle of reuniting ethnic kin’(1996, p. 
523).  Irredentism is unique, therefore, because ‘conflicts are by definition interstate 
in scope and involve third-party support, as in the case of Pakistani patronage of an 
Islamic Kashmir’ (Carment & James 1996, p. 524). Other examples include Serbia 
and parts of Bosnia and Croatia.   
Studies of ethnic and transnational ethnic and religious linkages and civil war 
evaluate the significance of both the type of ethnic and religious groups involved and 
the type of conflict.  Ethnic affinities and linkages are thought, in particular to influ-
ence outside state intervention, particularly in neighbouring and regional states 
(Carment & James 1995; Carment et al. 1997; D. R. Davis, Jaggers, & Moore 1997; 
Mitchell 1970).  A number of authors argue that cross-border ethnic affinities influ-
ence the likelihood and intensity of intervention (Carment & James 1995; D. R. 
Davis et al. 1997; Khosla 1999), while others consider the role of historical (colonial 
ties) or even personal ties.  The severity of an intra-state conflict may also increase 
the likelihood of intervention by elevating security threats, intensifying affective or 
humanitarian interests, and generating refugee burdens (Blechman 1995; Carment & 
Rowlands 1998; Licklider 1993; Zartman 1989).  In a study of interventions in the 
Third World, Findley and Teo find evidence that ‘increasing casualty and refugee 
levels hastens intervention’ (Findley & Teo 2006, p. 836).   
Conversely, the actor-centric approach reviews characteristics of the state ac-
tor that influence the decision to intervene, and the method and success of state 
intervention. These studies look at the types of powers that intervene (i.e. major 
powers, regional powers, regional states, and neighbouring states) state capabilities 
to intervene, and state interests in the conflict and beyond the conflict itself (Findley 
& Teo 2006; Heraclides 1990; Khosla 1999).  Khosla separates states into five types: 
major powers; regional powers; neighbours; regional states, and other (remaining) 
states (Khosla 1999, p. 1147).  According to the author, major powers include the 
U.S., the U.S.S.R./Russia, the United Kingdom, and France.  Regional powers are 
larger states with regional ambitions (e.g. Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Turkey, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil).  China is included as a regional power due to 
its orientation towards Asia.  States within a region that are not regional powers are 
classified as neighbours if bordering a conflict, or as regional states if not contigu-
ous. 
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The type of state, its capabilities, and its area of influence are all argued to af-
fect its potential to intervene within external conflicts.  The capabilities of potential 
interveners are thought, particularly by the realist and neorealist schools, to drive or 
increase the likelihood of outside support.  Scholars such as Pearson, Baumann, and 
Pickering (1994), for example, explain the realpolitik approach in which state capa-
bilities affect both the probability of intervention and the type of interventions they 
will pursue.  Major powers, therefore, are more able to pursue their interests through 
intervention.  The authors additionally note the geographical and strategic issues of 
states.  Regional powers are more likely to intervene in cases of global interests, 
while aspiring regional powers are more likely than smaller powers to intervene 
within regions.  The authors state: ‘Smaller powers have generally confined their 
primary interests to regional balance, while major powers have given priority to the 
relations in several regions serially or to the overall global power hierarchy’ (Pearson 
et al. 1994, p. 206).   
Accordingly, realist and liberals both maintain that major powers are more 
likely interveners.  Realists hold that major powers possess both the capabilities and 
potential interests for intervention, while liberals contend that major powers will seek 
to promote greater stability following the end of the Cold War.  Neorealists, howev-
er, argue that the end of the Cold War renders Third World intra-state disputes (with 
the exception of nuclear states) of less interest to major powers.  As Khosla notes, for 
neorealists, ‘there are few areas in the Third World considered strategic enough to 
warrant major power interventionism’ (Khosla 1999, p. 1147).  Neorealists argue that 
instead regional powers will become more involved in the affairs of the Third World.  
Evidence that certain power types are more likely to intervene varies by 
study.  Additionally, there is evidence for many different types of interveners.  In a 
study of 200 interventions from 1944 to 1994, Regan finds that major powers carried 
out nearly 40% of interventions, which include economic, military, or components of 
both (Regan 1996, p. 345).  Khosla’s (1999) study evaluates interventions in the 
Third World during the post-Cold War period from 1990 to 1998.  Additionally, un-
like many studies (including Reagans 2006 study), the author isolates cases of 
military intervention, involving the provision of equipment, training, troops, sanctu-
aries, and cross-border raids (Khosla 1999, p. 1150).  The results suggest an 
increasing trend for neighbours and regional powers to intervene militarily following 
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the Cold War.  The study finds: major powers (including superpowers) intervened 
militarily in 18% of the cases; regional powers intervened in 60% of the cases; 
neighbours provided military support in 61% of the cases; and regional states gave 
military aid in 14% of the cases (Khosla 1999, p. 1151). 
Additionally, a number of scholars argue that it is difficult for neighbouring 
states (or states within close proximity) to avoid becoming involved in nearby con-
flicts (Brown 1996; Carment et al. 1997) because they have interests within the intra-
state conflict, are concerned with local stability, or the conflict spills over to the 
neighbouring state.  Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) draw upon Rosh’s (1988) 
concept of ‘security webs’ to argue that geography and the strategic environment in-
fluence external intervention.  Therefore, ‘States are likely to find change and 
instability in neighbouring states to be more important that similar dynamics in dis-
tant locations…’ (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 2000, p. 620).   
Heraclides’ study of secessions also found that of ‘nineteen states that direct-
ly bordered a secessionist region or were within reasonable distance by sea from 
it…only four remained neutral or unfavourable toward the secessionists’ (Heraclides 
1990, pp. 374-5).  Fifteen of those states either supplied military support (India and 
Iran) or ‘medium- or high-level aid for an extended period.70  Findley and Teo 
(2006) research the likelihood of intervention using data from Regan (2002) covering 
interventions from 1994 to 1999.  The authors find that major powers, regional pow-
ers, and contiguous states are likely interveners.  In particular, major powers are just 
over five times as likely to intervene on the side of the opposition (and 16 times as 
likely on the side of the government) and regional states are about eight times more 
likely to support the opposition.  Contiguous states are of significant interest, as they 
are found to be about 108 times as likely to support an opposition group in a civil 
war (Findley & Teo 2006, pp. 835-6).71    
While studies on the conditions, actors, and types of conflict that may incen-
tivise (or disincentivise) intervention, or are more likely to result in intervention, 
these studies often do not fully address the interests, strategies, and calculus of for-
                                                      
70 Because the study only researches secessionist movements, the results may skew in favour of re-
gional power intervention.  As Heraclides notes: ‘An examination of the United States and the Soviet 
Union showed that the United States and the Soviet Union have not been particularly involved with 
secessionist movements’(Heraclides 1990, p. 375).  
71 Several studies assess the contagion or diffusion of civil conflict for neighbouring states.  See, for 
example, K. S. Gleditsch (2002) and Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006).   
127 
 
eign intervention.  The following section builds a conceptual framework and model 
in which states define their interests, strategies, and tactics regarding decisions of 
foreign interventions.  
 
4.3 Strategies of intervention 
David J. D. Singer (1963) offers a similar conceptual framework in ‘Inter-nation in-
fluence: a formal model,’ which creates a conceptual model for state tendencies to 
influence other states.  This model of influence has been established as a basis for 
studies of foreign intervention.  Singer contends that the international system is an 
‘influence environment’ because: a) states have the capacity (and gravity) for the use 
of violence; and b) states are prone to exert power and influence over one another 
because a state’s own interests cannot exists in isolation or independence of the goals 
and behaviours of other states (J. D. Singer 1963, pp. 422-3).  Singer’s model of in-
fluence incorporates not just state interests in changing the status quo with outside 
states, but also the anticipated or predicted behaviour of outside states in the presence 
or absence of outside influence.  Hence, states may seek to apply international influ-
ence to modify an external state’s behaviours or to modify or reinforce expected 
future behaviours of states.  Therefore, Singer seeks to explain how state ‘percep-
tions, predictions, and preferences’ affect: 1) state motivations to influence; 2) the 
relative amount of effort required for success; and, 3) the techniques and instruments 
employed to this end (J. D. Singer 1963, p. 424).   
Singer’s conceptual model is relevant to strategies of intervention because it 
addresses the state’s diverging preferences between an intervening state and its tar-
get, as well as other outside states that may be influenced, such as the target states 
allies.  Additionally, Singer’s theory incorporates current preferences as well as and 
temporal expectations of future behaviour.  Therefore, a state may influence another 
state in hopes of preferred future behaviours.  The level to which a state’s prefer-
ences diverge from another state’s preferences can be considered an encompassing 
driver of outside support for or against insurgent movements.  Following an empiri-
cal analysis of interventions, Findley and Teo conclude that diverging interests of 
states, including the target state and outside interveners as well as aligned states or 
those with similar interests, are a driving force in foreign intervention (Findley & 
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Teo 2006, p. 829).  Like Singer, the authors identify both interests of the target state, 
the potential intervener, and other states within the international system.   
Additionally, Regan’s expansion of Singer’s model incorporates the calculus 
to engage in various tactics of intervention versus the costs, risk, and potential sacri-
fice.  As Richard Haass states: ‘There is an important relationship between interests 
and the ability to intervene successfully. The ability to sustain an intervention over 
time and, more importantly, despite human and financial costs, is linked directly to 
the perceived importance of the interests at stake’ (Haass 1999, p. 71).  K.S. 
Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz elaborate on the link between diverging interests 
and the impetus for intervention: 
The basic ingredient here is that states have different preferences over 
the outcome of the civil war…When such an interests exist, these out-
side states have incentive to intervene in support of rebel groups by 
giving them economic resources, arms, external sanctuaries, and, in 
some cases, military support (K. S. Gleditsch et al. 2008, p. 484). 
Lemke and Regan (2004), Regan (2000, 2002), and others base their concep-
tual framework of foreign influence, or state involvement in the external civil wars as 
a method of international influence.72  Regan (1998, 2000) develops an expected util-
ity framework to evaluate the decision to intervene (or not intervene), and the type of 
intervention that may yield the highest expected benefits.  As the author explains: 
‘Given this model, three factors can influence the expected utility of intervening: 
costs, utilities over outcomes, and estimates of the likelihood of the intervention be-
ing successful; all are intertwined’ (Regan 1998, p. 762).   
State interests may be constructed from both instrumental and non-
instrumental preferences.  Costs, according to Regan, comprise a combination of 
domestic costs (political, material, and human) and international costs, estimated in 
terms of national security.  He offers the following equations to represent the ex-
pected utility of intervention based on the expected utility of not intervening (EUni) 
versus intervening (EUi) in an external intra-state conflict:  
                                                      
72 Regan defines ‘intervention’ as ‘convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the in-
ternal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim 
of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces’ (Regan 1998, p. 
756).  For a similar definition of intervention, see also: Feste (1992); Rosenau (1968). 
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Source: Regan, Patrick M. "Choosing to intervene: Outside interventions in internal conflicts." The 
Journal of Politics 60, no. 03 (1998): p. 761). 
 
Where ‘EU’ refers to the expected utility of non-intervention (EUni) and intervention (EUi) ‘q’ and ‘p’ 
are the probabilities that the conflict will be settled with (p) or without (q) intervention respectively. 
‘U’ refers to the potential intervener’s utility of successful intervention (Usw), or that fighting will con-
tinue after the intervening (Uf), or that a successful settlement will be reached without an intervention 
(Us), or that continued fighting continues without an intervention (Uc).  ‘ΣC’ represents the costs of 
non-intervention (ΣCni) (nonmaterial) intervention (ΣCi).73   
 
Accordingly, if the expected value of intervention (EUi) is higher than the expected 
utility of non-intervention (EUni) then the circumstances exist for a potential strategy 
of intervention in a foreign intra-state conflict.  Additionally, Regan (2000) extends 
this framework, in ‘Substituting Policies during US Interventions in Internal Con-
flicts: A Little of This, a Little of That’, by assessing the expected value of differing 
tactics of state intervention.   
Regan and Singer’s models involve the wider spectrum of foreign interven-
tion tactics that include non-violent and violent means of intervention and support of 
existing governments and insurgencies in existing intra-state conflicts.  While strate-
gies and interest may be similar in these cases, they differ at the tactical level.  The 
study presented here investigates the method of outsourcing to insurgencies through 
indirect (including financial support, weapons, training, safe havens) and direct mili-
tary support.  Additionally, in a number of cases states support insurgencies prior to 
the outbreak of civil war in order to initiate turmoil or intra-state conflict.  As 
Gleditsch et al. state: ‘Indeed, in some instances, civil wars are made possible by the 
support that outside actors are willing to give to nascent rebel groups’ (K. S. 
                                                      
73 Regan (1998, 2000) uses a limited definition of success determined by ‘stopping the fighting’.  As 
the author notes: ‘Clearly not all interventions have the explicit goal of stopping the hostilities, but 
other conceptions of success considered by potential interveners can often be achieved by stopping the 
fighting or require this as a necessary first step’ (Regan 1998, p. 760).  Similarly, E. A. Gartzke and 
Gleditsch (2006b) argue that states may have a wider set of objectives than the termination of vio-
lence, K. S. Gleditsch (2007) asserts that states may value preferred outcomes over more quickly 
reached settlements, and Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) contend that the geopolitical strategies 
are of more import to states than the termination of violence.  
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Gleditsch et al. 2008, p. 485).  The authors cite the Revolutionary United Front 
(URF) in Sierra Leone, noting that its capacity to initiate an intra-state conflict was 
dependent on support from Liberia.  In the countries of Mozambique, Togo, Chad, 
South Korea, Congo/Zaire, and Cambodia, transnational insurgencies received early 
outside support and are even considered by some to have been instigated by the for-
eign governments.74   
The preceding chapters have employed an expected utility of war theory to 
explain the framework in which states engage in direct or indirect conflict.  This the-
oretical framework establishes the interest in terms of diverging preferences between 
states and their interests in changing the status quo relative to other states in the di-
rection of their preferred outcome.  As established in Chapter 3 the choice to engage 
in violent means, the methods employed (direct or indirect), and the specific tactics 
are influenced by the estimated costs and risk of the conflict.  The strategies that 
drive external involvement may be instrumental and non-instrumental and can be 
analysed in four areas: 1) affective and instrumental interests and strategies based on 
transnational linkages within the target state; 2) universal interests and strategies, 
such as the promotion of democracy or humanitarian objectives; and 3) wider in-
strumental strategies regarding the target state, other outside interventions, and the 
balances of regional or global power and threats. 
 
4.3.1 Interests based on transnational ties 
States may have a number of transnational ties that contribute to their interests in the 
internal affairs of outside states.  Mitchell’s (1970) ‘transnational theory’ of foreign 
intervention establishes two types of transnational linkages that influence outside in-
tervention: transactional and affective.  Affective linkages involve ethnic, religious, 
and ideological ties, and may also include common histories and personal connec-
                                                      
74 In Mozambique, for example, RENAMO (National Mozambican Resistance) opposed the left-wing 
government of FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) in the 1970’s.  RENAMO received exten-
sive early funding by right-wing groups in South Africa and Rhodesia to counter FRELIMO’s support 
of rebel groups in those countries.  The Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) was also a state initiated 
insurgency.  Additionally, although the government of Ghana denied supporting the Movement for 
Togolese Democracy (MTD), which attempted a coup against the government of Togo, the MTD is an 
alleged case of a foreign born (or early supported) insurgency.  In Chad, the Islamic Legion consisted 
of mainly Chadian fighters, but was organised by the government of Libya to attack the government 
of Hissen Habré, against which they had fought in a war from 1980 to 1987. North Korea aided in the 
training of five thousand guerrilla fighters that attempted to overthrow the government of South Korea 
in 1949.  Finally, the Vietnam government organized the Kampuchean United Front for National Sal-
vation (KUFNS) and deployed 20,000 troops to assists its overthrow of the government.   
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tions.  Transactional linkages involve military, political, economic, and educational 
links.  In both cases, states may possess components of non-instrumental interests 
(affective, ideological, or universal) based on existing ties, and instrumental interests 
(political or economic) that are incentivised or justified by transnational linkages 
with the target state.   
 
Affective interests  
Affective linkages are thought to make outside state intervention more probable.  A 
number of scholars argue that ethnic affinities do so ‘especially when ethnic affini-
ties exist between the intervener and groups within the target state’ (Carment et al. 
1997; D. R. Davis et al. 1997, p. 829; Findley & Teo 2006; Khosla 1999).  Findley 
and Teo find that insurgencies engaged in ethnic intra-state conflicts are 10 times 
more likely to receive support (violent and non-violent) from an external state (gov-
ernments are 1.35 time more likely to receive support) (Findley & Teo 2006, p. 835).  
Ethnic linkages can influence intervention, especially in a neighbouring state where 
ethnic kin may hold sentiments with groups within the states.  The broader category 
of ethnic linkages can include genetic linkages, common identities and histories, and 
religious commonalities.  Monica Toft (2007) argues, in Getting Religion? The Puz-
zling Case of Islam and Civil War, that religious elites will attempt to demonstrate 
the intensity of their religious views in an effort to gain credentials that distinguish 
them from other religious elites and attract outside resources and support from state 
and non-state actors with similar religious views.   
Externally supported conflicts with ethnically driven insurgencies are often 
analysed according to the type of conflict.  Deepa Khosla identifies several conflict 
groups and estimates the likelihood of outside intervention (Khosla 1999, pp. 1146-
7).  The author divides ethnic conflicts into the following groups: 
! Ethnonationalists occupy a region historically and seek greater autonomy, 
such as the Kurds (in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey), or secession, such as the Karens 
in Burma;  
! Militant sects are differentiated and politically driven by their religious be-
liefs, such as Shi’ite groups in Saudi Arabia and Ba’athist groups in Iran;   
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! Communal contenders are disengaged tribal groups that seek a greater power 
within a state, such as the Yoruba and Ogani in Nigeria, and the Tajiks, Uz-
beks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns in Afghanistan;   
! Indigenous peoples include the descendents of formerly conquered lineages, 
such as the Dayaks and Kadazans in Malaysia, the Massai in Kenya, and the 
Tripuras, Assamese, and Bodos in India;  
! Ethnoclasses include those that occupy a distinct economic and cultural class 
of society, usually descended from slaves or immigrants; 
! National minorities are historically autonomous minorities whose ethic 
group controls a neighbouring state. 
 
Khosla’s study evaluates 270 such politically active ethnic groups from 1945 to 1998 
to determine most likely types of military intervention (military aid, including 
equipment, training, troops, sanctuaries, and cross-border raids) (1999, p. 1150).  
Ethnonationalist received external military support in 55% of the cases. Communal 
contenders received outside support in 53% of the cases.  Indigenous peoples and 
national minorities received outside military support in 32% and 11% of the cases 
respectively.  Militant sects received external military support in 8% of the cases, 
Ethnoclasses received external military support in only 4% of the cases (Khosla 
1999, pp. 1146-7).75   
 The role of transnational linkages has two general influences on methods of 
outsourcing to insurgencies and foreign intervention in general.  First, ethnic strife 
can escalate the interest of outside states and can threaten to extend to outside states, 
particularly regional or contiguous states.  In what Lake and Rothchild refer to as the 
‘primordialist approach,’ ethnicity drives regional violence.  ‘Although analysts may 
probe the catalysts of a given outbreak of violence, conflict is understood to be 
ultimately rooted in ethnicity itself’ (Lake & Rothchild 1998, p. 5).76  Along these 
lines, Anthony Smith argues: ‘Whenever ethnic nationalism has taken hold of popu-
lations, there one may expect to find powerful assertions of national self-
determination that, if long opposed, will embroil whole regions in bitter and protract-
                                                      
75 Militant sects and national minorities represent small portions of the cases studied: approximately 
6% and 5%, respectively; therefore, the results for those categories are less reliable.   
76 See also: Connor (1994); A. Smith (1996); A. D. Smith (1986); and K. S. Gleditsch (2007).  
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ed ethnic conflict’ Smith (A. D. Smith 1993, p. 40).  Affective linkages, in this sense, 
may drive state interests for foreign intervention.  
While affective linkages may influence outside state interests in affairs of tar-
get states, many of these interests exist prior to the emergence of an insurgent 
movement or intra-state conflict.  As K.S. Gleditsch et al note, ‘civil wars generate 
new issues of contention between states and new opportunities for using military 
power’ (K. S. Gleditsch et al. 2008, p. 484).  Therefore, an insurgency provides an 
opportunity structure for a state to promote its affective and/or instrumental interests 
within the target states, through intervention, without the costs and constraints of di-
rect interstate conflict. K. S. Gleditsch et al. (2008) argue that where ethnic conflicts 
escalate to interstate conflicts, the interstate conflict is often caused by externalisa-
tion–that is, outside state support of insurgent movements.77   
A number of scholars also argue that external interventions in ethnic conflicts 
are driven in part (or full) by instrumental interests.  This position argues that elites 
in outside states use ethnic affinities to justify external interventions and to generate 
domestic support for instrumental interests. The instrumental approach, as explained 
by Lake and Rothchild (1998), views ethnicity as a tool used to gain other ends: 
‘Whether used defensively to thwart the ambitions of others or offensively to achieve 
an end of one’s own, ethnicity is understood primarily a label or set of symbolic ties 
that is used for political advantage–much like interest-group membership or political-
party affiliation’ (Lake & Rothchild 1998, p. 7).  Carment and James assert that the 
objectives of elites are more associated with political motivations: ‘In brief, political 
leaders respond to international opportunities to promote their domestic interest, 
most explicitly the security and power of the ruling party elite…Leaders will use vio-
lence if it can secure or increase their share of power’ (Carment & James 2000, p. 
175).  
Heraclides (1990) undertakes case studies of seven post-war secessionist 
movements from 1960 to 1980 in Katanga, Biafra, the Southern Sudan, Bangladesh, 
Iraqi Kurdistan, Eritrea, and the Moro region of the Philippines.  The author com-
pares the extent to which an external state intervened in ethnic intra-state conflict on 
the side of insurgencies for affective reasons (i.e. ethnic, religious, ideological, issues 
                                                      
77 The authors also note that intra-state ethnic conflict can spread to interstate conflicts as a result of 
excessive refugee burdens and cases of externalisation in which a state pursues an insurgency across 
borders (K. S. Gleditsch et al. 2008).  
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of justice, and humanitarian concerns) versus instrumental reasons (international pol-
itics, economic, domestic or internal politics, and military considerations).  The study 
finds that instrumental interests are more common in cases where the level of exter-
nal involvement rose beyond the low-level (diplomatic support and endorsements).  
In cases of tangible external support (e.g. funding, equipment, training, safe havens, 
troops), instrumental objectives were found in 15 of 30 instances, whereas affective 
were found in seven, and both affective and instrumental in eight cases (Heraclides 
1990, p. 372).78  
 
Transactional linkages 
Transactional linkages include political, economic, educational, historical, and even 
personal relations between states that may engender interests in the internal affairs of 
other states.  Like affective interests, transnational linkages may catalyse outside 
state intervention and influence.  A notable example of transactional linkages can be 
found in the relationships between post-colonial powers and their former colonies.  
Colonial ties are historical in nature, but may also include political and economic 
linkages.  During the period of decolonisation (or decentralisation) that continued 
after the Second World War, a number of large powers became involved in the intra-
state conflicts of their former colonies.   
Findley and Teo (2006) find that post-colonial relationships are an indicator 
of foreign intervention.79  They note that former colonial powers often retain inter-
ests within former colonies, while warring factions retain close ties to the states that 
colonized them in many cases.  ‘Likewise, the former colonial powers may maintain 
interests in their former colonies, thereby increasing the probability they will return 
to aid their favoured groups’ (Findley & Teo 2006, p. 832).  Morgenthau explains the 
post-colonial interventions that followed decentralization largely through the existing 
transnational ties and, in many cases, dependency between colonial powers and their 
                                                      
78 Heraclides’ study also evaluates the extent to which transnational personal relationships among 
leaders drive external intervention, but the link between personal linkages and external support was 
vague.  The author presents Ivory Coast's support for Biafra in the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970) as 
a potential exception, in which, ‘President Houphouet-Boigny, who characterised the Biafra conflict 
as ‘a human tragedy’, had close personal links with Biafran leaders and supported their movement’ 
(Heraclides 1990, p. 371).   
79 In particular, Findley and Teo (2006) find that states that have colonial ties to Third-World states 
engaged in intra-state conflicts are approximately 126 time more likely to intervene on the side of the 
opposition and about 14 times more likely to intervene on the side of the government.   
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former colonies.  He states: ‘Many if not most of these new nations are not viable 
political, military and economic entities; they are lacking in some if not all of the 
prerequisites of nationhood.’  Further, he argues, economic aid, which in many cases 
was necessary for the nascent state’s survival, acted ‘as a lever for intervention’ 
(Morgenthau 1967, p. 427).  
Economic and historical transnational linkages may also drive outside state 
interventions in post-colonial states.  As Karen Feste explains: ‘Other factors im-
portant in evaluating situations outside the sphere of protected territorial jurisdiction 
marked by policy doctrine have included the history of military support and alliance 
commitments, and economic ties and resource dependencies between a target coun-
try and each superpower’ (Feste 1992, p. 35).  Transnational ties can incentivize a 
state to become involved with the internal affairs of other states to promote their in-
strumental and affective interests.  Additionally, Lemke and Regan argue that 
transnational linkages influence foreign intervention through the expectation of fu-
ture relations: ‘…neighbors, allies, and former colonial powers of civil war states are 
more likely to expect to interact with civil war states in the future, and consequently 
are more likely to intervene to influence the outcome of the civil war’ (Lemke & 
Regan 2004, pp. 153-4). 
 
4.3.2 Universal interests and strategies 
States may also intervene in the pursuit of universal interests, such as ideological or 
humanitarian objectives.  Like affective interests, universal interests may be inter-
twined with instrumental interests or even used to justify a war of utility.  N.P. 
Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre note: ‘In any intervention carried out by a major 
power, it is difficult to distinguish between universalistic motivations like ‘promote 
democracy’ and self-interested motivations like saving U.S. citizens, protecting 
United Fruit, or ensuring continued oil supplies’ (N. P. Gleditsch, Christiansen, & 
Hegre 2007, p. 12).  Hence, universal interests may influence foreign intervention by 
supplying the impetus to provide external support and reduce the domestic and inter-
national political costs of intervention.   
Morgenthau explains that while the Cold War involved a competition be-
tween superpowers, it also represented an ideological contest.   
Thus the cold war has not only been a conflict between two world pow-
ers but also a contest between two secular religions. And like the 
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religious wars of the seventeenth century, the war between communism 
and democracy does not respect national boundaries... Here is the dy-
namic force which has led the two superpowers to intervene all over the 
globe… (Morgenthau 1967, p. 429). 
Similarly, assessing the promotion of democracy as a motive for intervention, 
N.P. Gleditsch, Christiansen, Hegre argue that democracies, which may be less in-
clined to fight other democracies, practice ‘democratic interventionism’ in places 
such as Haiti, Kosovo, and Iraq. ‘Democracies may have a motivation to intervene in 
non-democracies, even in the absence of on-going conflict, for the purpose of regime 
change’, what the authors refer to as ‘democratic interventionism’ (N. P. Gleditsch et 
al. 2007, p. 1).80  They also note the difficulty in separating idealist ambitions from 
realist security concerns: ‘To some extent, the democratic peace blurs this distinction 
between universalism and self-interest.  A leader of a democratic nation may argue 
that an autocratic state presents a danger, whereas a democracy would be able to live 
peacefully with other democratic states’ (N. P. Gleditsch et al., p. 12).  Peceny goes 
further, arguing that liberal ideological challenges from Congress can lead American 
Presidents to ‘use the promotion of democracy to legitimize and build domestic polit-
ical consensus for U.S. interventions’ (Peceny 1999, p. 10).   
Universal interests also include humanitarian objectives.  Just as the concept 
of humanitarian warfare has emerged since the Second World War, humanitarian ob-
jectives may be an increasing driver of (or justification for) intervention including 
indirect methods of supporting or opposing insurgencies.  Humanitarian interven-
tions are often based on the goals to stop killing or abuses and to expedite a 
resolution (Licklider 1993; Zartman 1989).  Increasingly, outside support is thought 
to influence the duration of civil wars, and/or structurally assist their resolution and 
the theorized role of the outside state to both (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 2000; 
Carment & Rowlands 1998; Walter 1997). 
Pearson et al. assert, counter to realists and neorealist claims: ‘The number of 
claims of humanitarian intervention (to save lives, relieve suffering, distribute food, 
etc.) have increased since 1970, particularly by major and superpowers’ (Pearson et 
al. 1994, p. 222).  According to their research, the rate of humanitarian interventions 
                                                      
80 For arguments regarding the effects of pro democracy, Hermann and Kegly Jr. (1998) explores the 
impact of U.S. interventions since 1945 on the political systems of the targets, and Peceny (1999) 
analyses the historical relationship between U.S. military intervention and the democratization efforts, 
arguing that military intervention does not have an effect on democracy.   
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rose from 6% prior to 1970 to 11%.  However, major power humanitarian interven-
tions rose from 13% prior to the 1970 to 43% (while small powers intervened for 
humanitarian purposes only 6% of the time).  The authors argue that this trend may 
‘portend an eventual swing away from interventions based solely or primarily on re-
alist calculations and machinations’ (Pearson et al. 1994, p. 222).  Others explain that 
since the Second World War there has been tension between the ideal of state sover-
eignty and the need for humanitarian intervention, in which intervention for 
humanitarian causes has often been favoured over the rights of sovereignty (N. P. 
Gleditsch et al. 2007; Rosas 1994).  ‘A norm of humanitarian intervention began to 
emerge in international law, expanding the just war of self-defense to a just war in 
defense of citizens of other countries whose rights were being grossly violated’ (N. 
P. Gleditsch et al. 2007, p. 15).   
 
4.3.3 Instrumental interests and strategies  
Just as the threat of insurgent groups or the outbreak of intra-state conflict may both 
elevate affective interests within states while providing an opportunity for interven-
tion, the existence of insurgencies in outside states create potential concerns for 
security.  The presence or emergence of insurgent groups in outside states can threat-
en bordering states through contagion and spillover.  Intra-state conflicts, or civil 
wars, ‘can create new tension because of spillover from the fighting, such as mass 
refugee migration, damage of cross-border infrastructure, stray fire, and environmen-
tal impacts’ (K. S. Gleditsch et al. 2008, p. 487).  Internal strife within states also 
threatens neighbours and regional actors through the threat of contagion.  Neighbour-
ing states in particular often intervene in the conflicts and in many cases are 
entangled in an interstate conflict (Brown 1996; K. S. Gleditsch et al. 2008; 
Heraclides 1990).  The increasing number and effectiveness of insurgencies is also 
important to regional powers and regional stability, as well as to major powers or 
superpowers.  These insurgencies and revolutions ‘pose a serious and dangerous 
challenge to the existing international order. The depth of their local support and fre-
quent control of the instruments of violence ensures that the superpowers would not 
find the suppression of revolutionary movements an easy matter’ (Adelman 1986, p. 
4). 
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Insurgencies also create an opportunity structure for states to intervene as a 
means of promoting instrumental interests within the target state or wider strategies 
within the region or global system.  Instrumental interests can be defined as: 1) inter-
national political reasons, including strategic considerations; 2) economic gains; 3) 
domestic motives, or internal politics; and 4) military considerations (Heraclides 
1990, p. 370).  Stephen Walt submits that revolutions alter the balance of power rela-
tionships and create prospects for state to improve their relative positions ‘either by 
seizing valuable territory or by seeking important diplomatic concessions–or as a 
chance to attack a state that was previously protected by the old regime.  In either 
case, the revolution creates a window of opportunity for others to exploit’ (Walt 
1996, p. 32).  Even if an insurgency or intra-state conflict elevates security concerns 
for an outside state, that state may also use the opportunity to intervene to further its 
instrumental interests.  Walt (1996) maintains that states assess threats based on the 
aggregate power of other states, their perceived intent, and the offensive-defensive 
balance that determines the level of difficulty in harming another state.  Therefore, 
the author states: ‘In particular, the ability to undermine a foreign government 
through propaganda or subversion can be an especially potent form of offensive 
power, because it allows one state to ‘conquer’ others at little or no costs to itself’ 
(Walt 1996, p. 19).  
Strategic interests may involve objectives that are both exogenous and endog-
enous to the conflict.  Endogenous interests may include political and economic 
objectives that reside between the potential intervener and the target state, such as 
economic resources, as well as political goals that directly relate to the pair of states.  
Exogenous strategies of intervention can also involve more than a single intervener 
and single target state.  As Singer notes: ‘For analytical purposes, it is often conven-
ient to scrutinize only two nations at a time, but we cannot forget that all are 
influencing all, directly or indirectly, merely by sharing the same spatial, temporal, 
and socio-political environment’ (J. D. Singer 1963, p. 421).  Similarly, Balch-
Lindsay and Enterline state that much of the literature on foreign intervention ‘pro-
vides a firm basis for the contention that civil wars do not occur in isolation, but 
rather are embedded in the interstate system.  Thus, when civil wars occur, how they 
evolve, and how and when they end are, in part, functions of interstate processes’ 
(Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 2000, p. 620).  These exogenous and endogenous in-
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strumental strategies may include the pursuit of economic resources and power, 
weakening (or strengthening) states with similar preferences and alliance structures, 
manipulating regimes (or ruling elites) to converge with the intervener’s preferences, 
and challenging (or supporting) other interveners to strengthen allies and weaken ri-
vals.   
 
Economic interests and power 
Economic interests can involve potential gains for a state, as well as denying those 
advantages to other states.  Some of the earlier quantitative studies on intervention 
focused on economic interests within the target state, or wider economic strategy.  
Many such studies stress the economic goals of intervention, often viewing interven-
tion as a form of economic imperialism directed at the availability of raw materials, 
imports, export markets, and sources of foreign investment (Gibbs 1991; Magdoff 
1969; Odell 1974; Pearson & Baumann 1977).  Eric Hooglund (1992), for example, 
analyses varying levels of intervention within regions, arguing that the U.S. inter-
venes more often in the Middle East, for petroleum interests, than in Africa, which 
offers less potential economic gains.  
Yoon’s study of U.S. interventions measures the level of U.S. dependency on 
the raw materials of that state, the importance of the foreign market, and the level of 
U.S. foreign investment in the target state.  It does not, however, find a strong corre-
lation with U.S. intervention and economic or regional interests.  ‘The change in the 
values of imports, exports, and foreign investment shows a negligible effect on the 
probability that the United States will intervene.  These results suggest that U.S. in-
tervention occurs regardless of the variation in the amount of U.S. imports, exports, 
and foreign investment’ (Yoon 1997, p. 594).  Regional factors are also not found by 
the author to be a significant indicator of outside state intervention.  Additionally, 
data taken from the Non-State Actors data set also demonstrates that insurgent 
movements have been mixed across regions.  Figure 4-2 outlines the number of in-
surgencies from 1945 to 2004 per region, and Figure 4-3 illustrates those 
insurgencies active in each insurgency per year.  Both demonstrate that there is a mix 
of regions with insurgencies in the aggregate and across time and space.   
Economic interests may, however, be relevant in certain cases.  The Angolan 
Crisis (1974-1976), which involved the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the 
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Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the U.S.-supported National Liberation Front of An-
gola ( FNLA), and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola  (UNITA), 
provides an example.  Feste argues that while Soviet competition with both China 
and the U.S. were factors, natural resources played a key role:   
The wealth of natural resources in Angola was another key issue in the 
Kremlin's policy. On this issue, the Soviet Union's ambitions were two-
fold. First, with a friendly government in Luanda, Moscow could 
preserve its own vast natural resources while buying the Angolan stock 
at favorable prices. Second, if the Soviets bought scarce resources from 
Angola, they would be preventing China, the United States, and other 
competitors from having them (Feste 1992, p. 146).  
Additionally, states consider economic gains as one consideration within multi-
faceted interests.  For example, Pearson and Baumann suggest that superpower 
intervention in regions such as the Middle East involve the nature of the conflict, the 
economic wealth and natural resources of the state, their military infrastructure and 
alliances, and the prevailing norms regarding intervention (Pearson & Baumann 
1983). 
 
Political alliances  
The anticipated behaviour a future state may display toward the potential intervener, 
its allies, and rivals can influence the decision to intervene.  As Singer explains, 
states may seek to influence another state’s ‘existing preferences, or attempt to 
change them now in order to make it easier to appeal to them later’ (J. D. Singer 
1963, p. 425).  In a study of outside support for secessionist movements, Heraclides 
finds empirical evidence that states support outside insurgencies in large part as a 
strategy against a rival state or states:  
The validity of the dictum that the ‘enemy of one enemy is a potential 
‘friend’… was frequently valid with regard to tangible aid, since rough-
ly half of the states supplying arms and other high-level support to a 
secessionist movement could be regarded as enemies of the state threat-
ened by the movement (Heraclides 1990, p. 376). 
Findley and Teo (2006) also find a statistical correlation between rival states and in-
terventions. In particular, they find that states are 45 times more likely to support an 
insurgency within a rival state than their baseline.  Additionally, a measurement for 
the hazard of intervention (the probability of intervening over time and accounting 
for duration) determines that ‘rivalry with the civil war country increases the hazard 
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of intervention on the side of the opposition by 108 times the baseline’ (2006, pp. 
835-6).  Additionally, states are found more likely to intervene on the side of allied 
governments against insurgencies.   
In some cases, states favour foreign intervention to undermine rivals, 
strengthen allies, and expand their power or overall security.  Balch-Lindsay and 
Enterline argue that while a number of studies evaluate intervention directed at the 
goal of terminating violence, states will also pursue less altruistic strategies, ‘includ-
ing lengthening the duration of a civil war in order to distract, or drain the resources 
of the rival states’ (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 2000, pp. 616-7). Stavenhagen and 
Development (1996), in a study of ethnic conflict, finds that outside states intervene 
in conflicts in order to serve expansionist, geopolitical, and hegemonic interests 
within regions by weakening rival states, gaining access to their resources and terri-
tory, and strengthening domestic support.  A common example is Pakistan and India, 
both of which have supported insurgencies to undermine the other state.  Similarly, 
Feste (1992) and others observe that the Soviet Union supported a number of insur-
gencies for the purpose of weakening Western powers and combating Western 
imperialism. For example, the U.S.S.R., China, and Cuba supported the Marxist-
Leninist leaning Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the Maoist leaning 
UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and 
backed the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) against British forces in 
Malaya.  
States may also attempt to change a target state’s ruling elites in favor of an 
alternative group whose preferences or anticipated future behaviour will converge 
more with those of the intervening state.  Gleditsch, Salehyan, Schultz refer to this 
phenomenon as ‘regime disputes.’  ‘External actors may support rebel groups to re-
move a government whose regime type may be regarded as odious or whose policies 
seem hostile’ (K. S. Gleditsch et al. 2008, p. 485).  The authors cite the attempts by 
the U.S. to overthrow the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments through insurgencies 
during the Cold War, as well as support of insurgencies in Rhodesia and South Afri-
ca from Mozambique and other African governments in opposition to empowered 
white minorities.   
Revolutions and regime disputes may also involve the target state’s foreign 
policy.  As Morgenthau states: ‘A successful revolution frequently portends a new 
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orientation in the country’s foreign policy, as it did in the Congo, Cuba and Indone-
sia. Thus the great powers, expecting gains or fearing disadvantages from the 
revolution, are tempted to intervene on the side of the faction favoring them’ 
(Morgenthau 1967, p. 427).  The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for 
example, has sought to expand Iranian influence through a combination of military 
and political strategies in the region.  The IRGC supported ‘parties, militias, and in-
surgencies in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia’ (Nasr 
2006).81  
 
Influencing other interveners 
State interests to intervene in favour of or opposition to insurgencies may be ground-
ed, in part or in full, in relation to other existing or potential interveners.  Balch-
Lindsay and Enterline assert that intra-state conflicts involve factors that are internal 
and external to the conflict.  ‘Therefore, potential third parties to intra-state conflicts 
confront a complex of active and latent participation by several sets of actors’ 
(Balch-Lindsay & Enterline 2000, p. 619).  In a similar vein, Walt maintains that 
revolutions can elevate security competition between states: 
If a foreign power becomes concerned that one of its rivals will take 
advantage of the revolution in order to improve its own position, the 
foreign power may be forced to take action take to obtain spoils for it-
self or to prevent its rival from doing the same thing.  Thus, the 
window of opportunity created by the revolution may inspire conflict 
among third parties so that they intervene, even if they have no particu-
lar quarrel with the new regime. (Walt 1996, p. 33).  
Karl Deutsch (1964) asserted that states provide external support for intra-
state conflicts in order to challenge outside rivals.  This can involve proxy wars, in 
which direct rivals challenge each other within the field of an outside external con-
flict (Morgenthau 1967). Proxy wars involved the superpowers during the Cold War 
in the cases of Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Angola, and also involved regional pow-
ers.  For example, in 1998 during the Second Congo War in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), Uganda intervened on the side of the opposition, followed by its 
                                                      
81 The IRGC also backed insurgencies in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, organized the militia and cleri-
cal leaders in Lebanon that would eventually become Hezbollah, and following Operation Enduring 
Freedom used the Qods Force (QF) to provide ‘aid in the form of paramilitary training, weapons, and 
equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) and 
the Special Group Criminals (SGCs)’ (Felter & Fishman 2008, p. 6).   
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rival Sudan on the side of the government.  Sudan is not allied to the DRC; however, 
Uganda and Sudan had multiple disputes in 1998, both accusing the other of 
invading one’s own territory, which may have driven Sudan’s invertenetion on the 
opposing side (Findley & Teo 2006, pp. 834-5).   
Similarly, decisions to intervene may also be influenced by the presence of 
another third party intervenor that is an ally the state’s rival.  Feste (1992) and Nuri 
(1987) note that the USSR used ‘surrogates’, such as Cuba, to indirectly promote 
Soviet interests during the Cold War.  Additionally, the level to which the prefer-
ences of a potential or existing intervener conform or diverge to a state may drive 
that states interests.  For example, Cuba’s external involvement in outside insurgen-
cies during the Cold War around interest in the U.S. both because of their strategic 
allegiance with Russia but also their ideological agenda.  This may involve the polit-
ical (domestic and international), ideological, or even specific interests of the 
intervener.   
Findley and Teo’s (2006) empirical study of interventions since the Second 
World War supports the wider claim that that states support or oppose insurgencies 
in some cases not because of the conflict, but instead because of other outside actors 
that may support a side.  The study finds that a potential intervening state’s ‘hazard 
of intervention’ (based on the probability of intervention, the time period, and the 
duration) is influenced by the presence of other states intervening in the conflict.82  
The authors find that a state’s hazard of intervention is four times greater when a ri-
val state has supported the opposition in the given conflict.  However, when a state 
rival supports a government of an intra-state conflict (e.g. Russian support of the Af-
ghan government) the hazard of intervention by the state increases by 11 times the 
baseline (Findley & Teo 2006, p. 834).83  In addition, it is not uncommon that states 
intervene in accord with allies who are also intervening (Findley & Teo 2006, p. 
835).   
                                                      
82 Findley and Teo’s research study adapts data from Regan’s (2006) data on civil war durations.  The 
analysis evaluates each separate intervening state in a given conflict.  The project, however, assumes 
that the opportunity for intervention begins at the onset of an intra-state conflict, and, therefore, does 
non include cases in which states support insurgencies prior (or in an effort to initiate) intra-state con-
flict.   
83 Findley and Teo (2006) also investigate the likelihood of ‘bandwagoning’ or intervening on the 
state side of a conflict with allies.  The authors find that a state is more likely (6.5 times) to intervene 
with allies on the side of a government, and about 0.85% more likely to intervene with allies on the 
side of an opposition.      
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Yoon’s study of US interventions from 1945 to 1989 finds that the number of 
actual proxy wars (in which the in which intervention by the U.S.S.R. motivated U.S. 
intervention) is somewhat limited, as only a small number of cases (Angola, Nicara-
gua, Afghanistan, and El Salvador) met this criterion (Yoon 1997, pp. 592-3).  
However, the author finds, ‘The probability of US intervention increases dramatical-
ly…if a Soviet ally intervenes’ (1997, p. 593).  The probability of US intervention 
during the period of study rose by 32.6% if a Soviet ally also intervened, and the 
probability of indirect military intervention increased by 19.3% (non-military by 
11.9%, and direct military by 1.4%).84  Additionally, intervention by a state identi-
fied to be communist elevated the probability of US intervention by 22.9%, and 
specifically increased the probability of indirect military intervention by 12.5% (non-
military by 9.8% and direct military by .6%).   
 
Figure 4-2:  Total Insurgencies by region: 1945–2004 
 
 
                                                      
84 Yoon establishes the following categories of intervention: ‘no intervention’ as lacking signs of vio-
lent of non-violent intervention; ‘non-military intervention’ as verbal statements and the provision or 
withholding of economic aid; ‘indirect military intervention’ as arms supply and deployment of mili-
tary advisors (without participation in fighting); and ‘direct military intervention’ as the dispatch of 
combat personnel to the combat zone, actual combat action, aerial bombings of targets, or naval assis-
tance (Yoon 1997, pp. 585-6).  
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Figure 4-3:  Insurgencies per year by region: 1945–2004 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
From the Corinth-Corcyra Civil War to the present, external intervention has been a 
strategy of warfare.  The scale of outside support for insurgencies by states has risen 
significantly since the Second World War.  From 1945 to 2004 the number of insur-
gencies with open outside state support has risen from 8 to 22.  Additionally, this 
number may be higher if some portion of the 10 insurgencies located in outside terri-
tories had tacit secret agreements with states to use safe havens.  The types of states 
that are outsourcing has also shifted from predominantly by major powers to a great-
er number of regional powers, regional states, and states that are contiguous to a 
given conflict.   
In one sense, as the rising number of insurgencies can be expected to generate 
greater security concerns regionally, and sometimes globally, so may they also invite 
intervention.  At the same time, insurgencies also create opportunity structures for 
states to pursue their interests.  When a state becomes involved in an intra-state con-
flict, outside states may find an opportunity to take advantage of a weakened 
adversary and engage in interstate conflict.  Accordingly, the presence or emergence 
of an insurgency in an external state affords an outside state with an opportunity to 
support the insurgency in order to initiate or take advantage of an intra-state conflict.  
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In addition, as costs, constraints, and risks of direct interstate conflict increase, inter-
vention becomes a relatively effective method by which to influence other states.   
The interests of states that support insurgencies (and governments in civil 
wars) has varied across time in terms of the actors involved, the phenomenon, the 
characteristics of the international system, and the specific interests and goals of out-
side states.  States may employ strategies of intervention and outsourcing to pursue a 
range of instrumental and non-instrumental interests.  These interests may be affec-
tive interests based on transnational ties to the target state or universal humanitarian 
or ideological interests.  They may also have interests in the outcome of the conflict 
itself, based on economic or geopolitical gains, the desire to weaken a rival state, to 
oppose or influence allies and alliance structures, or to challenge other external sup-
porters of the state (or insurgency).  As Yoon notes, the end of the Cold War does 
not negate strategies of intervention, but instead, ‘strategic interests need to be rede-
fined and new variables measuring this concept need to be found’ (Yoon 1997, p. 
598).  Hence, while interests vary with changing conditions, foreign intervention is 
often a method of external influence relevant to diverse circumstance and interests.  
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5  Transnational Insurgent Networks: Changing Capabilities  
and Activities 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction: The rise of transnational insurgent networks 
Over the course of history, the effectiveness of indirect warfare and insurgencies has 
varied with developing technology, changing political systems, and evolving tactics 
of indirect warfare.  As far back as the writings of Sun Tzu, indirect forces and 
methods were often employed in conjunction with direct tactics and armies.  Insur-
gencies that depended on indirect methods were less common and, prior to the 
Spanish guerrilla, were often defeated (see Chapter 1).  As Clausewitz notes, the 
Spanish guerrilla war (1804-14) and the resistance to Napoleon’s forces was a turn-
ing point for indirect warfare (Clausewitz 1832/1976, p. 220).  Its success was 
followed by other formidable insurgencies, such as the Boer Wars (1880–1881 and 
1899–1902), China’s communist insurgency (1927–1937), and the Cuban Revolution 
(1953–1959).   
Many scholars believe insurgencies have also realized another significant 
shift in their methods and capabilities: the emergence of transnational insurgencies.  
Transnational insurgencies are defined here as insurgencies with international objec-
tives and operations and/or insurgencies that are supported by outside state or non-
state actors that have international objectives.  The emergence of insurgencies at the 
transnational level is in large part due to their emergent ability to partner with inter-
national actors and form transnational networks.  Insurgencies prior to the Second 
World War (including the Spanish guerrilla) have sometimes involved outside actors.  
However, since the end of the Second World War, insurgencies are increasingly en-
gaging in complex transnational relationships with states, other insurgencies, non-
state actors, and often maintain outside operations in which forces are located in out-
side states (see Figure 5-1).  Additionally (not depicted in the figure) insurgencies in 
many cases collaborate with international criminal organizations for weapons, exper-
tise, and revenue generation, and may also work with outside diasporas that are 
independent (or not formally associated with) non-state actor groups.  As David Kil-
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cullen argues, the new phenomenon of transnational networks ‘goes far beyond clas-
sical single-state insurgent goals.  Al-Qaeda operatives pass messages between and 
among Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq.  Improvised explosive devices that first 
appear in Chechnya proliferate to Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Kilcullen 2006, p. 114).   
The emergence of insurgencies at the transnational level is theorised to be oc-
curring through globalisation and developing technology, including: changing 
communications and information technology or ‘a social structure characteristic of 
the information age’ (Castells 2000, p. 5); and globalisation involving ‘recent in-
creases in the mobility of people, capital, goods and ideas…’ (Adamson 2005, p. 31).  
Manuel Castells notes that emerging technologies enable networks, and transnational 
networks, to expand in ways that they could not before: 
[…] for the first time, the introduction of new infor-
mation/communication technologies allows networks to keep their 
flexibility and adaptability, thus asserting their evolutionary nature.  
While, at the same time, these technologies allow for co-ordination and 
management of complexity, in an interactive system which features 
feedback effects, and communication patterns from anywhere to eve-
rywhere within the networks (Castells 2000, p. 15). 
Communications and information technology can act as a ‘force multiplier’ for 
transnational insurgent strategies and operations (Steven Metz 2012, pp. 86-8).  In 
addition, these technologies facilitate the control of messaging and defined objec-
tives to socially and geographically expansive networks, and may have the potential 
to, ‘create information-age ideologies, in which identities and loyalties may shift 
from the nation state to the transnational level of global civil society’ (Arquilla, 
Ronfeldt, & Zanini 1999).  In a similar vein, globalisation has further integrated the 
role of corporations, non-state actors, and governments at the international level, and 
empowered insurgencies to interact more easily beyond their borders.  ‘The key spe-
cial feature of the network society is the networked connection between the local and 
the global.  The global architecture of global networks connects places selectively, 
according to their relative value for the network’ (Castells 2011, p. xxxv). 
As insurgencies shift from largely domestic groups to transnational move-
ments, their capabilities and effectiveness can change.  The trend from traditional 
insurgencies to transnational insurgent movements expands the range of activities of 
insurgencies, and may thereby elevate their capabilities, effectiveness, and range of 
influence.  Figure 5-2 charts the aggregate capabilities of insurgencies in terms of 
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their number of people directly involved as a percentage of the population.  Using 
this indicator, the capabilities of insurgencies have risen by about threefold since 
1952 (fourfold since 1950).85  As Mark Duffield states, regarding the emergence of a 
transnational wars, ‘in places like Afghanistan, Colombia and the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo…can be understood as a realisation of its inner potential and 
surprising capacities’ (Duffield 2002, p. 156).  
This chapter evaluates the emergence of transnational networks and transna-
tional insurgencies, and their impact on the effectiveness of insurgencies.  The first 
section evaluates network theory and how networks emerge and function (social 
network analysis), the principles that govern networks (organisational network theo-
ry), and their strengths and weaknesses.  The second section analyses the 
mechanisms by which transnational insurgencies may benefit from transnational 
network organizational structures, increasing access to international support, re-
sources, and expertise, and the ability of transnational insurgencies to engage in 
activities beyond their borders.  As argued here, the rising effectiveness of insurgen-
cies elevates the opportunity structure for non-state actor groups to initiate 
insurgencies, and for both state and non-state actors to outsource to insurgencies as 
an indirect method of warfare.   
                                                      
85 Although the aggregate number of individuals directly engage with insurgencies has risen, the num-
ber of insurgencies has expanded so the average size for each insurgency has not risen an even slightly 
declined (See Chapter 3).     
150 
 
Figure 5-1: Domestic and transnational insurgencies by type 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Strength of transnational insurgencies 
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5.2 Network Analysis and Organizational Theory 
Many theorists and analysts believe that the ability of insurgencies to interact 
through transnational networks has expanded the capabilities and activities of these 
groups.  The shift from domestic insurgencies to transnational insurgencies can be 
explained largely through network theory, which seeks to explain how networks 
function and their potential strengths and weaknesses.  Network organizational struc-
tures were originally analysed in the 1930’s and 1940’s within the field of 
psychology (Lewin & Lippitt 1938; Moreno 1934, 1951) and through anthropologi-
cal studies (A. Davis, Gardner, & Gardner 1941; Warner & Lunt 1941).   
In the 1970’s, the field of network study re-emerged and expanded within the 
social sciences (Granovetter 1973; Rapoport & Horvath 1961; H. C. White, 
Boorman, & Breiger 1976).  Social Networks journal was founded in 1999 by which 
time, ‘social network analysis came to be universally recognized among social scien-
tists’ (Freeman 2004, p. 127).  In the 1990’s, the study of network theory witnessed 
another expansion in the field of physics (Barabasi 2002; Watts 2003; Watts & 
Strogatz 1998), economics and organizational theory (Goldberg 1980; Macneil 1978; 
Podolny & Page 1998; R. Powell 1999; W. W. Powell 1990; Oliver E. Williamson 
1985), and mathematics and computer science (Fiduccia & Mattheyses 1982; Fiedler 
1973; Hubert 1974; Parlett 1980).  Within this array of literature and research, net-
works can be studied through: a) the sociological systems that build and bind 
networks; b) network structures and effectiveness; and c) the governing principals of 
networks and transnational networks.   
 
Sociology and structure of networks  
The sociological approach to networks addresses the innate tendency for individuals 
to organise themselves according to networks.  Sociometry, or what Granovetter re-
fers to as, ‘the precursor of network analysis,’ established an early study of what is 
now termed network theory (Granovetter 1973, p. 1360). ISIL recruitment estimates, 
from countries CIA report Jacob L. Moreno (a psychiatrist) and Helen Hall Jennings 
(a psychologist) founded the school of sociometry.  Moreno believed the evolution 
and organization or groups could be understood through the individual social posi-
tions based on alliances, ideology, agendas, and subgroups (Moreno 1934).   His 
development of the sociogram graphically developed systems of what is now termed 
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network theory, involving points, nodes, and the relationships between groups 
(Moreno 1951).   
There are a number of ties that both create and sustain networks structures.  
Individuals may organize their relationships through what Borgatti and Lopez-
Kidwell (2011) refer to as ‘affective/cognitive’ and ‘role’ based relations.  Affective, 
or cognitive relations involve ‘knowing, liking, or disliking’ (as addressed by More-
no and early sociological studies), and ‘role’ based relationships, such as kinship or 
identified roles (often institutionalized) such as ‘boss or friend’ (Borgatti & Lopez-
Kidwell 2011, p. 44).  Alternatively, relationships can be evaluated as either ‘states’ 
or ‘events’ (Borgatti & Halgin 2011).  ‘States’ are continuous relationships involving 
affective, cognitive (e.g. the others knowledge and interests), and role-based ties (e.g. 
boss, friends, and friends of friends); ‘events’ denote interactions or transactions and 
meetings that define between links (Borgatti & Halgin 2011, p. 1170).  Homans, for 
example, takes the events-based approach noting, in The Human Group, ‘It is possi-
ble just by counting interactions to map out a group quantitatively distinct from 
others’ (Homans 1950, p. 84).  A wider framework offered by Podolny and Page 
(1998) asserts that economic networks can be joined for any reason.   
Relational ties are a part of the organic material that structures and sustains 
networks.  While actors may strategically form and promote networks as an alterna-
tive to hierarchical systems of organisation, the links between individuals are 
understood to give rise to networks, their structure, and the glue that holds them to-
gether.86  Mark Sageman (2004) argues that global Salafist Jihad ultimately 
burgeoned through social networks.  Sageman’s research depicts part of the growth 
of Islamist militant networks (al-Qaeda) through the actors corresponding social 
backgrounds, similar psychological make-up, and their particular situation (Sageman 
2004, p. 61).87  He states: ‘Many of the founders of the global Salafi jihad came to 
Afghanistan in the 1980’s [to fight the Soviet invasion] from different countries and 
without prior connection to each other’ (Sageman 2004, p. 38).  
                                                      
86 Citing the economic historical research of Agnew (1988); Finley (1999), Powell argues that markets 
were built from the network structures of the classical world: ‘Economic units emerged from the 
dense webs of political, religious, and social affiliations that had enveloped economic activity for cen-
turies’ (W. W. Powell 1990, p. 298).   
87 There is some debate as to the extent in which ‘the social network thus forms an infrastructure’ for a 
network, or conversely, ‘social networks do not exist in advance, but rather that they arise as a conse-
quence of regular criminal collaboration’ (Bruinsma & Bernasco 2004).   
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Sageman notes that while the Egyptians (who formed much of the leadership 
later) knew each other through their pre-existing anti-government activities in Egypt, 
the militant movement was ‘a collection of local jihads, receiving training and finan-
cial and logistic support from the vanguard of the movement, al-Qaeda’ (Sageman 
2004, p. 38).  Castells further explains that many militants who were trained by the 
Afghan Service Bureau (MAK) and veterans of Afghanistan, 
spread themselves around the Muslim world, constituting, for instance, 
the main nucleus of radical Islamic guerrillas in Algeria and Egypt, 
and connecting with revolutionary Islamic groups in the Philippines, in 
Yemen, in the Sudan, in Indonesia, in Bosnia, and other countries 
(Castells 2011, p. 120)  
The author asserts that bin Laden was able to maintain a team of veterans from the 
Soviet-Afghan war and MAC training camps to recruit and train a new generation of 
militant fighters.  ‘This original network, and its offspring, is the essential collective 
actor that constituted al-Qaeda and its expanded global network’ (Castells 2011, p. 
121).  
 
Network structures and effectiveness 
Within such a network, the effectiveness of the persons and groups (nodes) and ties 
that they possess can be evaluated through their strength and relative distance.  The 
homophily principle holds that groups will tend to be more homophilous, or based on 
similarities between people (Lazarsfeld & Merton 1954; M. McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, & Cook 2001).  Therefore, networks are expected to be more closely-knit 
(dense), and based on strong ties.  Granovetter (1973) in ‘The Strength of Weak 
Ties’ argues that networks with closely structured groups will tend to have strong 
ties that are unlikely to resemble bridges, which are sources of original information.  
Ronald S. Burt (1992) offers a similar argument through his ‘structural holes’ theory 
of social capital.  Burt reasons that structural holes occur when closely tied nodes in 
a group have redundant ties (and redundant information) and, therefore, tend to lack 
bridges that expand the social distance of the actors and nodes.  
The propensity to form close ties may also affect the performance of the 
overall network.  In the 1950’s, Pool and Kochen originally evaluated what is re-
ferred to as the ‘small world problem.’  The small world problem asserts that because 
actors tend to arrange themselves through close ties and groups, the resulting net-
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works will be localized (Milgram 1967; Pool & Kochen 1978; Rapoport & Horvath 
1961).  The theory was empirically tested and supported in a study by Travers and 
Milgram (1969), which confirmed that networks were often dense and localized.  
However, Watts and Strogatz (1998) further studied the small world concept and 
found that while individuals are often organized in closely associated groups, a small 
number of additional random ties greatly extends the social distance of a network.88  
The authors developed the ‘average clustering coefficient (C)p’ as a measure of the 
degree to which a node and its immediate neighbours have direct connections with 
one another.  Their study replaced a small number of links between neighbouring 
nodes with links to randomly selected nodes in the network.  The results determined 
that a few bridges significantly reduces the path distances of the network, but does 
not have a significant negative impact on the density of the cluster (average cluster-
ing coefficient).   
 Given that a few bridges can offset special limitations, the closeness of ties, 
or clustering, may present independent advantages and disadvantages.  Closeness is 
often treated as a measure of how long it takes for a node to distribute information to 
all other nodes’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014, p. 50).  This phenomenon is also re-
ferred to as ‘clustering’, when egos (any actor within a network) possesses many ties 
to nodes close to them.89  Levine and Kurzban espouse that clusters, or dense net-
works, can be structurally advantageous, attract other outside actors, and enhance 
generalized (diverse) activities and social integration (Levine & Kurzban 2006, pp. 
180-2).  The authors argue that dense clusters are better equipped for the dissemina-
tion of complex information, which may lose accuracy when transmitted over longer 
social distances or between networks (Hansen 1999; Reagans & McEvily 2003; 
Sorenson, Rivkin, & Fleming 2006).  Reagans and McEvily (2003) also argue that 
dense networks are built on close relationships that are less internally competitive 
and, therefore, foster the transfer of knowledge.  Others submit that clusters are bet-
ter able to provide coordination, monitoring, and innovation (Ahuja 2000; Biggart & 
Guillén 1999). 
                                                      
88 See also: Newman, Mark E. J., & Watts, Duncan J. (1999). ‘Renormalization group analysis of the 
small-world network model.’ Physics Letters A, 263(4), 341-346. 
89 An ‘ego’ is defined as any actor within a network; ‘alters’ are those nodes to which the ego is di-
rectly tied; and an ‘ego–network’ denotes the ego, ties to alters, and ties between alters (Borgatti & 
Foster 2003, p. 992).   
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While close ties have a number of advantages, clusters that are exclusive are 
rarely as effective (Uzzi 1997).  In an empirical study of the small world problem, 
Uzzi and Spiro find that dense networks with clusters offer higher productivity.  
However, the trend only continues up to a point, at which the effectiveness of the 
network reverses suggesting that, ‘the relationship between a small world and per-
formance follows an inverted U-shaped function’ (Uzzi & Spiro 2005, p. 449). 
Levine and Kurzban similarly conclude that ‘an optimal setting for private gains 
would be to connect two dense clusters that are disconnected from each other, as 
long as the entrepreneur is densely embedded in one of these clusters’ (Levine & 
Kurzban 2006, p. 182).  The optimal level of closeness may also depend on the levels 
of risk and the need for secrecy.   
A study of criminal groups by Bruinsma and Bernasco finds that ‘criminal 
groups that are engaged in large-scale transnational smuggling and trading of heroin, 
are mostly based on collaboration between members of cohesive (and often ethnical-
ly homogeneous) social networks’ (Bruinsma & Bernasco 2004, pp. 89-90).  They 
hold that networks that incur high levels of risk require significant levels of trust.  
The closeness of ties may also vary in different parts of a network.  For example, 
while al-Qaeda has established a vast and diverse range of global partnerships, ‘the 
core al-Qaeda core is built on personal ties of trust…essentially, Arabs from the Arab 
peninsula and Egypt’ (Castells 2011, p. 122).   
The performance of a network, and the nodes within it, are also impacted by 
the flows of information or resources, or the transivity.  The paths (and the number 
of paths) and relative space between nodes influence the effectiveness of nodes, their 
roles, the resources available to the nodes, and the flow of those resources (Burt 
2004).  For example, Borgatti (2005) and Freeman (1979) explain that nodes with 
more ties are more likely to receive more traffic (and resource(s) associated with that 
traffic).  Similarly, Freeman (1977) holds that nodes that are on more frequent, criti-
cal, or sole paths may possess more influence.  Cook and Emerson (1978) employ 
social experiments in which they determined that centrally located actors are able to 
negotiate more transactions.  Hence, node centrality may indicate more paths of in-
fluence (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011; Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, & Yamagishi 
1983). Others argue that a more powerful position is based on the relative power of 
those connected: ‘power comes from being connected to those who are powerless’ 
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(Bonacich 1987, p. 1171; Borgatti & Halgin 2011; Markovsky, Willer, & Patton 
1988; Marsden 1983).  Additionally, different resources may flow differently based 
on their properties.  Information, for example, can be in two places at once, but may 
not travel on redundant paths, while a physical resource may only pass from one 
node at a time (Borgatti & Halgin 2011, p. 1172).  Network exchange theory also 
espouses that different sets of nodes with similar structural characteristics (nature of 
relationships) tend to posit similar results (Borgatti and Everett, 1992b).   
The power of networks, like that of other organizations, varies between net-
works as well as between actors, or egos, within networks.  Castells, in ‘A network 
Theory of Power’, develops categories and theories of network power.  He categoriz-
es ‘network power’ as the aggregate power of the network actors and organization, as 
opposed to those outside the network, and the power of the network to exclude or 
include actors and organizations (network gatekeeping theory).  ‘Networking power’ 
is defined by the power incurred by the coordination of those actors and the specific 
network solutions employed by the network (Castells 2011, pp. 773-5).   
Within the network, power is generated largely from ‘programmers’ and 
‘switchers.’  ‘Programmers and switchers are those actors and networks of actors 
who, because of their position in the social structure, hold network-making power–
the paramount form of power in the network society’ (Castells, p. 777).  These power 
relationships are not those of individual actors, but, ‘the form of power exercised by 
certain nodes over other nodes in the network’ (Castells 2011, p. 781).   
Programmers are argued to set the ideas that embody the network through 
communication:  
Thus, the control of (or influence on) the networks of communication, 
and the ability to create an effective process of communication and 
persuasion along the lines that favor the projects of the would-be pro-
grammers are the key assets in the ability to program each 
network…They are the fields of power in the network society (Castells 
2011, p. 777).   
Switchers, as defined by the author, influence control over the connections (or bridg-
es) between networks.  ‘Switchers are actors composed of networks of actors that are 
specifically operated in each process of connection’ (Castells 2011, p. 777).  Raab 
and Milward (2003), for example, demonstrate that dark (covert and illegal) net-
works across the world are connected by what they refer to as ‘brokers’.  ‘Very often 
these brokers are dictators, rebel chiefs, warlords, or presidents of failed states with 
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private armies.  They facilitate the operation of all types of covert networks and in 
that process achieve enormous material gains’ (Raab & Milward, p. 431).  Both pro-
grammers and switchers may express power by either enforcing or countering the 
existing domination of the network.   
Based on the underlying personal and collaborative relationships of a net-
work, its activities, and the environment in which it functions, networks may take on 
a variety of structural forms.  The three most common network structures are the 
‘chain’, the ‘star’, ‘hub’, or ‘wheel’ network, and the ‘all-channel’ network (Arquilla 
et al. 1999, p. 84).  The chain network utilizes a linear structure of nodes, often used 
for smuggling operations.  ‘The basic feature… is a chain of bilateral contracts; a 
group or a person will only know his or her immediate predecessor and successor in 
the supply chain’ (Raab & Milward 2003, p. 420).  A study by Bruinsma and Ber-
nasco (2004) finds that illicit women trafficking groups in the Netherlands are 
characterized by two clusters at each end, connected by a chain of persons for 
transport.  Organized car theft, on the other hand, also involves a linear structure, but 
connects a chain of clusters bound by weak ties, each of which performs separate 
functions (e.g. stealing cars, recycling merchandise, providing paperwork) (Raab & 
Milward, pp. 88-90).  The star, hub, or wheel networks involve a central node struc-
ture, and is often used for franchising (legal and illicit) and certain cartels.  The all-
channel network involves a wide range of collaboration with a wide variety of 
groups often involved in large-scale operations, such as international heroin trade 
(Bruinsma & Bernasco 2004).   
 
The governing structure of networks 
Network theory provides an analysis of how networks emerge, function, and their 
effectiveness.  Their governing structure, however, determines how networks can be 
defined and distinguished from other forms of organisation, and how they fit into or-
ganizational theory.  Eilstrup-Sangiovanni conceptually separates social network 
analysis (SNA), which is largely descriptive of networks, and organizational network 
theory (ONT), ‘which offers a rich repository of hypotheses about the benefits of in-
formal, horizontal interaction–many of which carry direct relevance for the study of 
security governance’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014, p. 46) .  An analysis of organisa-
tional network theory illuminates two distinguishing characteristics of networks: 1) 
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networks are not bounded by hierarchical organizational structures; and 2) networks 
lack outside arbitration and are, therefore, governed endogenously.  
The building blocks of an organisational theory of networks emerged most 
notably from the field of economics.  Ronald Coase (1937) offered a classic work in 
which market forms of organisation acted as non-hierarchal structures that result in 
different advantages and disadvantages.  A number of authors have expanded on 
Coase’s attention to non-hierarchical forms of corporate organisation.  Oliver E Wil-
liamson (1975) argued that transaction costs drive the use of hierarchical and market 
systems.  Williamson theorized organizational structures can be described as pure 
markets on one end, pure hierarchies on the other end, and hybrid organizational 
structures that possess elements of both.90  The analysis of non-hierarchical forms of 
organisation resulted in increasing attention to networks.  A number of other scholars 
have evaluated the non-hierarchical, or network, forms of organisation such as coop-
erative arrangements and joint ventures (Mariti & Smiley 1983; Richardson 1972), 
coalitions (Porter & Fuller 1986), and quasi firms (Eccles 1981). 
Several theories have expanded on the role of trust in economic relationships 
and its application to non-hierarchical alternative to organisation.  Macneil (1978) 
argues that relational contracting is grounded on social norms as well as the desire 
for continued relationships in the future, and can serve to reduce transaction costs.91  
Zucker (1986) asserts that trust (within the context of production) is either process-
based, characteristic-based, or institution-based:  process-based trust is built on past 
transactions and expected future transactions; character-based trust is formed through 
the social characteristics of another person; and institution-based trust is established 
by formal societal structures and mechanisms.  Other studies have incorporated the 
role of trust in the dynamics of economic systems.  Bradach and Eccles, for example, 
espouse that there are ‘three control mechanisms that govern economic transactions 
between actors: price, authority, and trust’ (Bradach & Eccles 1989, p. 97).    
W. W. Powell (1990) broke with Williamson’s theory of a hybrid form of or-
ganization between markets and hierarchies, and instead argued that networks are a 
                                                      
90 Oliver E Williamson (1975) also argued that hybrids between markets and hierarchies would trend 
in the direction of one, or another, in a two-tailed distribution.   
91 Macaulay (1963) presented an early premise for relational contracts.  In a study of businesses, the 
author found that personal guarantees and norms were preferable methods to bind contracts. See also: 
Goldberg (1980), Jeffries and Reed (2000), and Oliver E. Williamson (1985).  
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separate form of organisation.  His approach set the framework for network theory 
within the field of political science (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014, p. 44).  Powell 
(1990) theorised that network organizations are distinct because they are not bound-
ed to hierarchical organizational structures or held together by outside authority.  
Accordingly, Podolny and Page define networks as follows: 
[…] when considered a form of governance, the network form can be 
distinctly characterized. We define a network form of organization as 
any collection of actors (N≥2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange 
relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate or-
ganizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise 
during the exchange (Podolny & Page 1998, p. 59). 
The authors explain that goodwill between parties is not necessary for a network or-
ganisation, it is instead defined by any actors that wish to enter a relation for which 
there is no legitimate form of arbitration between the actors (Podolny & Page, p. 61).  
Instead, the glue that holds network activities together is endogenous to the network.   
There are several mechanisms by which networks establish credible commit-
ments from within to enable collaboration.  First, Powell notes that networks are 
‘more dependent on relationships, mutual interests, and repudiation–as well as less 
guided by a formal structure of authority’ (W. W. Powell 1990, p. 300).  For exam-
ple, Raab and Milward (2003) explain that the absence of hierarchical systems to 
resolve disputes elevates transaction costs significantly.  Therefore, ‘while there is 
some cooperation between different groups, the majority of trafficking between the 
producer, transit, and consumer countries is done within ethnically homogeneous 
groups where kinship ties still play an important role…’ (Raab & Milward, p. 421).   
Second, reciprocity is often enhanced by the prospect of future relations and 
activities (Axelrod 1986, 2006).  Third, obligations between parties can compel fu-
ture relations, meetings, and transactions (W. W. Powell 1990, p. 304; Sahlins 1972).  
And, finally, ‘hostage exchange’ or ‘hostage taking’ refers broadly to the ability to 
exact negative consequences in order to strengthen the credible commitment of an 
agreement or a contract (Schelling 1956; Oliver E Williamson 1983).  The term hos-
tage taking is often used figuratively, but can also be applied literally in reference to 
illicit groups.  ‘Because covert networks cannot rely on formal institutions or the le-
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gal systems of nation-states...A breach of trust is connected to mutual destruction or 
at least the death of loved ones’ (Raab & Milward 2003, pp. 430-1).92  
A lack of legitimate outside authority, which leads to network organizations, 
may be a preference or a necessity.  In some cases, actors and groups may seek non-
hierarchical organisations without arbitration.  Powell notes that many small tech-
nology firms were able to expand at a fast non-linear rate, compared to their 
competitors, based on horizontal networks that were more agile and flexible (1990, 
pp. 298-9).  The author also explains that parts of the Italian economy had been 
heavily decentralized into small enterprises built largely on family networks and arti-
san associations, in part to avoid labour union power in large firms (1990, pp. 310-1).  
Additionally, weak states, or governments that lack (or avoid) authority in certain 
areas, may render parties unable to provide a credible system for resolution of dis-
putes.  In such cases, lack of a realistic expectation of third party arbitration may 
necessitate network relationships based on trust and horizontal organization.  Moses 
Finley’s The Ancient Economy explains that because Rome during the 1st century 
B.C. was unable to legislate interests rates, land owners accessed needed cash 
through ‘a complicated network of loans and guarantees.  To borrow created political 
obligation–until one was assigned a provincial governorship and recouped’ (Finley 
1999, p. 53).   
Similarly, groups and organizations involved in illicit activities operate out-
side of a legitimate system of law and third party arbitration, and often must establish 
endogenous trust and credible commitments within networks.  Transnational insur-
gent networks, therefore, must establish relationships with other groups horizontally, 
based on endogenous systems of trust and credible commitments.  However, this 
ability of insurgencies to organize into networks at the transnational level may ex-
tend the capabilities and influence of these groups.   
 
5.3 Effectiveness of transnational insurgent networks 
Insurgencies, which may have employed network organization prior to the transfor-
mation, are now able to utilize larger, more complex, networks beyond their borders.   
The emergence of transnational insurgent networks has potentially expanded the ca-
                                                      
92 Inter-marriage is also a form of hostage exchange between tribes, states, and other groups.  Bin 
Laden, for example, is believed to have married a number of his children to close allies (Raab & 
Milward 2003, p. 431).  
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pabilities of insurgencies in two ways.  First, transnational networks are believed to 
benefit from flat, horizontal forms of organization at the transnational level that have 
advantages over state hierarchies.  Second, the ability to partner with a diverse set of 
state and non-state actors internationally enables these groups to secure increased 
expertise and resources and engage in violent activities beyond their borders. 
 
5.3.1 Structural dynamics of transnational insurgencies 
The potential organizational strengths of transnational insurgent networks reside in 
the fact that they are not bound to hierarchical structures.  Transnational insurgen-
cies, however, may have hierarchical elements, depending in part on their level of 
decentralization and outside partnerships (network members).  Renate Mayntz, for 
example, explains that a number of terrorist organizations (some of which have card-
carrying members) ‘are acknowledged as corporate actors, and have an internal 
structure that can be described by means of a traditional organizational chart’  
(Mayntz 2004, p. 9).  The author establishes a theoretical framework for ideal types 
of networks and hierarchies, noting that most terrorist groups have components of 
both.  He also argues that as terrorist organization have shifted to the international 
level they retain elements of central control, while expanding horizontally through 
loose connections with outside groups, ‘to protect if from endogenous disintegration 
and from ineffectiveness’ (Mayntz 2004, p. 14).  Klaus Von Lampe (2003) similarly 
describes a continuum with an isolated individual at one end and a formal (criminal) 
organization on the opposite end.   
Despite remaining hierarchical organizational elements, in practice, many in-
surgencies are organized in networks that can benefit both from the complex, often 
far-reaching relationships, as well as the organizational structure itself.  For example, 
Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, explain that the al-Gama’a al-Islamiya (IG) in Egypt, 
which is responsible for the Temple of Hatshepsut attack in 1997 and other attacks, 
‘is a decentralized organization that operates without a single operational leader’ 
(Arquilla et al. 1999, p. 95).  Al-Qaeda under bin Laden had a strong core leadership, 
‘but it does not have a command and control structure. It provides training and in-
doctrination to the true believers who answer the call, after careful screening’ 
(Arquilla et al., p. 135).  Similarly, Raab and Milward explain: ‘Some networks are 
dense at the top and loose at the bottom, like Al Qaeda before 11 September. Others, 
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like the drug-smuggling networks, can go from a vertically integrated network to a 
series of bilateral contracts based on the threats to their existence’ (Raab & Milward 
2003, p. 430).   
Most state militaries and organizations are hierarchical in nature, character-
ized by ‘clear departmental boundaries, clean lines of authority, detailed reporting 
mechanisms, and formal decision-making procedures…’ (W. W. Powell 1990, p. 
303).  Hierarchies have a number of strengths.  Hierarchies in most cases possess 
material and logistical resources, advanced technological abilities, a body of trained 
staff, and overall access to state power, or what Kenney (2007) terms ‘force’.  How-
ever, transnational network structures are believed to hold a number of relative 
advantages, especially for elicit groups that rely on flexibility, speed, and adaptabil-
ity.  In a study of Middle Eastern terrorist groups, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini 
espouse that there has been a shift in strength from traditional, more hierarchical ter-
rorist organizations of the 1960’s and 1970’s (Abu Nidal Organization, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine–PFLP)93 to more decentralized and less hierar-
chical groups that emerged in the 1990’s (Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 
Hizbullah, Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Egyptian Islamic Group (IG), 
and Osama bin Laden’s Arab Afghans)  (Arquilla et al. 1999, pp. 92-3).  The authors 
conclude: ‘What seems evident here is that the old generation of traditional hierar-
chical, bureaucratic groups is on the wane’ (Arquilla et al., p. 93). 
As noted by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, the organizational structure of transna-
tional networks offers what many theorists and analysts view as an organizational 
and tactical advantage.  The authors state:  
The rise of networks means that power is migrating to nonstate actors, 
because they are able to organize into sprawling multiorganizational 
networks (especially “all-channel” networks, in which every node is 
connected to every other node) more readily than can traditional, hier-
archical, state actors. This means that conflicts may increasingly be 
waged by “networks,” perhaps more than by “hierarchies.” It also 
means that whoever masters the network form stands to gain the ad-
vantage (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001, p. 1) 
Transnational insurgent networks vary in size, objectives, actors, and methods.  
However, transnational networks are unified by some elements.  The non-
                                                      
93 The authors’ study of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) include three PFLP-
related splinters—the PFLP-General Command, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Demo-
cratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (Arquilla et al. 1999, p. 92). 
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hierarchical organisational structure of transnational networks is usually flat and hor-
izontal, and ‘tend to be highly decentralised, with action emanating not from a single 
centre, but from multiple, dispersed, and loosely connected nodes’ (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2005, p. 7).  This organizational structure is thought to produce several 
characteristics that affect network effectiveness: decentralization, speed, flexibility, 
adaptability, looseness (loose coupling), redundancy, resilience, and learning.   
Decentralization is thought to enable networks to process information, along 
with other resources, through separate nodes and links between the nodes with great-
er speed than hierarchical systems (Castells 1996).  W. W. Powell (1990) argues that 
networks provide reliable and useful information that does not normally flow 
through hierarchical structures, and can be effective when the values of resources are 
difficult to assess.  Additionally, the author argues that trust reduces complex reali-
ties far more quickly and economically than prediction, authority, or bargaining.  
Decentralized networks also allow greater autonomy for decision making (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2005).  Kenney (2007) maintains that loose and flat organizational 
structures enable networks to process information and make critical decisions more 
quickly than state counterterrorism and law enforcement bureaucracies.   
Transnational networks are also considered to be very adaptable.  As McFar-
lane explains, ‘The complex adaptive systems associated with the new wars have 
been exploiting the flexible and relational power of the network for some years’ 
(McFarlane 2000, p. 157).  These organisations are argued to manoeuvre agilely to 
adapt to their environment and to learn quickly (Castells 1996; W. W. Powell 1990; 
Watts 2003).  Networks are also thought to be able to expand and contract effectively 
to conform to their strategic goals, or what is referred to as ‘scalability’ (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2005; Smith-Doerr & Powell 2005).  The ability to expand and contract 
with relative speed (compared to hierarchies) is thought to make transnational insur-
gencies agile and elusive.   
Networks often engage in what is referred to as ‘loose coupling’ and ‘redun-
dancy‘ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones 2008, p. 15).  Loose coupling describes 
systems that are characterized by a dialectic of closeness and separation at the same 
time (Orton & Weick 1990).  Loose coupling occurs when relationships that have 
scarce or weak common variables are distinct but responsive to one another, or only 
interact at certain times, or with diminished intensity (Glassman 1973; Weick 1976, 
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1982).  Mayntz adds that loose coupling can also involve ‘latent relationships,’ in 
which existing dormant relations, ‘can be activated at any time in case of a specific 
need for action’ (Mayntz 2004, p. 13).  ‘The special mode of loose coupling protects 
the organization from being discovered and from the disruptive effects of the loss of 
a single unit or leader’ (Mayntz, p. 14).  Additionally, redundant nodes and networks, 
while not necessarily efficient, can also make transnational networks more resilient.  
‘In terms of defensive potential, well-constructed networks tend to be redundant and 
diverse, making them robust and resilient in the face of adversity’ (Arquilla et al. 
1999, p. 88). 
In their study of dark networks, Raab and Milward (2003) note that the large 
vertically integrated and hierarchically structured drug cartels of the 1980’s ‘tried to 
hang on to their product through its entire chain of manufacturing, distribution, and 
sale to consumers.  But they ultimately paid the price for their hierarchical control; a 
single broken link could bring down the whole organization’ (Brzezinski 2002; Raab 
& Milward 2003, p. 420).  The combination of covert secrecy and resilience makes 
networks difficult and costly to challenge.  As Castells states: ‘The implications of 
networking organization are huge…It is not possible to bomb a network, only its 
nodes, in a very long, and costly world-wide strategy, which always has to deal with 
the self-reproducing and reconfiguring capacities of the network’ (Castells 2011, p. 
138). 
Transnational insurgent networks may also be able to develop a high level of 
expertise that makes them resilient.  Dense networks are argued to increase innova-
tion, monitoring, coordination, and the transfer of knowledge (Ahuja 2000; Biggart 
& Guillén 1999; Reagans & McEvily 2003).  Illicit transnational networks also enlist 
a range of resources that are tailored to their activities.  As Morselli explains, ‘the 
network framework provides what is probably the most suitable working tool for as-
sembling the resource pooling that is typical of entrepreneurial crimes that require a 
greater level of skill, sophistication, and complex collaboration’ (Morselli 2009, p. 
10).  And finally, networks continually learn and quickly adapt in order to survive.  
Kenney (2007) explains that the level of risk incurred by illicit organizations gener-
ates learning systems that function like ‘high reliability organizations,’ or HRO’s 
(e.g. traffic control system or naval aircraft carriers).  Such organizations continually 
examine small failures and adjust accordingly.  Through a process of examination 
165 
 
and adaptation, illicit networks can evolve their resilience over time, and efforts to 
disrupt their activities may, in some cases, strengthen them.94   
Networks and transnational networks have potential organizational strengths 
that are unique to their design, but may also benefit from relative tactical advantages 
when opposing hierarchies.  Speed and flexibility, for example, are more effective 
against adversaries that are relatively slow and rigid.  This asymmetry of tactics has 
led to increased attention to counterinsurgency strategies that engage with network 
elements of military structure, as well as more flexible and agile systems of global 
governance.  Arquilla et al. (1999) assert that hierarchies are not well structured to 
fight networks, noting failures to defeat transnational drug cartels, the Zapatista 
movement in Mexico, religious movements in Algeria.  In the face of tactical asym-
metry, the authors submit that states should incorporate network structures: ‘It takes 
networks to fight networks.  Governments that would defend against netwar may 
have to adopt organizational designs and strategies like those of their adversaries’ 
(Arquilla et al. 1999, p. 90).95 
The effectiveness of the organisation structure of transnational networks has 
engendered the idea that states must incorporate features of networks to be competi-
tive with both legitimate and illicit organizations (Slaughter 2004).  Both 
international governance and military structure has been adjusted to incorporate ele-
ments of network theory to combat illicit transnational networks.  After the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, international coalitions were made more flexible and 
dynamic to track illicit networks (McFarlane 2000).  Additionally, the U.S. military 
has also undergone shifts from ‘platform-centric warfare’ to ‘network-centric war-
fare.’  Network-centric warfare enables bottom-up decision making to allow greater 
speed and agility in dealing with counter-insurgency (Cebrowski & Garstka 1998, p. 
1).  
Transnational network organisational structures may also have disadvantages.  
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones, for example, point out that ‘al-Qaida carried out its 
                                                      
94 Kenney (2007) notes that this form of resilience based on continual learning and adaptation, is not 
necessarily due to the organization structure of networks, but is instead more driven by high risk ac-
tivities (often associated with illicit organizations).   
95  The authors define netwars as: ‘an emerging mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, involv-
ing measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and 
related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age’ (Arquilla et al. 1999, p. 
82). 
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most successful missions when it was relatively hierarchically structured. The al-
Qaida that perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks was not really organized as a 
network’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones 2008, p. 34).  One argument against the 
strength of networks is that because their structure lacks central leadership, strategic 
thinking and large-scale planning can be weak or, in some cases, non-existent 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones 2008; W.W. Powell 1990).  Additionally, although 
there are many advantages to endogenous network systems of trust and credible 
commitments, recruitment may be constrained by the need for strong ties (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni & Jones 2008; Raab & Milward 2003).  Furthermore, Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni and Jones (2008, pp. 19-23) argue that the advantages of illicit net-
works, although valid, are overstated.  They espouse, for example, that while 
networks receive varied information well, 
[…] decentralized or “distributed” systems, on the other hand, tend to 
be less efficient information providers.  Because such systems lack a 
central directory to catalogue information, searches effectively involve 
each node querying neighboring nodes, which query other neighboring 
nodes until the information is found (or the search is abandoned) 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones 2008, p. 19).   
In some cases, the lack of a central command and the tendency for isolation 
in networks may also make it more difficult to access outside information.  Addition-
ally, they note that network adaptability and scalability are limited.  Many of these 
arguments, however, more or less maintain that the organizational structures of net-
works are formidable, but diverge over the level of threat to state sovereignty.  ‘We 
agree that network-based threats pose serious challenges to state security.  But, we 
argue, the prevailing pessimism about the ability of states to combat illicit networks 
is premature’ (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones 2008, p. 8).   
 
5.3.2 Transnational insurgent networks: resources and activities 
As transnational networks become more viable and potentially more effective, insur-
gencies are increasingly horizontally integrated beyond their borders, and, therefore, 
form transnational insurgent networks.  The shift from domestic insurgencies to 
transnational insurgent networks has expanded the effectiveness and capabilities of 
insurgencies in two ways.  First, insurgencies often structure their networks to gain 
additional resources and expertise through outside states, other insurgencies, criminal 
groups, non-state actors, and diasporas.  Second, transnational insurgencies can use 
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their networks to pursue wider goals beyond their borders, either by supporting other 
insurgencies or engaging in activities directly.  
 
State network actors 
State actors have been involved significantly in transnational insurgent networks ei-
ther by directly supporting an insurgent group or by linking with multiple network 
actors.  There is a growing literature that explores the idea that states are increasingly 
supporting or backing domestic insurgencies where the state perceives an interest in 
the outcomes or an international or regional strategic interest.  Idean Salehyan’s em-
pirical study finds that out of 285 rebel groups from 1946 to 2003, 134 have an 
explicit or widely accepted connection with a foreign patron, and an additional 30 
have alleged outside support.  ‘The vast majority of these cases involved a foreign 
government sponsoring a rebel group through arms or finances’ (Salehyan 2010, pp. 
5-6). 96  Examples include Gleditsch and Beardsley’s (2004) analysis of the involve-
ment of ‘transnational third party actors’ in the domestic insurgencies of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua.  By providing funding, safe havens, weapons, training, 
and troops, outside states can expand the resources available to an insurgent group or 
groups (Salehyan 2009, 2010, 2010).   
A number of states (particularly major powers) engage in what is referred to 
as ‘delegation,’ in which a state outsources or supports an insurgency, and generally 
involves an asymmetry of power from the state (principal) to the insurgency (agent) 
(G. J. Miller 2005; Salehyan 2010).  Other state actors may be more embedded in the 
network through a number of insurgencies that may often have connection with one 
another and comprise an integrated ego-system.  The Republic of Iran provides a 
good framework of proactive support to a variety of network actors within a region.  
‘The Republic of Iran uses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods 
Force (QF) and is believed to provide aid in the form of paramilitary training, weap-
ons, and equipment to various Iraqi militant groups, including Moqtada al Sadr’s 
                                                      
96 While many conflict studies use the MID (Militarized International Disputes) data from the Corre-
lates of War (COW), Salehyan uses a new dataset by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2008), 
the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars dataset (NSA), which includes information on all rebel groups 
active since 1945, based on the list of conflicts provided by the Uppsala University/International 
Peace Research Institute, Oslo Armed Conflicts Dataset, and includes information on foreign support 
for rebel groups.   
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Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) and the Special Group Criminals (SGCs)’ (Felter & Fishman 
2008, p. 6).  The Iranian backed networks are thought to have activities in Lebanon, 
through Hezbollah, in Palestine through Hamas, and in Turkey, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan (Felter & Fishman 2008).  
State actors may also provide geographical support to insurgent groups (Lia 
and Kjøk 2001; Byman et al. 2001).  A significant number of insurgencies have terri-
tory in outside states that function as safe havens.  In some cases, particularly in 
neighbouring states, insurgencies operate in foreign territories without the permission 
of the states. But in a number of cases, states have tacit, secret, or outright access to 
geographical territory that helps shield the insurgency from enemies and where they 
can also receive training and support from the state or other network partners.   Ex-
amples include al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Kenya, and Yemen.  
Additionally, while it was commonly thought that failed states were ideal sanctuar-
ies, a study by Jacob Shapiro and Clinton Watts (2007) entitled ‘Al-Qa’ida’s 
(Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa’ argues that weak states are more desirable 
safe havens than failed states.  The study found that Kenya, as a weak state, func-
tioned more effectively than the failed state of Somalia.  The authors maintain that 
while weak states have a limited capacity to hunt for the insurgent group, state sov-
ereignty hinders the ability of outside states to search the safe haven territory.  
Additionally, weak states possess sufficient infrastructure and a functioning society 
in which insurgents may go into hiding.  And finally, insurgencies in failed states 
may have to compete with other illicit groups more often than in weak states.   
 
Transnational criminal networks 
In addition to states, transnational insurgent networks may involve a range of illicit 
criminal organizations. A number of academic studies have found that criminal 
groups were often operated through ‘loose webs’ beyond their borders, or transna-
tional networks.  As Williams states, ‘there is a growing recognition that organized 
crime is increasingly operating through fluid network structures rather than more-
formal hierarchies’ (Williams 2001, p. 62).  Transnational criminal networks are also 
often found to have links to transnational insurgencies.  They include criminal net-
works such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and illicit weapons trade that can 
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provide transnational insurgencies with crucial financial resources, weaponry, and 
the ability to conceal funds (Castells 1996; Levitsky 2003; Williams 1994, 2001).  
The objectives of transnational illicit groups may diverge: ‘…some, such as 
arms trafficking and drugs, are illegal and instrumental in their pursuit of wealth and 
power; some, such as Al-Qaeda, wish to destroy both the military and economic 
power of the ‘infidel’ West’ (Raab & Milward 2003, p. 415).  However, they may 
often work together to provide arms, smuggle and launder money, and provide criti-
cal expertise.  Illicit non-state actors may also include ‘war economies’ and warlord 
activities, which may provide profits from natural resources to fund insurgencies 
(Cilliers & Dietrich 2000; Duffield 2001, 2002; Kaldor 2007; Le Billon 2001).  
‘Covert networks have come together with warlords controlling access to resources 
to create commodity wars.  These wars are fought over control of diamonds, petrole-
um concessions, and coca leaves and poppies’ (Raab & Milward 2003, p. 428).   
Illicit transnational groups can be critical to the operations of transnational in-
surgencies.  Raab and Milward (2003) in, ‘Dark Networks as Problems,’ evaluate 
networks consisting of failed states (and natural resources), transnational insurgen-
cies, and transnational crime.97  In particular, the authors find a link between al-
Qaeda, failed states (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso), and transnational 
criminal networks including diamond smugglers and arms traders.  ‘The connection 
appears based on Al Qaeda’s need to exchange cash for diamonds’ (Raab & Milward 
2003, p. 425).  Diamonds acted as a currency for al-Qaeda that was easily transport-
ed, and war-torn failed states required financing for weapons.   
By the late 1990’s, Liberia had become the center of a great deal of di-
amond-related criminal activity.  [Charles] Taylor oversaw the trade in 
weapons for diamonds with the RUF [Revolutionary United Front] and 
did the same for other diamond-producing countries…Al Qaeda 
bought diamonds from Sierra Leon diamond fields, which are very 
close to the Liberian border, at below market rates and resold them in 
Europe for millions of dollars in profit…(Raab & Milward 2003, p. 
426) 
Arms traders, some of which came from Russia, were also a key component for both 
al-Qaeda and warlords of the failed states.  In particular, the authors cite the example 
                                                      
97 Shelley (2004) submits that traditional criminal organizations have often evolved with their states 
and are dependent on existing institutions and financial markets for their activities.  Therefore, these 
criminal groups do not partner with terrorist groups in the interest of preserving their state structures.  
The author notes, however, the newer criminal groups in failed or ungovernable states are more will-
ing to engage with risky terrorist organizations (Shelley 2004, p. 101).  
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of Victor Bout, a former Soviet pilot who became a weapons trader, and operated a 
fleet of planes which flew ‘weapons, poison, chemicals, operatives, and cash to both 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in addition to his African ventures’ (Raab 
& Milward 2003, p. 427). 
 
Non-state actors and diasporas 
Insurgencies also raise support (primarily financial) from networks of non-state ac-
tors and diasporas internationally that may have ethnic or strategic interests that are 
congruent with the activities of the insurgent movement.  The non-state actors data-
base suggest that a number of insurgencies receive support from outside non-state 
actors, diasporas (or individuals) as well as outside insurgencies.  From 1945 to 
2004, about 21% of insurgent groups received major or minor military support (in-
cluding funding, weapons, and other support for military purposes) from one of these 
groups.  Fiona B. (Adamson 2005) argues that non-state actor support of insurgent 
groups has become more prevalent as diasporas expand and global transfers of goods 
and resources becomes more liquid: 
Increasingly, there is also greater attention being paid to the global 
market in illicit capital flows and illicit flows of goods across borders.  
Many of these flows are facilitated by the activities of transnational in-
formal economic networks, which are often intertwined, to a greater or 
lesser extent, with migration networks.  These informal economic net-
works are embedded in existing social configurations, in that they rely 
heavily on personal relations between members, rather than formal or 
impersonal organizational structures (Adamson 2005, p. 35). 
Mayntz (2004) espouses that some organizations act largely as a network arm 
to support an insurgency (or insurgencies) by building ‘international support net-
works that collect funds and provide the national organization with other resources 
(such as a legitimate narrative) (2004, p. 9).  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), as the author notes, were able to gain support from outside states and inter-
national diaspora in the form of funds, weapons, bombmaking equipment, and 
communications activities (propaganda) for insurgent operations in Sri Lanka. In a 
study of terrorism, Castells (2011) explains that the pre–9/11 development of al-
Qaeda and Islamic jihad was supported by a number of banks and groups.  He ex-
plains: ‘There are well-known connections between Islamic banks and financial 
institutions and Islamic charities and Islamic organizations around the world’ 
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(Castells, p. 129).  The author notes, for example, that the Zakat (a religious tax in 
many Islamic countries) is used for humanitarian projects through the International 
Islamic Relief Foundation (IIRO); some of which have supported local organizations 
that have been connected to Islamic militants. 
Individuals and groups in the region (and globally) are also used by insurgen-
cies for recruitment.  During the U.S. led occupation of Iraq, data from the 
Countering Terrorism Center at West Point released data on the number of fighters 
that entered Iraq from outside states within the region.  The study found that from 
August of 2006 to August of 2007, 244 fighters originated from Saudi Arabia, 112 
were from Libya, 49 originated from Syria, 48 from Yemen, 43 from Algeria, 36 
from Morocco, and 11 from Jordan.  Based on the information, the authors note: 
‘…Iraq has inspired thousands of young men from around the world to join al–
Qa’ida’s cause’ (Felter & Fishman 2007).  In late 2014, the Islamic State in Syia and 
Iraq was estimated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have in the vicinity of 
30,000 fighters from over 80 different countries (including Western states).  
 
5.3.3 Transnational activities 
Transnational insurgencies can be evaluated in two groups: first, insurgencies with 
largely domestic objectives and outside state and/or non-state actor support, such as 
the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) or al-Qaeda in Iraq; 
second, transnational insurgencies that have regional or international objectives as 
well as outside support such as Hizballah, al-Qa’ida, and the Mujahidin-e Khalq Or-
ganization (MKO).  These insurgencies are able to combine their objectives and 
resources in a way that can elevate their aggregate capabilities and enable regional or 
international objectives and activities.  David Kilcullen describes the transnational 
activities of insurgencies: 
[…] in the field today we see real-time cooperation and cross-
pollination among insurgents in many countries. Ayman al-Zawahiri 
has referred to a four-stage strategy in Iraq, involving expulsion of US 
forces, creation of an Islamic Emirate in Sunni areas, its extension to 
neighbouring countries and then attacks on Israel. (Kilcullen 2006, p. 
114).      
Transnational insurgencies may engage in regional or international objectives 
by engaging in activities beyond their borders, supporting domestic insurgencies in 
outside states, and networking with other insurgencies with regional or international 
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objectives.  First, insurgencies may directly engage in activities regionally or interna-
tionally, such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional; 
ELN) in Bolivia, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and al-
Qaida regionally and internationally.  The Islamic Party of Turkestan (IMT), former-
ly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), for example, expanded its mission 
from a domestic strategy for an Islamic state of Uzbekistan to Central Asia; it has 
troops fighting abroad in the Ferghana valley bordering Kyrgyzstan and is espoused 
also to be located in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.  
Second, internationalization may involve the support of insurgencies in other 
states.  Examples include the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s support and develop-
ment of Lebanese Hizbollah and support for Sadrist Shite insurgencies in Iraq, as 
well as al-Qaeda’s international network of Sunni insurgencies.98  Daniel S. Roper 
(2008) describes this method as franchising: 
Not a traditional organization, al Qaeda resembles a criminal parasite 
that attaches itself to ongoing insurgencies.  An example of this is the 
relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Else-
where, it is very much an organization, a “loosely knit framework of 
radical co-religionists spreading jihad” internationally, motivated by a 
collective vision to re-establish the caliphate (Roper 2008, p. 100). 
Third, an international network may be formed for the purpose of achieving 
common goals, or even in pursuit of separate goals in which mutual cooperation is 
beneficial.  For example, the Kurdish insurgencies in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey cooper-
ate for the goal of an independent Kurdish state. In particular, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was aligned with the Kurdish Democratic Party of 
Iraq (KPD), and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey supported the Free Life 
Party of Iran (PJAK), and was aligned with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
in Iraq, and had bases in Greece, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. 
 
5.3.4 Data analysis 
The data analysis is adapted from the Non-state Actor data set to measure the trends 
in domestic and transnational insurgent networks to review trends in insurgencies 
                                                      
98 Castells, for example argues that al-Qaeda’s network, despite its far reaching objectives and organi-
zational ties, has experienced greater autonomy because, ‘there is a simplicity of goals, and because 
the mystical character of the organization, entirely devoted to God’s will’ (Castells 2011, p. 137). 
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from 1945 to 2004.99  This section will evaluate three insurgency groups: 1) insur-
gencies with domestic strategies and objectives and no transnational activities; 2) 
insurgencies with domestic objectives and strategies that engage in transnational ac-
tivities to increase their capacity; and, 3) insurgencies with international and/or 
regional objectives, strategies and activities.  Insurgencies with regional and interna-
tional objectives will have outside operations in which they either promote those 
objectives and strategies through a physical presence in an outside territory or territo-
ries, or by supporting an outside group or groups.  Insurgencies with domestic 
interests but transnational activities receive outside support, such as financing, mili-
tary support, training and safe havens, but do not promote objectives through a 
physical presence outside their state or support outside groups. Domestic insurgen-
cies have neither outside operations or support.  
Of the 187 insurgencies from 1945 to 2004, 90, or 48%, are engaged in out-
side operations of some kind.  This section evaluates the trends in domestic and 
transnational insurgencies.  In particular, it determines why some insurgencies do not 
engage in transnational networks.  Additionally, it evaluates the extent to which 
transnational insurgencies have domestic objectives, engaging in transnational net-
works primarily to acquire resources and support, or have regional and/international 
objectives.   
 
Domestic insurgencies 
Since the Second World War, the number of overall domestic insurgencies has de-
creased from over half of all insurgencies in 1944 to approximately 13% of 
                                                      
99 The data for chapters four and five utilise a variety of sources, but is grounded in the Non-State 
Actors in Civil Wars data set (NSA) developed by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2008), the 
Non-State Actor Data: Version 3.3 (NSAEX), and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia ("Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program") as a consistent basis of empirical data.  The NSA data set is based on the list 
of conflicts provided by the Uppsala University/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo Armed 
Conflicts Dataset, contains information on all insurgencies active since 1945, and includes infor-
mation on insurgencies involved in conflicts as well as their sources of foreign support (Salehyan 
2010, p. 5).  The accompanying NSAEX provides descriptive information on the relevant history of 
states and governments, related insurgencies, and outside supporters.  The information from the NSA 
data set, NSAEX and outside sources qualitative data (consistent with the former) have been compiled 
into a single source.  The NSA data set codes according to state, conflict type, and each dyad of gov-
ernment and insurgency within each conflict.  The revised data set compiles data on government-
insurgent group dyads into 187 insurgency movements based on coding for wider conflicts.  There-
fore, each entry may include multiple insurgencies and outside supporters, but is related to a single 
area of conflict.  Additional qualitative data have been added regarding the state background, infor-
mation on insurgencies and movements, outside state or non-state actor involvement, and the 
objectives of the actors involved.     
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insurgencies in 2004.100  Hence, there is an increasing pattern of transnational insur-
gencies either to promote greater capacity or to pursue regional or international 
interests (see figure 5-3).  Therefore, most insurgencies since the Second World War 
are transnational in nature.  Given the ability of insurgencies to gain resources and 
expertise through transnational networks, it would seem that most insurgencies 
would seek them out.  However, there are some cases in which insurgencies to not 
receive foreign support or partner with outside groups. 
First, the groups involved in an insurgency may have domestic interests and 
see outside support as too costly to their strategy and interests.  In what is referred to 
as ‘interventionalism’ states give to insurgent groups without conditions.  However, 
in many cases, state (or non-state) actor support requires the insurgencies to make 
compromises that benefit the supporter.  As Salehyan notes, ‘external actors play an 
important role in shaping the insurgency and exert control over it’ (Salehyan 2010, p. 
9).101  Therefore, insurgent groups must assess the ‘cost’ of support, which these 
groups may in some cases find prohibitive or undermining to their objectives.   
Insurgencies may also possess strategies that do not benefit greatly from out-
side support.  In cases of long insurgencies and civil wars, outside assistance is often 
beneficial and even essential.  In short local revolutions and coups, the insurgency 
will sometimes benefit from secrecy and a hoped-for short struggle.  While in some 
cases, outside states back (or even instigate) coups, a number of coups are done in-
dependently.  Coups in Burundi, Cameroon, Gambia, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon (France), Ghana, Nigeria, Haiti, Venezuela, Argentina, Guinea-Bissau, Sene-
gal, Guinea, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic all lacked outside support.102  
Finally, in some cases insurgent groups are not able to attract outside state or 
non-state actors.  For example, the Forest Brothers, LTSPA, LNPA, BDPS, and UPA 
in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine attempted to resist the Soviet occupa-
                                                      
100 In 1945 there were only two insurgent movements, one of which was a domestic insurgency. In the 
remainder of the 1940’s there were from five to nine insurgencies each year, which declined to just 
one in 2004.   
101 There are also many explanations for the emergence of domestic insurgencies, including poverty 
and inequality (Abadie 2006; Collier et al. 2004; T.R. Gurr 1970; Muller & Seligson 1987), the failure 
to benefit from modernization (T.R. Gurr 1970), greed (Collier & Hoeffler 2004), ethnicity and na-
tionalism (Connor 1994; Huntington 1996; A. D. Smith 1988), and political freedom, political 
instability, terrain, and population size (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Krueger & Maleckova 2002). 
102 While some coups have been supported (or even driven by outside state intervention) other coups 
did attract the interest of outside actors or assistance by the insurgencies or groups.  Examples include 
an attempted coup against Noriega in Panama that was supported by the U.S., and a leftist coup in 
Azerbaijan supported by the U.S.S.R.   
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tion after World War Two.  The groups hoped for support from Western democra-
cies, but did not receive assistance.  This may be in part due to their location, their 
adversary, and the early state of the Cold War that preceded the emergence of proxy 
wars.  Conversely, in the Middle East, only one insurgency–a faction of the 
Yemenite Socialist Party for an independent South Yemen–is a domestic insurgency.  
The other eighteen insurgencies recorded for the region are transnational insurgen-
cies.  In may cases, insurgencies in the Middle East benefit from networks of states 
and non-state actors with tribal or ethnic ties that create a basis for transnational net-
works.  
 
Insurgencies with outside operations and domestic interests 
There are three types of domestic insurgencies with outside operations.  First, groups 
in an insurgency may gain a physical presence in an outside state without the permis-
sion of the state, and therefore are not supported by outside state actors.103  In these 
cases the insurgencies may have association with a province, ethnic group, or other 
group within a state, or they may cross the border without permission.  The Nepali 
Congress, for example, utilized the Indian border for operations in opposition to 
King Mahendra of Nepal.  However, the frequency of insurgencies utilizing outside 
territories without government permission is relatively low.  Of the 88 insurgencies 
with outside operations, only 10 insurgencies, approximately 11%, do so without the 
permission of the states.   
Second, there are insurgencies with domestic interests and outside operations 
that are supported by a state, and qualify as an outside state actor supported insur-
gencies.  Insurgencies located within an outside territories may be given a safe haven 
by a state, which in many cases is accompanies with other forms of assistance, such 
as training, weapons and financial support.  In other cases the state will primarily 
provide support, and the insurgency does not have a strong physical presence in the 
in the supporting state.  The National Revolutionary Council, for example, received 
extensive U.S. support and training for the Bay of Pigs invasion.  Of the 90 insurgen-
cy movements reviewed, only 2 were provided support with a limited physical 
presence (just over two per cent), 12 were provided safe havens alone (about 13%), 
                                                      
103 The willingness of the foreign government to host groups involved in an insurgency is difficult to 
know in cases where the state denies providing safe haven or support to the group or groups. 
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and 46 were supplied with both safe havens and support (about 52%).  The evidence 
suggests that a majority of insurgencies have domestic objectives and strategies and 
are physically present in outside territories because of the support an outside state 
actor or actors provide. 
 
Insurgencies with regional or international objectives 
Of the insurgencies from 1945 to 2004, approximately 139 are transnational in that 
they have outside operations or receive outside actor support.  Of those, 90, or about 
65%, have outside operations with some kind of a physical presence in a foreign 
state.104  Some groups engage outside their state to promote regional or international 
strategies and objectives.  However, a large number of these insurgencies retain do-
mestic strategies and objectives, and utilise outside operations for safe havens and 
support to expand the capacity or promote regional or international objectives within 
a single state.  For example, secessionist movements in Burma by the Karen National 
Union (KNU) and Shan State Independence Army (SSIA) both utilised extensive 
operations and support in neighbouring Thailand.  These insurgencies have outside 
operations to enhance their capacity for domestic strategies.   
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the shift from domestic to transnational 
insurgencies is due in greater part to the intervention of outside actors in domestic 
insurgencies and less to less to expanding interests of insurgencies.  Of the 90 insur-
gencies that have outside operations, just over 20 (22%) have regional or 
international objectives, strategies, and activities.  Of these there is one international 
insurgency, ten regional insurgencies that are either received very early state support 
or consist of a network of ethnic groups with similar goals, and nine regional Islamic 
and leftist insurgencies.  Hence, about 11% of all insurgencies from 1945 to 2004 
have outside interests and operations combined with international activities beyond 
safe havens.  However, insurgencies with outside objectives and operations have in-
creased over time, such as the Islamic State.  From 1945 to 1959, there have been 
only eight such insurgencies.  From 1960 on there has been an increase in outside 
objectives and operations, although the trend is not linear and demonstrates variation.  
                                                      
104 The remaining 51 insurgencies receive outside state or non-state actor support of some kind, but do 
not have outside operations.  
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Additionally, while these there are a smaller number of these groups, their influence 
and reach can be extensive.   
Although much international attention has been given to international terror-
ism, the number of transnational insurgencies in which the insurgency possesses 
regional and international strategies is not large. Within the time period being ana-
lysed, al-Qaeda is the only insurgency with international interests and operations to 
reach the twenty-five battle-death threshold.  The organization has both regional and 
international strategies and religious and political objectives.  However, the emer-
gence of transnational insurgencies at the international level has emerged in recent 
year.  Other organisations that may have global ambitions, such as the Islamic State 
(ISIS or ISIL) are not included in this data.   
The remaining insurgencies are regional in nature.  In the countries of 
Mozambique, Togo, Chad, South Korea, Congo/Zaire, and Cambodia, transnational 
insurgencies sometime initiated or receive early support for outside states largely 
through an outside state for strategic reasons.  While the insurgencies may have in-
digenous elements, such as fighters and domestic strategies, they are initiated and 
supported to the extent that they are considered an extension of another state and/or 
non-state actor.  In Mozambique, for example, RENAMO (National Mozambican 
Resistance) opposed the left-wing government of FRELIMO (Mozambique Libera-
tion Front) in the 1970’s.  RENAMO maintained domestic strategies against the 
government with outside support form neighbouring states.  However, the organisa-
tion gained early support by right-wing groups in South Africa and Rhodesia to 
counter FRELIMO’s support of insurgencies in those countries.   
The Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) also received very early outside sup-
port.  Following the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the emergence of the opposing 
Rwanda Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as near victors, Hutu refugees fled to 
Zaire, where elements involved in the genocide–the Interahamwe and the ex-
Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR)–used the camps to launch attacks against the 
RPF.  In reaction, the Rwandan government initiated the ADFL to attack refugee 
camps with Rwandan troops.  The ADFL and Rwandan army fought the Interaham-
we/ex-FAR forces and eventually deposed the president of Zaire.  
As noted in the previous chapter, a number of insurgencies receive early out-
side support from states, of given more for the purpose of initiating a conflict rather 
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than supporting groups already amerced in a civil war.  In 1986 the Movement for 
Togolese Democracy (MTD) attempted a coup against the government of Togo.  The 
MTD leadership resided in Ghana, where Togo has alleged that the rebels originated 
and were supported.  Although the government of Ghana denied the claim, the MTD 
is an alleged case of a foreign born insurgency.  Also, in Chad the Islamic Legion 
consisted of mainly Chadian fighters, but was organised by the government of Libya 
to attack the government of Hissen Habré, against which they had fought in a war 
from 1980 to 1987.  In 1949, 5,000 guerrilla fighters trained in North Korea were 
placed in key towns in an attempt to overthrow the South Korean government.  Addi-
tionally, while Cambodia insurgencies are generally motivated by domestic interests, 
the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS) was organised by 
Vietnam and deployed 20,000 troops to overthrow the government and establish a 
pro-Vietnam government.   
Another unique group of insurgencies are considered regional because their 
ethnicities share borders and, in some cases, insurgent objectives and strategies.  
While many insurgencies receive support from outside state or non-state actors with 
similar ethnicities, both the Afar and the Kurds separately network with insurgent 
ethnic groups in multiple states for independence.  Also noted above, the Kurdish 
insurgencies in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey cooperate in for the goal of an independent 
Kurdish state. In particular, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was 
aligned with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq (KPD), and the Kurdish Workers 
Party (PKK) in Turkey supported the Free Life Party of Iran (PJAK), and was 
aligned with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq, and had bases in 
Greece, Syria, Iran, and Iraq.  The Afar are located between Ethiopia and Eritrea and 
fought to protect their interests in the region.  Many groups fought collectively 
against the Ethiopian government in both Eritrea and Ethiopia.105  Because Eritrea 
was not yet independent, the insurgencies’ interests are considered domestic.  How-
ever, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (AFDUF), located in Eritrea, 
also supported Djibouti through the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democra-
                                                      
105 There was cooperation between several groups: the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) in Ethiopia, the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).   
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cy (FRUD) active in Djibouti, fought for Afar’s autonomy and independence after 
Eritrean independence.   
The previous 11 cases are insurgencies that have outside objectives, or have 
groups within the insurgencies that have outside objectives.  However, with the ex-
ception of al-Qaeda, these objectives are either inspired by an outside state or by eth-
ethnic struggles that overlap borders.  The remaining nine cases are insurgencies that 
have regional strategies and objectives.  These insurgencies occur in the states of 
Ethiopia, Oman, Turkey, Bolivia, India, Congo-Zaire, Israel, Thailand, and Uzbeki-
stan, seeking either leftists or Islamic governments in their regions.   
Insurgencies against Israel have domestic strategies in their opposition to the 
state of Israel; however, for some insurgencies involved, this encompasses regional 
objectives and strategies.  There have been a number of significant insurgencies 
against Israel from 1945 to 2004: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine (PFLP), the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Hizbollah, Hamas, and al-
Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade (AMB).  Some groups, such and PNA and AMB are domes-
tic actors with foreign support or operations.  Others, such as Hamas, are an 
outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, and therefore represent a larger region-
al/international strategy involving Islamic states in the region.    
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is active in Uzbekistan, and also 
has troops on the border of Kyrgystan and may have had fighters in Afghanistan, 
Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), a Marxist-Leninist organisation, pursued a strategy to over-
throw conservative regimens in the Middle East region, beginning with the sultanate 
of Oman. The strategy may be mistaken for a domestic one, as it was largely defeat-
ed in Oman and only had outside troops in South Yemen as a safe haven and support; 
it was, nevertheless, regional in strategy and objectives.  In Ethiopia, al-Itahad al-
Islamia fought to unify the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and Somalia into an Islamic 
state, with possible ties to the Somali Islamic Union, or al-Itihaad al-Islamiya 
(AIAI), and al-Qaeda.   
The remaining insurgencies with regional strategies are those dedicated to 
leftist revolutionary agendas.  One of the most famous is the National Liberation 
Army (Ejército  de Liberación Nacional; ELN), led by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in Bo-
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livia in the 1960’s, with the objective of engendering Marxist revolutions in the re-
gion.  The insurgency was heavily supported by Cuba, to the extent that it can almost 
be considered a state initiated insurgency.  The small force challenged the govern-
ment of Bolivia with a small band of guerrillas.  The attempt was ultimately 
unsuccessful in part due to U.S. provisions of assistance and training to the Bolivian 
military.  
The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was heavily propped up by outside 
Asian state supporters.  It can also be seen as an insurgency with regional objectives 
because it maintained outside bases in Laos and Vietnam and participated in training 
programs for Leninist/Maoist insurgencies in the region.  In Turkey, Devrimci Sol 
(Dev Sol) sought a Marxist revolution.  The strategy, while mostly domestic, had re-
gional elements, as the insurgency maintained outside operations with Palestinian 
organisations.  In India, a number of ethnic/Marxists/Leninist movements were do-
mestic in their strategies and objectives.  The Naxalites, however, held close ties to 
the insurgent Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) and may have held joint 
training missions.  
Finally, insurgencies may also support outside actors in an effort to promote 
regional or international objectives.  The degree and nature of this support, however, 
is not easily assessed.  Many of the cases are alleged, and it is uncertain if the groups 
are insurgencies, nonviolent non-state actors, or diasporas.  Nevertheless, there are 
39 cases of minor or major military support being provided by outside non-state ac-
tor groups, or approximately 21% of all insurgencies from 1945 to 2004.  Hence, 
there is evidence that, while insurgent groups remain largely domestic at the opera-
tional level, there are movements by non-state actors to pursue their strategies and 
objectives through other insurgencies. 
The detailed analysis suggests that the number of insurgencies with interna-
tional and regional objectives and strategies is, at the highest, 11% of all insurgencies 
and, if we discount collaborative ethnic insurgencies and state initiated insurgencies, 
the number is as low as 5%.  The role of non-state actors pursuing regional and in-
ternational interests remains, nevertheless, significant and growing.  Regional and 
international insurgencies are trending slightly upwards over time, and an additional 
31 insurgencies receive military support from non-state actors (although not always 
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through insurgencies).  Furthermore, a single entry for an organisation like al-Qaeda 
may be a modest representation of that organisation’s scope.  
Despite these caveats, the majority of insurgencies remain domestic in terms 
of their strategies, objectives, and activities.  Of the 20 regional and transnational in-
surgencies, there are a limited number of cases where a decline of the state may have 
spawned regional or international objectives and strategies.  Marxist movements and 
Islamic movements, particularly those adverse to the state of Israel, may result from 
cases of a limited state capacity to engage in direct interstate conflict.  Additionally, 
the level of support by non-state actors for insurgent groups implies growing interest 
at the transnational level.  While these groups may well act at the transnational level 
in part due to a decline in the capacity of the state to engage in direct war, the larger 
portion of the empirical evidence demonstrates a high number of insurgencies within 
transnational networks to gain resources for activities primarily within their state.   
 
Figure 5-3: Domestic and transnational insurgencies 1945-2004 
 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Insurgencies that are organized in transnational networks employ similar strategies to 
traditional insurgencies, but do so through advanced means and tactics.  Traditional 
insurgencies’ strategies involve greater speed and mobility, the ability to hide and 
access alternative resources, and utilize a comparative advantage to direct forces.  
Classical guerrilla warfare, for example, often involves strategies of faster mobility, 
psychological demoralisation, and many small attacks as opposed to a decisive bat-
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tle.  Additionally, traditional insurgencies use urban and rural terrain in which detec-
tion is difficult, and engage the local populations ‘like a fish to water’ to hide and to 
access resources ( Griffith & Zedong 1937/1978, pp. 92-3).  Additionally, the effec-
tiveness of traditional insurgencies involves the potential advantages of a tactical 
asymmetry to the direct forces.  Guevara describes guerrilla warfare as a ‘form of 
tactics with which to gain a relative superiority…’ (Guevara 1961, p. 159).  In his 
writings, Guevara believed that guerrilla forces could harness a number of tactical 
advantages that the direct forces could not, and ultimately lead to victory.  
Transnational insurgencies employ similar strategies, but with a wider range 
of resources and capabilities offered through expanding technology, globalization, 
and transnational networks.  As transnational networks have emerged as a form of 
organization, insurgencies often attempt to utilise a new set of tactics that can elevate 
their effectiveness and widen their potential objectives.  Network organizational 
structures can be employed through a variety of forms to harness greater speed, resil-
ience, and secrecy at the organizational level, and to utilise innovative tactics.  Just 
as many traditional insurgencies must gain resources and support from local popula-
tions, the transnational insurgency may develop a range of international partnerships 
for expertise, messaging, and resources from states, criminal networks (and war-
lords), non-state actors groups, and diasporas.  And transnational insurgent networks 
also can gain a tactical advantage over hierarchical forms of organization, often em-
ployed by states and state militaries.  Finally, insurgencies can pursue objectives and 
operations beyond their borders through outside operations, support of other insur-
gencies (franchising), and mutual cooperation.   
Data demonstrates that in the vast majority of cases, insurgencies are engaged 
in complex transnational networks for one of several reasons.  First, transnational 
insurgencies often seek to expand their resources and support for domestic insurgent 
movements.  Second, insurgencies participate in transnational networks to contribute 
to a regional or global set of objectives through their activities in a particular state as 
a part of a larger network.  Finally, transnational insurgencies promote regional ob-
jectives and strategies through activities beyond their borders.  This may include 
direct attacks, such as undertaken by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL), 
and/or outsourcing (franchising) to a range of network actors.  Through international 
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support and activities, transnational insurgencies have significantly multiplied their 
effectiveness and expanded their capabilities.   
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6  Case Study: 2001 Invasion of Afghanistan 
 
 
 
Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan, involved the use 
direct military air power, special operations units, and an indirect strategy of out-
sourcing to Afghan insurgent groups loosely termed the ‘Northern Alliance’.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to evaluate why policy makers chose indirect methods as 
opposed to a direct strategy, and the results of that decision.  In particular, the study 
tests if  the decision to outsource was based on an assessment of the costs, con-
straints, and risks associated with direct versus indirect methods, and on the 
capabilities of insurgent groups.  The chapter also searches for other factors that may 
explain the choice of strategy, and it assess the outcome of the strategy and the extent 
to which the strategy met the goals of overthrowing the Taliban and establishing a 
stable state.   
The study begins with a theoretical framework, which adapts the expected 
value model to include factors that are relevant to the study of Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  In particular, the model incorporates short-term and long-term anticipated 
costs and benefits to reflect the interest of policy makers in both a successful inva-
sion as well as a resulting stable Afghan state that would not host terrorists in the 
future.  The study then evaluates the ‘Afghan model’ or the use of conventional forc-
es with local opposition groups, the history and character of the Northern Alliance, 
and the reasons that led policy makers to incorporate an indirect strategy with local 
opposition groups instead of a direct invasion. that drove the decision to accept out-
sourcing as opposed to a direct invasion.  Finally, the study assesses the outcome of 
this strategy in both the invasion period (or the short–term) and the state building 
process that followed (or the long term).   
 
6.1 Theoretical framework: the expected value of ‘delegation’ 
The expected value of war framework was expanded in Chapter 3 to include options 
of going to war versus not going to war, options of direct and indirect methods of 
conflict or outsourcing to insurgencies.  It also incorporated tactics that combine di-
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rect and indirect methods.106  According to this framework, a state will assess the an-
ticipated net value of non-violent options, direct interstate warfare, and indirect 
methods of outsourcing to insurgencies, all of which can involve a variety of tactics.  
It is anticipated that if a state can accomplish its goal through outsourcing to a third 
party, this method often results in diminished costs, risks, loss of life (for the state), 
and can evade political constraints through secrecy or a decreased presence.   
The theoretical framework presented here builds upon the expected value of 
direct and indirect methods of warfare outlined in previous chapters.  However, the 
model is expanded to be able to evaluate characteristics relevant to the objectives and 
tactics of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan.  First, because policy makers held short-
term objectives to overthrow the Taliban government, as well as long-term objectives 
of establishing a stable state, the expected value model is expanded to include both 
short-term and long-term anticipated costs and benefits.  Second, Operation Endur-
ing Freedom is similar to a specific type of outsourcing referred to as ‘delegation’ 
under the Principal-Agent Theory (P-A).  Delegation is based on a number of as-
sumptions that are relevant to the U.S. support of the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan.  Additionally, the P-A Theory offers an in-depth framework of the an-
ticipated benefits and drawbacks of outsourcing conflict to insurgent groups that are 
used in this analysis.   
 
6.2 The Principal–Agent Theory and delegation 
The Principal-Agent Theory (P-A) refers to the relationship between a principal that 
delegates responsibilities to a given agent.  It is applied here to advantages and dis-
advantages of outsourcing to insurgencies.  The P-A Theory was originally based on 
economic models.  These early studies evaluated the benefits, costs, and risks that a 
principal incurs when delegating activities to a given agent.  As Gary Miller ex-
plains, there are six core assumptions to the principal-agent model (G. J. Miller 2005, 
pp. 205-6).  First, the principal possesses an interest in the potential impact of the 
agent and in transferring risk to the agent.  Second, the principal and the agent have 
informational asymmetry, whereby the principal primarily sees the outcome of the 
                                                      
106 Similarly, Salehyan maintains that a state that wishes to enter a conflict with another state will 
have four options: ‘They can do nothing, attack with their own forces, entirely delegate conflict to a 
rebel organization, or pursue a blended strategy where conflict occurs through direct and indirect 
means’ (Salehyan 2010, p. 11).   
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process and has limited ability to monitor and control the process.  This lack of con-
trol may require the principal to incur costs to monitor and incentivise the agent.  
Third, the preferences of the principal differ from the preferences of the agent.  
Fourth, the principal makes the first offer to the agent based on its preferences.  Fifth, 
the principal and agent possess an understanding of the others’ expected value for a 
given activity and can use backward induction to determine the best possible out-
come.  Finally, the principal is assumed to offer an optimal solution to the agent as a 
‘take it or leave it’ offer.   
The economic relationship of the principal and the agent has a number of po-
tential advantages and disadvantages (Shavell 1979, 1979; Spence & Zeckhauser 
1971).  For the principal, the relationship is theorised to reduce costs incurred direct-
ly by the principal.  Additionally, the principal may also benefit from specialised 
skills and information potentially held by the agent.  The agent may also benefit from 
the support of the principal, but will have to change its behaviour to act more in the 
interests of the principal less in its own interests (Weingast 1984; Weingast & Moran 
1983).  Furthermore, the interests of the principal and agent will differ.  Therefore, 
the principal must incur risk and expense to monitor and incentivise the agent to act 
in accordance with its interests; this is referred to as ‘moral hazard’.    
The theoretical framework of P-A Theory has more recently been applied to 
the delegation of warfare, especially regarding delegation from state actors to insur-
gent groups (Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham 2011).  Delegation 
of warfare from a state to an insurgent group poses similar advantages and disad-
vantages.  A strategy of delegation is thought to enable the state to offset the 
financial costs of conflict as well as domestic casualties.  Furthermore, delegation of 
conflict may be accomplished either with partial or full anonymity to avoid domestic 
and international political constraints, and may avert or diminish the risk of local out-
rage and reprisal (Salehyan 2010, p. 16).  Finally, delegation to a rebel group may 
increase effectiveness and efficiency if the insurgent group possesses specialised 
skills and local knowledge that is not held by the state.   
Conversely, a delegation strategy may pose disadvantages to the state that can 
raise the relative costs and risk of outsourcing, or limit the objectives that might oth-
erwise be attained through direct methods.  There are two scenarios in which the 
state may experience heightened costs and risk as a result of a strategy of delegation.  
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First, outsourcing to insurgencies involves a network relationship that lacks outside 
authority and must be structured on trust and endogenous methods of credible com-
mitment.  Therefore, the extent that the interests of the rebel group diverge from 
those of the state (or the moral hazard) the more likely the state will incur costs to 
monitor and incentivise the rebel group and the higher the risk that the interests of 
the state will be compromised. 
Second, the capabilities and skills of the insurgent groups may be less than 
those of the state, which partially or fully relinquishes operational control through 
delegation.  While the rebel group has localised expertise and knowledge, the state 
often has greater capabilities. Therefore, while outsourcing can transfer the risks and 
cost of a conflict to a third party, divergent skills can lead to a proportional loss in 
the overall efficiency for the principal or, in more extreme cases, mission failure.  
Hence, as both the skills and interests of the rebel group diverge from those of the 
state, outsourcing may become a relatively more costly and risky strategy.  Con-
versely,  more skilled rebel groups that hold similar interest to a state are likely to 
decrease the needed cost of monitoring and risks for the state.   
The theorised trade–offs of delegation under the P-A Theory are generally 
applied to the operational stage of a conflict. Strategies that are only concerned with 
the operation phase are based on short–term interests, such weakening rival states 
and its allies, or using the conflict to exact geopolitical or economic gains (Balch-
Lindsay & Enterline 2000; Feste 1992; Stavenhagen & Development 1996; Walt 
1996).  However, states may also have long–term interests in the territory and result-
ing institutions of the post–conflict state.  Long–term interests may involve 
democracy building, humanitarian efforts, or what Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 
refer to as ‘regime disputes’ or attempts to change the regime of an external state (K. 
S. Gleditsch et al. 2008, p. 485).  In some cases, states will also become involved in 
reconstruction and institution building after a conflict.  Therefore, states with long–
term interests must consider the impact that outsourcing to insurgencies may have on 
the post–conflict state.   
The same challenges of diverging skills and interests may continue after the 
conflict because, in most cases, the victorious insurgent groups will seek to influence 
the resulting state.  Accordingly, empowering insurgent groups in the conflict period 
may also empower these groups on the post-conflict state.  While the state and the 
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insurgent group may have held similar interests in the conflict state, these interests 
may or may not be similar for the post-conflict state.  Additionally, if the state is in-
volved in the development of the post-conflict period, it may again incur costs of 
monitoring and incentivising third party groups.  Therefore, while the delegation of 
conflict may decrease the costs and risks of conflict during the operational stage, it 
may also have long-term effects on the reconstruction and state building phases that 
follow a successful conflict.  As a result, states with long-term interests need to con-
sider the short and long-term expected values of direct and indirect methods of 
outsourcing to insurgencies.    
 
6.2.1 The expected utility of delegation and direct warfare 
Delegation is analysed here through a rational decision framework that compares ex-
pected values of delegation tactics versus direct warfare.  Because the delegation and 
direct warfare may have differing consequences for both the long-term and short-
term objectives, the expected utility model offered here evaluates both the short-term 
invasion period and the long-term interest of the target state following the invasion.  
Modelling strategies of expected utilities for direct and indirect strategies in the inva-
sion and state-building periods enables an understanding of the conditions that 
favour direct and indirect methods.  The following section shows the expected value 
models for direct warfare (dir) and P-A strategies of delegation (pa) and the condi-
tions favouring each strategy in the invasion stage (short-term) and post-invasion 
(long-term) period.  The two separate parts–long-term (LT) and short-term (ST)–and 
will apply the equation to direct warfare (dir) and P-A (pa) delegation strategies.   
The expected value for a given strategy may be expressed as a function of the 
estimated utility (benefits) of winning multiplied times the probability of success, 
minus the estimated costs minus the estimated probability of failure.  Equation 1 
demonstrates the expected value model for warfare: 
(Eq. 1) expected value, Ε! 𝑉!"# = 𝑃!"# − 𝐶!"# 1 − 𝑃!"#    
In many cases, the expected value also involves long-term assessment of the 
costs and benefits of conflict.  In cases where the long-term political structure and 
control is important to the invader, cost and risk may even be incurred during a re-
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building period.  A long-term expected utility equation structure is modified to in-
clude the short-term and long-term utilities: 
(Eq. 2) short-term and long-term expected utility, Ε! 𝑉!"#$"%&' =   Ε! 𝑉!!!"#!!"#$ + 𝐸!(𝑉!"#$!!"#$) 
Combining eq.1 (expected value) and eq. 2 (short and long-term expected 
utilities) gives eq. 3 for the short and long-term expected utilities.  Additionally, es-
timates of the probability of success (Pi) and anticipated costs (Ci) (including 
economic costs, political constraints, and loss of life) may be applied to any given 
strategy for both the long and short terms.  
(Eq. 3a) strategy expected value, Ε! 𝑉!"# = 𝑈!" 𝑃!"#!" − 𝐶!"#!" 1 − 𝑃!"#!" + [𝑈!"#!" 𝑃!"#!" − 𝐶!"#!" (1 − 𝑃!"#!" )]   
Additionally, because the probability of success and failure in the long-term 
is conditionally dependent on success in the short-term, the expected long-term utili-
ty is multiplied times the probability of success in the short-term for revised 
equation.  Equation 3b multiplies short-term and long-term costs together:  
(Eq. 3b) strategy expected value, Ε! 𝑉!"# = 𝑈!" 𝑃!"#!" − 𝐶!"#!" 1 − 𝑃!"#!" + [(𝑈!"#!" ) 𝑃!"#!" )(𝑃!"#!" − 𝐶!"#!" (1 − 𝑃!"#!" )(1 − 𝑃!"#!" )] 
The expected value model may then be applied to both strategies of direct 
warfare and delegation for both the short-term and long-term expected utilities. 
Equation 4 and 5b illustrate the expected value equations for both direct (dir) and 
indirect methods (pa) for both short and long-term objectives.107 
(Eq. 4a) expected utility P-A, short and long-term, Ε! 𝑉!" = [𝑃!"!"(𝑈!!") − 𝐶!"!" 1 − 𝑃!"!" ] + [(𝑃!"!"×𝑃!"!")(𝑈!!") − 𝐶!"!" 1 − 𝑃!"!" (1 − 𝑃!"!")] 
                                                      
107 Where Ε! 𝑉!"#  is the expected value for direct warfare, Ε! 𝑉!"  is the expected value for dele-
gation to an agent, 𝑈!!" and 𝑈!!"are the state’s short-term and long-term utilities respectively under 
delegation; 𝑃!"!" and  𝑃!"!"  are the probabilities of  success for delegation in the short term and long-
terms respectively,  (1 − 𝑃!"!") and  1 − 𝑃!"!"  are the probability loosing under a strategy of delega-
tion in the short and long-terms respectively, and 𝐶!"!"  and  𝐶!"!" are the costs of delegation in the short 
and long-term respectively.  Similarly, 𝑃!"#!"  and 𝑃!"#!"  are the probabilities of success for direct warfare 
in the short term and long-terms respectively,  (1 − 𝑃!"#!" ) and  1 − 𝑃!"#!"  are the probability loosing 
for direct warfare in the short and long-terms respectively, and 𝐶!"#!"   and  𝐶!"#!"  are the costs of delega-
tion in the short and long-term respectively.  
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(Eq. 4b) expected utility D-W, short and long-term, Ε! 𝑉!"# = [𝑃!"#!" (𝑈!!") − 𝐶!"#!" 1 − 𝑃!"#!" ] + [(𝑃!"#!"×𝑃!"#!" )(𝑈!!") − 𝐶!"#!" 1 − 𝑃!"#!" (1 − 𝑃!"#!" )] 
The expected utility models for P-A versus D-W strategies, with separate 
terms, for the short and long-terms formalise the logical relationship of the variables, 
the necessary conditions of use of delegation and direct warfare strategies, and cases 
of extreme delegation.  First, because the costs and risk of moral hazard may increase 
over time, delegation is more likely to be favoured in cases where the principal holds 
relatively low or non-existent interests in the long-term.  Second, because long-term 
success is dependent on the success of the invasion, the probabilities of success and 
failure are consecutive.  Hence, the second term of the equation, expected utility for 
the long-term, is multiplied by the short-term probabilities of success and failure.  
Because long-term strategies depend on success in the short-term, it is likely that pol-
icy makers place more importance on strategies that favour short-term probability of 
success.   
Based on the above models, there are a few scenarios in which a state will 
likely opt for a strategy of delegation.  First, if the costs and risk of direct warfare are 
high, these factors will likely preclude long-term interests that may be more feasible 
through direct strategies because it risks losing both.  In some cases, the state may 
simply be unable to bear the necessary costs for direct warfare economically, in 
terms of human life, and politically through international and domestic constraints.  
Under such a scenario, the cost variable under a direct strategy would rise to such an 
extent as to yield a higher relative utility for delegation.  Second, if a state does not 
hold long-term interests in the status of the target state, outsourcing is likely a less 
costly and risky method of conflict with limited risk of moral hazard.  For examples, 
states may weaken rivals by supporting insurgent movements.  In such cases, the di-
verging interests of the insurgent group are less important to the objectives.  Third, if 
the insurgency and the state have similar interests (and the skills of the insurgency 
are sufficient), the risk of moral hazard will be low and the probability of success 
will be relatively high.  
There is also a possibility that decision makers within a state miscalculate the 
expected value.  Imperfect assessments of expected utilities are possible under a few 
scenarios.  Procrastination, the human tendency to decide about future things later, 
may lead to weighting the model to favour short-term goals that are most easily ac-
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complished through outsourcing strategies.  There may also be less information 
available to estimate the long-term expected value of a strategy as there is for the 
short–term military invasion.  Hence, the risk of moral hazard in the long-term may 
be underweighted.  Finally, bureaucratic and institutional dependency theories 
demonstrate the potential for an organisational bias to focus on the immediate and 
crucial goals of the military invasion, and possibly discount the long-term goals of 
the post-conflict state.   
 
6.3 The ‘Afghan model’ 
To better understand the decision to delegate, this section evaluates the 2001 inva-
sion of Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, in which the U.S. led coalition 
employed a P-A strategy with the Northern Alliance.  Operation Enduring Freedom 
sought to ally the U.S. led coalition with Afghan indigenous rebel groups and out-
source much of the conflict to the Northern Alliance through a strategic combination 
of direct and indirect tactics.  The strategy involved, ‘aggressive use of CIA para-
military operatives in working with friendly Afghan resistance forces, as well as the 
employment of the CIA’s armed MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
in tracking down and eliminating Taliban and al Qaeda leaders’ (Lambeth 2001, p. 
60).  The plan offered a faster and less costly and risky invasion, but delegated some 
operational control to rebel groups, which would expect a role in the new govern-
ment. 
It is notable, however, that during the early stages of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the Taliban successfully countered this strategy.  Air supremacy originally 
provided an effective means to wear down and constrain movements by the Taliban.  
However, the Taliban went to ground to avoid being identified by artillery fire and to 
defend against offensives by the Northern Alliance.  One month into the campaign 
there appeared to be a stalemate as Taliban forces were able to hide from air power 
and successfully defend chosen areas.  In October of 2001, Coalition Forces in Af-
ghanistan shifted the strategy to involve more direct support of the Northern 
Alliance, allowing covert identification of targets on the ground and the use of preci-
sion attacks instead of artillery.  It is this revised strategy that is now referred to as 
the ‘Afghan Model.’   
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This case offers a well-suited framework to evaluate the gains from delega-
tion against the cost associated with delegation.  The invasion of Afghanistan was 
generally considered a success at the operational level, it incorporated a variety of 
diverse transnational insurgent networks, and involves short and long-term objec-
tives.  Additionally, because the interests of the Coalition were long-term and 
divergent from those of the Northern Alliance, it can be considered an unlikely case 
for delegation.  While many studies of delegation or outsoaring evaluate short-term 
goals, this research will go further by analysing the impact of outsourcing on both 
the immediate objective of the overthrow of the Taliban and the capture of al-Qaeda 
members, as well as the broader objective of creating a stable state that would not 
serve as a safe-haven for future terrorist groups.   
The evaluation of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan first assesses the opposi-
tion groups included under the umbrella of the Northern Alliance, their involvement 
in transnational networks, and their motivations and capabilities relative to the Tali-
ban government.  Second, this section analyses the rationale used by decision makers 
to evaluate the expected value for the conflict and post-conflict state of operations in 
Afghanistan.  Finally, the study evaluates the results of the Afghan model in accom-
plishing the two primary objectives: the overthrow of the Taliban, and the 
establishment of a stable state that would provide safe havens for terrorist groups in 
the future.  
 
6.3.1 The Northern Alliance 
Recent Afghan history showed how warlords and their patronage networks became 
empowered in Afghanistan.108  While the existence of tribal warfare has a long histo-
ry in Afghanistan, it forcefully re-emerged during the Soviet Occupation from 1979 
to 1989.  In an effort to provide security, militia groups began to increase in promi-
nence and power, often aided by outside states.  The end of the Soviet occupation 
and the fall of the central government, Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq (HDK), led to the 
reign of the Peshawar in Kabul through a power-sharing alliance of warlords and 
ethnic parties, establishing the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992.  This resulted in 
part because when the HDK fell, a number local militia groups and warlords ab-
                                                      
108 For additional history on the anthropology of Afghan opposition groups and their role in the gov-
ernment after 2001 see, for example: Giustozzi (2008); Giustozzi and Ullah (2006); Saikal, Farhadi, 
and Nourzhanov (2004); Sedra (2003). 
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sorbed much of the military resources.  The outcome was intensified by then Defense 
Minister Massoud’s decision to disband the HDK military, much of which was ab-
sorbed by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a prominent warlord in the north with a 
largely Uzbek following.  Fractionalization within society and rising security con-
cerns also intensified the dominance of warlords and militia groups.  From 1992 to 
1996, the Peshawar was attacked by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami militia, 
and later joined by Dostum, who defected and founded his Junbish-i Milli militia 
with much of the former HDK.  
The resulting disorder and demand for security led to the emergence of the 
Taliban, consisting of small groups of foreign fighters originally from Kandahar.  
These groups were supported by and outside support from Pakistan as well as clergy 
and backers of the reestablishment of King Zahir Shad.  The Taliban successfully 
won Kabul in 1996, and by 1998 controlled eighty per cent of Afghanistan.  The 
threat of the Taliban drove Massoud and Dostum into cooperation, and eventually 
led to the creation of the larger United Front, or the Northern Alliance.  In 1998, a 
military defeat resulted in Dostum’s exile, leaving Massoud at the head of the North-
ern Alliance against the Taliban.  Taliban atrocities also drove parts of the population 
to seek protection under Massoud and his militias, which, according to UN reports, 
maintained a reasonably strong record in human rights from 1996 to 2001.  Given 
Massoud’s refusal to join the Taliban government without a democratic system of 
representation may reflect a vision for a democratic Afghanistan that would have 
been congruent with the interests of the U.S. led coalition; however, he was assassi-
nated by al-Qaeda in September 2001.   
The allies of the Northern Alliance during Operation Enduring Freedom in-
cluded the loosely allied faction that emerged from Afghanistan’s history.  The 
groups that comprised the Northern Alliance and their leaders, which allied with the 
2001 invasion, included the following:  
! In the northern provinces the U.S. led coaltion worked with former com-
manders and allies of Massoud, such as Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, Atta 
Mohammad Noor, Mohammad Daoud Daoud, Qasim Fahim, Gul Haider, 
Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq, Rashid Dostum, and Qazi Kabir Marzban.   
! To the east, U.S. forces worked with Haji Abdul Qadir, and also Hazrat Ali, 
Jaan Daad Khan and Abdullah Wahedi, Qatrah and Najmuddin.   
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! In the southern provinces, Qari Baba, Noorzai and Hotak, with Gul Agha 
Shirzai responsible for defeating the Taliban in Kadahar with Coalition sup-
port.   
! Allies from the west and southwest included Ismail Khan, Doctor Ibrahim, 
and Fazlkarim Aimaq.  
! Central Afghanistan allies included Hussain Anwari, Said Hussein Aalemi 
Balkhi, Said Mustafa Kazemi, Akbari, Mohammad Ali Jawed, Karim Khaili 
and Sher Alam.   
By the end of Operation Enduring Freedom, warlord armies were estimated at 
750,000 full and part-time soldiers (Giustozzi 2003a, p. 4). 
These Afghan insurgent groups, while possessing domestic objectives, were 
often integrated into complex transnational networks that involved a history of out-
side states and non-state actors groups and transnational criminal networks that have 
rendered these groups highly effective, but often entailed diverging interests.  Out-
side states have historically supplied Afghan insurgencies a wealth of resources and 
support.  The United States provided between 4 and 5 billion USD to the mujahideen 
between 1980 and 1992 while the Soviet Union supplied between 5 billion USD to 
the government annually from 1979 and 1989 (Rubin 2002, p. 20).  Pakistan has also 
heavily funded the mujahideen during the Soviet invasion and also provided, ‘weap-
ons, financial aid, and other assistance such as wheat and petroleum to the Taliban 
and other groups from the 1990’s through 2001’ (Jones 2008, p. 33).  Pakistan con-
tinued to support the Taliban, particularly through the ISI (Inter–Service 
Intelligence) following its overthrow.  Funds flowed from Saudi Arabia to the tune of 
4 billion USD officially to the mujahideen from 1980 to 1990, and unofficially to the 
Taliban until 1998.  Iran, Russia, and India all provided support to the Uzbek, Tajik, 
and Hazara minorities and anti-Taliban forces in the northern portions of the country, 
many of which were apart of the Northern Alliance.   
Afghan insurgents (and warlords) were often involved in transnational crime 
networks involving the drug trade and other transnational criminal networks.  The 
Taliban often acquired rents from the drug trade through the taxation of farmers, 
checkpoints, and bribes.  Afghan warlords and groups cooperated with a number of 
criminal drug trading groups of Russian, Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen drug trading 
cartels that commonly work with similar ethnic groups in Afghanistan.  Tajik crimi-
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nal groups accounted for much of the opium trade with Russia and in 2006 Afghani-
stan accounted for much about 90% of the work opium market (Jalali 2006, p. 112; 
Jones 2008, p. 47).  Afghan warlords also hold territorial control which enables them 
to extract rents from the local populations, the trade of natural resources, or through 
other illegal activities such as counterfeiting (Rubin 2000).   
 
6.3.2 The decision to delegate 
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the National Security Council (NSC) pre-
sented two proposals for an invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow the Taliban.  
A plan for a direct invasion was submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that called for 
large-scale coalition operation and four months for planning and several army divi-
sions, which has been was referred to as ‘the forty-one months and five divisions’ 
(Benjamin & Simon 2003, p. 295).  The proposed direct invasion had advantages and 
disadvantages.  The operation would require a longer period of planning and opera-
tions, as well as higher expected costs to engage a ground force within Afghanistan.  
However, the plan would retain full control of the military operation under the Coali-
tion Force–Afghanistan and would allow the coalition to select allies for the 
reconstruction phase after the invasion.   
A second strategy was proposed by the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), presented by the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, and 
Counterterrorism Chief Cofer Black on the 13th of September (Rothstein 2006, p. 4).  
The proposal involved allying with groups of Afghan rebels, loosely referred to as 
the Northern Alliance, with which the CIA had a history of relationships.  The CIA 
proposal incorporated a three-pronged approach involving precision air power, Spe-
cial Operations Forces (SOF) to designate and validate targets, and support and aid 
Afghan opposition groups that would comprise most of the ground campaign.  
There are a number of reasons why the CIA proposal was accepted, many of 
which are integral to outsourcing and the P-A Theory.  The option to delegate much 
of the conflict to the local rebels forecasted lower Coalition costs in terms of casual-
ties and financial requirements.  The CIA plan also increased the projected speed of 
the mission while diminishing the Coalition footprint, thereby significantly deflating 
the risk of a protracted guerrilla war.  Secretary Rumsfeld originally rejected a Unit-
ed States Central Command (CENTCOM) proposal for a four-month planning and 
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logistical period prior to kinetic operations, and instead instructed General Tommy 
Franks to think not in months but in weeks (Lambeth 2001, p. 51).  The increased 
speed and reduced Coalition profile also decreased the probability of regional con-
demnation.  
The direct involvement of local fighters also created a reduced Western pres-
ence and the impression of legitimacy both within Afghanistan and the region.109  As 
Richard Andres notes: ‘Throughout the 1990’s, Osama bin Laden, citing the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan as a precedent, had repeatedly argued that Al Qaeda 
should encourage a US invasion of the Middle East in order to inspire an insurgency’ 
(Andres 2006, p. 398).  The strategy of outsourcing to northern and southern anti–
Taliban opposition groups would, ‘dispel any impression among the Afghan rank and 
file—as well as elsewhere throughout the Muslim world—that the United States was 
at war with Afghanistan, as opposed to bin Laden and the Taliban’ (Lambeth 2001, 
p. 58).  This strategy was also thought to encourage early Taliban defections, enlist 
groups with local knowledge that would be valuable in the hunt for bin Laden, and 
incorporate the opposition groups directly into the new government.  
Other calculations may be idiosyncratic to Afghanistan and the War on Ter-
rorism, such as the perceived need for an immediate reaction following the events of 
September 11 (the plan submitted by the Joint Chiefs required a much longer plan-
ning period).  In addition to the preference to respond quickly following the attacks 
on the U.S. World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there was also concern that Af-
ghanistan presented a heightened risk of a guerrilla holdout given the state’s history 
of successful insurgencies and geographical terrain that is well-suited for guerrilla 
warfare.  As reported from White House conversations, President Bush and members 
of his cabinet were well aware of Afghanistan’s reputation as ‘the graveyard of em-
pires’ and feared a U.S. led invasion would result in a guerrilla war (Andres et al. 
2006, p. 131). 
At least in the invasion stage, the CIA plan for delegation to the Northern Al-
liance was highly successful in reducing financial costs and casualties, lowering risk, 
and accelerating the speed and efficiency of the mission.  The strategy did reduce 
                                                      
109 For more on the principal-agent theory and increased legitimacy, see: Salehyan (2010) and Sale-
hyan et al. (2011) . 
197 
 
costs and the speed of success.  As Andres explains, the costs and casualties under 
the Afghan model were less that the direct invasion of Iraq that would follow: 
Operations in Afghanistan have cost the United States $54 billion, a 
sizable amount, but less than half of the $125 billon spent on Iraq.  
More important, there have been far fewer U.S. casualties in Afghani-
stan than in Iraq.  By the end of 2005, enemy action caused 1,660 U.S. 
military deaths in Iraq and only 125 in Afghanistan (Andres et al. 
2006, p. 124). 
This new form of warfare, defined by Montgomery Meigs as ‘asymmetric,’ was, as 
noted by Stephen D. Biddle, considered by some to be the ‘future of warfare’ (Biddle 
2002; Meigs 2003).  
Despite the operational success of the Afghan Model in combining direct and 
indirect warfare, there are arguments that the Afghan Model, or outsourcing, is not 
replicable or ideal as a strategy in the conflict stage.110  While the strategy succeeded 
in the invasion stage in Afghanistan, the problem of moral hazard and diverging in-
terests may have been costly factors.  O’Hanlon argues that a lack of cohesion of 
interests between the principal and the indigenous proxy group resulted in a flawed 
relationship at the operational level (Michael E. O'Hanlon 2002).111  Although the 
Northern Alliance shared the objective of overthrowing the Taliban government, 
they did not share (at least to the same degree) an interest in capturing and killing al-
Qaeda members hiding in Afghanistan.  Military experts commonly cite two exam-
ples: Tora Bora, where much of al-Qaeda escaped including Osama bin Laden; and 
Anaconda, where numerous al-Qaeda were also lost (Andres et al. 2006; Michael E. 
O'Hanlon 2002).  In both cases, the Northern Alliance was sceptical about extending 
operations to these areas while still engaged with the Taliban: a direct contradiction 
to U.S. interests, which strongly resided in the capture of al-Qaeda members.112   
Because outsourcing to opposition groups often involves diverging interests 
and skills, there are doubts that the ‘Afghan Model’ is replicable.  A number of 
scholars believe the model to be applicable primarily in Afghanistan.  Biddle, for ex-
ample, argues that the relative lack of skills possessed by insurgent groups makes the 
                                                      
110 Secretary of State Colin Powel announced that the ‘Afghan Model’ was not replicable to Iraq, 
where delegation was used in the North, but most of the invasion returned to traditional models. 
111 Stephen Biddle (2002) poses a similar argument noting that indigenous allies require comparable 
skill, motivation, and equipment to be successful (pp. 42-3). 
112 Conversely, Andres, Wills, and Griffith (2001) argue that failures during the battles of Tora Bora 
and Anaconda are largely due to Coalition difficulties in operations and planning, and that the Afghan 
Model is replicable in other theatres.   
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Afghan model difficult to apply outside of Afghanistan (Biddle 2002).  U.S. Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also doubted the extent to which the Afghan model 
was directly replicable (Rumsfeld 2002, p. 22).  Although the Afghan model was 
considered as an option for the subsequent invasion of Iraq, in the end Operation 
Iraqi Freedom was largely based on direct tactics, with limited use of outsourcing.  
Delegation was applied only in the northern areas of Iraq through a similar strategy 
of precision air attacks and the support of two Kurdish groups: the Kurdistan Demo-
cratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).   
Andres explains a number of reasons that the Afghan model was not used 
predominantly in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Andres 2006).  In large part, the capabil-
ities of the two groups (KDP and PUK) relative to the Iraqi forces were deemed 
insufficient.  The extent to which precision air strikes could fill the gap between the 
Kurdish groups and the Iraqi army was uncertain to planners.  Biddle, for example, 
argues that the Northern Alliance and the Taliban represented somewhat matched 
opponents, in which one side gained the advantage through air support (Biddle 
2002).  This argument was circulated in the military community prior to the invasion 
of Iraq (Andres 2006, p. 401).  Additionally, Turkey was against empowering the 
Kurdish groups, and Shi’ite and Sunni sects within Iraq would likely be apprehensive 
of a Kurdish victory over the government. 
 
6.3.3 Long-term outcome of the decision to delegate 
The costs of diverging interests and skills of the allied indigenous groups can also be 
evaluated through the reconstruction and state building period that followed the inva-
sion.  The integration of warlords into the government system has a number of 
potential negative impacts on the political and security development of a stable state.  
A central drawback of outsourcing to insurgent groups is the outcome of empower-
ing those groups.  As Giustozzi notes, empowering warlords within the Afghan 
government had been avoided in the past:   
Although the communist governments of 1980-1992 also often dealt 
with warlords, they were always keen to keep them away from the cen-
tral state administration. No warlord was ever appointed to the cabinet 
during the communist years, nor as provincial governor, although 
some of them succeeded in becoming district managers (Giustozzi 
2004, p. 11).  
199 
 
The interests of the Coalition and the Northern Alliance diverged significant-
ly in the state–building phase.  The goal of the Coalition and the International 
Community, following the overthrow of the Taliban, was the creation of a stable 
democratic government to avoid its use as a terrorist and insurgent safe-haven in the 
future.  The interests of warlords and militia leaders differed by their nature.  Wil-
liam Reno contends that warlords have held government offices in countries like 
Somalia, Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and Liberia, but there their interests centre on 
consolidation of their private power and patronage-politics that fractionalise the col-
lective ideals of a modern state (Reno 2002, pp. 842-3).  The methods and skills used 
to achieve these interests include building upon ethnic divisions and providing secu-
rity from other warlords and militia leaders, resembling a feudal structure more than 
a modern state.  Furthermore, these means often involve extraction of necessary re-
sources from their territories through customs duties, drug cultivation and trade, and 
other criminal networks.  The following section will evaluate the Northern Alliance, 
the extent to which they were empowered by the invasion, and their impact on the 
objective of establishing a stable Afghan state. 
 
Incorporating warlords in the post-Taliban state 
Following the fall of the Taliban, the international community and the new govern-
ment selected a transitional strategy to incorporate and legitimize warlords within the 
political framework of the country (Sedra 2003).  Giustozzi explains: ‘These allianc-
es coincided to a large extent (and not by chance) with those that the Coalition forces 
formed with a number of warlords and factional military leaders’ (Giustozzi 2004, p. 
3).  The decision at the Bonn Convention to select Hamid Karzai as President was a 
compromise choice largely between two members of the Fabha-ye Mutahid (a pri-
marily non-Pashtun) delegation: Younis Qanoni, a close associate of the late 
Massoud, and Abdullah Abdullah, who suggested Karzai (Saikal et al. 2004).   
Additionally, the Transitional Administration of Afghanistan allocated sever-
al high-level ministerial positions to Northern Alliance warlords.  They included: 
Fahim, Vice President and Minister of Defense; Karim Khalili, Vice President; and 
Haji Abdul Aadeer, Vice President (Schaefer & Reid 2001, pp. 79-80).  By 2004, 
several warlords and militia leaders remained in ministerial positions, including 
Fahim, Qanoni and Abdulah, Mohammad Mohaqeq, Sayyed Hussain Anwari, Gul 
200 
 
Agha Shirzai, and Ishmal Khan’s son, Mirwais Saddiq, and about twenty governors 
that were former warlords or militia commanders (Giustozzi 2004, p. 5).  Additional-
ly, because the Afghan army was developing, security was often outsourced to 
warlords and militia leaders. 
In 2003, and following Karzai’s re-election in 2004 with 55% of the vote, a 
number of attempts were made to dismiss warlords and militia leaders from govern-
ment.  Fahim had been removed from the Presidential ticket prior to the election, and 
Qanoni had been divested of his ministerial role.113  Additionally, initiatives were 
taken to replace local provincial militia leaders with political leaders, and to disband 
militia groups.  Gul Agha Shirzai, governor of Kandahar, was removed by Karzai 
and later appointed as Minister of Urban Development.  Others were more difficult 
to manoeuvre, such as Ismail Khan, and required the central government to ally with 
other militia leaders, such as Zahir Nayebzada and Dr. Ibrahim.  Additionally, the 
government favoured warlords and militia leaders that supported the central govern-
ment, but many times these were not the most competent leaders.  Hence, once a 
political infrastructure of warlords was put in place, it has been difficult to remove 
and slow to transition into a modern state.   
 
Government capacity and fractionalisation 
The legitimisation or warlords and militia leaders and their incorporation into the 
government can negatively affect bureaucratic efficiency.  Returning expatriated Af-
ghans established a portion of the new government, but the remainder was instituted 
through warlords and militia leaders.  Building upon their power structures often mo-
tivated the latter.  Therefore, qualified administrative staff members under the 
Taliban were relieved of their positions, and staffing of departments and offices un-
der the new government was often allocated to ‘relatives or cronies of jihad 
commanders,’ many of which lacked necessary education, experience, and skills 
(Giustozzi 2004, pp. 5-6).  In the same way that Salehyan, Biddle, O’Hanon and oth-
ers argue that outsourcing to groups that lack skills and possess opposing interests to 
the state compromise a military operation, this same lack of skills and interests in 
                                                      
113 This strategy by Karzai was fuelled by a desire to diminish both the power of warlords, and the 
disproportionate governing by Tajik and other minorities unjustified in the eyes of the Pashtun majori-
ty.  
201 
 
decentralized power networks may have thwarted the state-building process (Biddle 
2002; Michael E. O'Hanlon 2002; Salehyan 2010).   
 
Fractionalisation of security 
The Afghan army was also staffed through patronage networks.  These networks 
served factions within Afghanistan more than the overall security of the state.  De-
fense Minister Fahim appointed many of his political allies personal network into 
position of command in the Afghan army.  Barnett Rubin, a leading expert on Af-
ghanistan, described the Ministry of Defense under Fahim as something ‘closer to a 
military faction’ (Rubin 2003, p. 40).  The Bonn International Center for Conversion 
explains that the Bonn Agreement:  
[…] transferred authority over the bulk of Afghanistan’s security insti-
tutions to a particular faction of the Islamic United Front for the 
Salvation of Afghanistan (UF or Northern Alliance), the military force 
that ousted the Taliban with the assistance of the US (Sedra 2003, p. 
11). 
Fractionalisation of the military led to imbalances in security.  In 2002, 14 brigades 
were placed in Jamiat-i Islami affiliated areas (including Kabul), while only 15 divi-
sions were allocated to the remaining south, southeast, east, west, and central 
provinces of the country.  Additionally, 37 of 38 generals selected by Fahim were 
Tajik, and almost all of them were associated with Massoud’s Shura-e Nazar Super-
visory Council (Shura-I Nezar) (Giustozzi 2003, p. 26).114  
 
Total spoiler groups 
The empowerment of Northern Alliance warlords in the Afghan government and the 
resulting fractionalization of the state is thought to have fuelled the emergence of 
‘total spoiler groups’, such as the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmartyar’s Hizb’I Islam 
party (Sedra 2003, p. 9).  It is reported that for weeks, ‘President Bush’s team debat-
ed whether helping the Northern Alliance’s ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks—in a 
predominantly Pashtun country—would cause more political problems after the war 
than their battlefield potential warranted’ (Andres et al. 2006, p. 133; Woodward 
2002).  Even though key members of the Northern Alliance promoted Karzai, a 
                                                      
114 For more on the fragmentation of Afghan security, see also: Rubin (1989, 2002) .   
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Pashtun supporter of King Zahir Shad, as president, the Pashtun community was un-
easy with the proliferation of northern minorities in the government.  
An even more significant cause for dissatisfaction may have been the out-
sourcing of security.  Human rights abuses by militia groups, as reported by the 
United Nations, are believed to have led to increased fractionalization and resurgence 
of the Taliban and southern Pashtun militia groups.  Giustozzi and others maintain 
that the current insurgency in Afghanistan is the result of the, ‘predatory behaviour 
of local authorities which has antagonised individuals and groups…particularly those 
who have been cooperating more closely with the Taliban when they were in the cap-
ital’ (Giustozzi 2008, p. 35; Mackinlay 2000).  Additionally, outside support for total 
spoiler groups has also expanded their capabilities, and is not directly related to the 
empowerment of the Northern Alliance in the Afghan government. 
 
The war economy 
Afghanistan’s economy is largely based on illicit activities that support warlords.  
The warlord economy, which existed prior to the overthrow of the Taliban, was driv-
en by several methods of revenue generation that reinforce the fractionalised nature 
militia and insurgent groups.  First, warlords have historically exploited their popula-
tions through taxes and customs revenues in border areas.  Second, warlords and 
militia groups often control natural resources in Afghanistan.  Massoud’s area of 
control during the reign of the Taliban, for example, ‘included a small though ex-
panding opium-growing area, but he appears to have made more money through 
printing money and the international marketing of gems’ (Rubin 2000, p. 1795).  
Third, Afghan groups are known to establish and collaborate with criminal networks, 
particularly for the cultivation and trade of drugs.  The Pashtun southern areas of the 
country have traditionally controlled cultivation and trade of poppy, the primary ille-
gal crop.  During a ban of poppy in 2001 by the Taliban, the northern provinces, such 
as Badakhshan, became more involved, and in 2005 the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported increasing Tajik involvement and trade through 
Tajikistan (Krastev 2005).  However, this trend has shifted back somewhat, as 90% 
of poppy cultivation was reported in 2010 in the south and west of the country.   
The creation of a stable Afghan state has depended in large part on suppress-
ing illicit sources of revenues and instead building legal centralised sources of 
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revenues in which to strengthen a central government to shift away from warlord pat-
ronage networks that has been the basis of the Afghan economy.  While the central 
government established a competent minister of finance, warlords and spoiler 
groups, including Fahim’s army, continued to take customs and retain the majority of 
the proceeds.  The risk of Afghanistan becoming a narco-state could result in state 
failure.  Ismail Khan, for example, controls customs post in Herat, earning up to 20 
million USD per day (Starr 2003, p. 46).  Additionally, while production was limited 
to cultivation and trade during the Taliban rule, drug trade has increased in the ag-
gregate and is beginning to incorporate drug processing laboratories (Sedra 2003).   
The decision to delegate in Afghanistan, as opposed to mounting a conven-
tional operation where allies could be selected after the invasion, incorporated 
warlords into the state formation in Afghanistan produced a largely patriarchal struc-
ture instead of a modern state.  The plan in Afghanistan has sought to incorporate 
first tier warlords, followed by second tier warlords and militia leaders, into the gov-
ernment framework and eventually establish a secure, centralised government (Sedra 
2003).  Jackson describes this strategy of incorporating warlords as an ‘embryonic’ 
form of government that can eventually grow into a stable state (Jackson 2003).  
William Reno offers a darker prognosis, contending that the patronage politics of 
warlord states has negative elements including the promotion of private interests as 
opposed to public interests, fractionalisation of the state through militia groups and 
ethnicity, and the exploitation of the economy by these groups (Reno 2002).  Hence, 
the state building process in Afghanistan is likely to be a long process of evolution 
from patriarchal politics to a modern state, with the possibility of long-term state de-
cline or even state failure.   
The reconstruction period testifies to the difficulty of transitioning a warlord-
based state into a stable democracy. This difficulty has led to an ineffective Afghan 
bureaucracy, fractionalisation of Afghan security and warlords and spoiler groups, 
and the increasing exploitation of the economy.  While the destruction of the Taliban 
government was fast and cost effective, the period that follows constitutes the long-
est war in U.S. history.  The costs of Afghanistan were around 15-20 billion USD in 
2003 and 2004 respectively.  These costs have ‘risen dramatically since FY2006, as 
troop levels and the intensity of conflict has grown, increasing from $19 billion in 
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FY2006 to $60 billion in FY2009’ Belasco (2011, p. 19).  Additionally, by 2014, the 
U.S. casualties exceeded 2,000.   
Despite these costs of delegation in the state building process, the option of a 
conventional invasion proposed by the Joint Chiefs may not have been a better op-
tion in the case of Afghanistan.  The expected advantage was the ability to choose 
allies after the invasion, thereby creating a more organic and stable government.  
First, based on the historical path of the Northern Alliance from the Bonn Conven-
tion to the present, the counterfactual government that would have emerged would 
probably have been an improvement; however, it is much more difficult to say how 
much better given the political history in the country and the Coalition’s resistance to 
incorporating the Taliban.  Problems incurred from warlords may be inherent to Af-
ghan society in general.  A network analysis by Armando Geller and Scott Moss 
describes Afghanistan as a group of complex networks that are on based personal ties 
and (sometimes shifting) entrepreneurial and power relationships (Geller & Moss 
2008).  Hence, it would be difficult to build a central government through any em-
powered group.   
Other considerations are the costs of a conventional invasion and the risk of a 
long guerrilla war.  These costs and risks may have outweighed the negative impact 
of incorporating the Northern Alliance in the state building process, particularly giv-
en the geography and history of successful resistance in the country.  Furthermore, a 
direct invasion would have required a heavy Coalition presence to create a security 
framework during the state building process, and soaring funding from international 
donors.  Finally, the difficulties in state-building in Afghanistan may be less an out-
come of the invasion strategy, and more a result of a bad execution of state-building 
process by outside groups.  The international community may have made several 
mistakes such as the appointment of Fahim as Secretary of Defense, the shift of at-
tention and troops to Iraq, and unmet donor commitments.   
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has evaluated the decision to enter into a network, or partnership, with 
the Northern Alliance, as opposed to a direct invasion.   In particular, the U.S. led 
invasion of Afghanistan involved a strategy of outsourcing referred to as ‘delegation’ 
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to insurgent groups and the use of mixed-methods of direct means by air power and 
indirect methods by outsourcing to insurgent groups.   
The study has found that there are four central factors to a decision to out-
source to an insurgency (for both state and non-state actors).  First, the estimated 
outcomes and the anticipated political constraints, risks, costs and casualties of both 
a direct invasion versus outsourcing to insurgent groups were considered.  Second, 
the capabilities of the insurgent group or groups and their skills are critical to the de-
cision to outsource as well as to the success of the state’s objectives.  Third, because 
network relationships are established on trust and endogenous systems of credible 
commitment, the similarity of interests between the state and the insurgent groups 
are relevant to the use of an outsourcing strategy.  And, finally, the specific short and 
long-term objectives of the state may favour different strategies of direct and indirect 
tactics.   
First, the anticipated costs, casualties, risks, and uncertainty of a direct inva-
sion were relevant factors that are related to an overall declining value of direct 
interstate warfare.  The Afghan model of delegation warfare to insurgent groups of-
fered policy makers an opportunity to reduce the required time of an invasion, the 
economic costs, the expected loss of life, and the risk or a long guerrilla war.  It also 
averted the political risk of stirring outrage in the region by creating a sense of legit-
imacy through local opposition groups.  Additionally, outsourcing to the Northern 
Alliance harnessed local knowledge and intelligence of the insurgent groups, reduced 
overall costs by avoiding the large-scale movement of assets, and transferring risks 
and costs from the state to the opposition groups.   
The decision to delegate also involved an assessment of the capabilities of the 
insurgent groups.  Policy makers determined that insurgencies (and warlords) were 
well funded and experience from decades of wars, outside supporters, and lucrative 
transnational criminal networks.  The capabilities of the insurgent groups was also 
relevant to the decision not to replicate the Afghan model–or strategies of outsourc-
ing–to the war in Iraq, which immediately followed Operation Enduring Freedom.  
Although during the invasion of Iraq, the military did outsource to two Kurdish 
groups in northern Iraq, the wide use of the Afghan model was rejected in large part 
because the Kurdish groups had limited capabilities in comparison to the Iraqi army.  
Nevertheless, while the Northern Alliance was capable, some analysts have argued 
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that because the skills of the Northern Alliance were less than those of the U.S. forc-
es, the strategy of outsourcing may have resulted in the failure to capture key al-
Qaeda members, including Osama bin Laden, in Tora Bora and Anaconda.  
Finally, the goals and interests of the state (or outsourcing groups) are im-
portant to the decision to delegate.  While direct methods of conflict rely on 
hierarchical structures, outsourcing to third party groups represents a network rela-
tionship (even if the outsourcing party is stronger).  Therefore, the relationship is 
based on trust, common interests, and endogenous mechanisms of credible commit-
ment.  The more that an outsourcing state (or group) has divergent interests from a 
third party, the higher the costs of monitoring and controlling the behaviour of the 
network actors, and the higher the risk of failure or diminished goals.  The study of 
Operation Enduring Freedom suggests that long-term goals are more difficult to at-
tain when its interest diverge from those of the insurgent group.  Conversely, short-
term interests, such as weakening a rival state or fighting a proxy war, may depend 
less (or not at all) on diverging interests with insurgencies.  Hence, as Jeffrey Record 
notes, mixed methods in which the state provides airpower and outsources to local 
surrogates on the ground ‘may be of limited value in situations requiring the con-
quest, occupations, and administration of territory’ (Record 2002, p. 20).   
In the final analysis, changing factors in the international system may influ-
ence the likelihood of insurgencies and the use of outsourcing.  A declining expected 
utility of direct warfare (increasing costs, risk, uncertainty, and economic costs) 
should result in an overall higher relative value for outsourcing to insurgencies.  Ad-
ditionally, an increasing effectiveness of insurgencies and expanding capabilities 
should, on the whole, make these groups more effective partners for states and non-
state actors to engage with.  Conversely, the goals of the state and the interests of the 
insurgencies may vary from case to case.  States with long–term objectives (or goals 
that are difficult but critical to fulfil) may prefer direct methods of conflict to avoid 
the moral hazard required by networking and outsourcing to insurgent groups.    
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7  Conclusion 
 
 
 
7.1 The emergence of transnational insurgencies 
While the nature of warfare remains constant, the characters of both direct and indi-
rect methods of warfare have changed over time.  The history of indirect warfare 
demonstrates that indirect warfare throughout much of history has been waged in 
conjunction with direct methods and strategies.  Insurgencies (or groups engaged in 
primarily indirect tactics) were largely unsuccessful until, as Clausewitz notes, the 
Spanish guerrilla, which was able to resist the French invasion in 1808 (Clausewitz 
1832/1976, p. 220).  This would be followed by other successful insurgencies, the 
tactics of which have been developed by Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War and 
the writings of T.E. Lawrence, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevera, and Võ Nguyên Giáp (Giap 
1937/1962; Guevara 1961; Lawrence 1920/1968).  Since the Second World War, in-
surgencies realised another significant change: the increasing emergence of 
transnational insurgencies.  Transnational insurgent groups work through networks 
consisting of outside states, non-state actors, criminal groups, individuals, diasporas, 
and other insurgencies to support domestic agendas or pursue objectives beyond their 
borders.   
Insurgencies in the past have had international dimensions.  The American 
Revolution, for example, was aided by French support of the Continental Army and 
the aforementioned Spanish guerrilla received support from Britain.  However, mod-
ern transnational insurgencies are unique in their frequency and character.  This 
study finds that in 1946, for example, only eight insurgencies received outside sup-
port, less that half of all insurgencies.  Over the years, the number of insurgencies 
has increased, as well as the ratio of transnational insurgencies to domestic insurgen-
cies.  In 2002, 35 out of 40 insurgencies were transnational insurgencies, over 85%.  
These insurgencies are either supported by outside states and/or non-state actors (in-
cluding relationships with transnational criminal groups) or are active beyond their 
borders.   
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The character of transnational insurgencies has also changed.  While insur-
gencies of the past were sometimes supported by outside states (often rivals of the 
civil war state) transnational insurgencies are of a different character, often network 
with multiple outside actors.  These can include states, non-state actor groups, trans-
national criminal organisations, diasporas, individuals, and other insurgent groups.  
The study of Afghanistan, for example, demonstrates that insurgencies received (and 
in some cases continue to receive) outside support from multiple states, worked with 
transnational criminal organisations, and were sometimes aided by outside foreign 
fighters.  Some insurgencies also pursue outside objectives by engaging directly in 
activities outside their borders or by supporting other insurgencies in outside states.  
For example, Kurdish insurgencies in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey cooperate for the goal of 
an independent Kurdish state, and al-Qaeda (since 2001) has developed a vast inter-
national network of Sunni insurgencies.   
This thesis has analysed the emergence of transnational insurgencies follow-
ing the Second World War to determine why insurgencies have emerged at the 
transnational level, and the impact of that change.  This study finds two key explana-
tions for the shift from domestic to transnational insurgencies.  First, new 
communications technology and globalisation have enabled insurgencies to engage 
in transnational networks that expand the resources, capabilities, and effectiveness of 
insurgent groups.  Second, a declining value (or expected value) of direct interstate 
warfare (direct methods) has led state actors increasingly to employ indirect methods 
of outsourcing to insurgencies as an alternative to direct interstate warfare.  
 
7.2 The shift from direct to indirect methods 
One reason for the emergence of transnational insurgencies has been the increasing 
effectiveness and expanding capabilities of transnational insurgent networks.  First, 
transnational networks are found to enable insurgent groups to utilise flat, horizontal 
organisational structures that are often flexible, agile, and difficult to detect and dis-
rupt.  Second, transnational insurgent networks are found to be able to gain 
additional resources and expertise through relationships with outside states, non-state 
actor groups, individuals and diasporas, foreign fighters, and criminal networks, and 
other insurgent groups that expand the availability of weapons, funding, training, 
money laundering, and fighters available to insurgent groups.  For example, Sunni 
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insurgent groups in Iraq have been found to receive outside funds and foreign fight-
ers from the region to counter coalition forces after Operation Iraqi Freedom.  A 
large number of the insurgencies since 1946 researched here are determined to have 
domestic objectives and goals, but join larger transnational networks to expand their 
resources and effectiveness.  Third, transnational networks enable insurgencies to 
network with outside groups and pursue regional or international objectives.  Alt-
hough a relatively smaller number of insurgencies have both transnational objectives 
and activities, the ability to engage internationally or ‘franchise’ through other insur-
gencies enables a powerful organizational structure and regional or global reach.  
Chechen rebels, for example, have received support from al–Qaeda for terrorist ac-
tivities in the pursuit of independence from Russia.  This research finds that through 
these three advantages the capabilities of all insurgencies have risen significantly 
from 1945 to 2010, during which time the percentage of the world’s population di-
rectly involved in insurgencies has more than tripled. 
The relationship between insurgencies and states has also changed.  State 
support of rebellions against enemies is not a new strategy.  For example, Thucydi-
des’ account of the Peloponnesian War described support for outside rebellions, such 
as Athenian support of Corcyra in its civil war against Corinth (Thucydides 431 
B.C./1961).  However, strategies of outside state support, or ‘outsourcing’ to insur-
gencies, have become increasingly common.  Following the Second World War, the 
Soviet Union and its allies challenged Western powers by supporting insurgencies 
engaged in decolonization conflicts with major powers.  This was followed by a pe-
riod of Cold War era proxy wars, often waged between the two superpowers and 
their allies, involving outside states such as Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, El Sal-
vador, Laos, Korea, and Vietnam.  
Since the end of the Cold War, major powers (including the former super-
powers) have continued to outsource, while regional powers and regional states 
increasingly support outside insurgencies.  While some regional states, such as Cuba 
China, and Iran, supported outside insurgencies during the Cold War period, the data 
from a number of empirical studies demonstrates that these regional powers, regional 
states, and neighbours’ intra-state conflicts, are increasingly outsourcing to insurgent 
groups.  As a result, while some expected that outsourcing would wane after the Cold 
War, outsourcing instead has persisted. 
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This study finds two explanations for the trend of increasing outside state 
support for insurgencies.  First, as insurgencies become increasing effective and ex-
pand their capabilities these networks have become more effective agents for state 
outsourcing.  For example, in the case study of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. 
decision makers from the same administration with similar interests chose to out-
source to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, which benefited from years of 
outside support from states and effective networks with transnational crime that ex-
panded their resources.  However, a similar strategy of outsourcing was not 
employed in Iraq a short time later, even though the model in Afghanistan was be-
lieved to be a success.  The change in strategy war due in large part to the belief that 
Kurdish groups in the northern portion of Iraq were relatively small, compared with 
Sadam Hussein’s army.  As insurgent groups have become more effective since the 
days of the Spanish guerrilla, expanding through transnational networks and opera-
tions, outsourcing to these groups has increased.  
The second explanation is a declining value (or expected value) of direct in-
terstate warfare since the Second World War.  This thesis has offered an expected 
value theory in which a state either engages in direct or indirect methods (or the out-
sourcing) of warfare.  The quantitative analysis demonstrates that the relative value 
of indirect methods has increased relative to methods of direct interstate warfare.  
From 1950 to 2010 the expected value of insurgencies and transnational insurgencies 
increased as their aggregate effectiveness has risen and as insurgencies increasingly 
gained transnational support and capabilities.  Conversely, from 1945 to 2002 the 
expected value of direct interstate warfare has been declining, as measured through 
diverging capabilities of states (and groups of allied states) and the ability of smaller 
states to resist occupations.  These changing capabilities translate higher expected 
costs, risks, and loss of life to direct interstate warfare, as well as a higher risk of 
guerrilla warfare in situations of state occupation.  In addition, other factors can in-
fluence direct interstate warfare, such as domestic and international political 
constraints, high economic costs of occupation, declining economic benefits of direct 
interstate warfare, and an increasing societal and cultural aversion to war and casual-
ties (both on the side of the state and the enemy).   
Strategies of outsourcing to insurgencies are found to enable a state to avoid 
many of the costs, constraints, and risks of war that in many cases would either be 
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incurred by a direct interstate conflict or would otherwise inhibit the use of violence.  
Indirect methods that involve outsourcing can transfer costs, casualties, and risks to 
an insurgent group or groups.  In Afghanistan and elsewhere this displacement of 
costs, casualties, and risks is found to be an incentive for states to outsource as an 
alternative to direct interstate warfare.   
In addition, outsourcing offers other advantages for specific cases.  First, 
states that lack the resources for a direct invasion may engage in strategies of out-
sourcing to insurgencies.  Cuba, for example, has supported a number of outside 
insurgencies including the MPLA (Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola) 
and FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) in states that it would not likely be 
able to engage with direct methods.  Second, decision makers may employ strategies 
of outsourcing to avoid or mitigate cultural or societal adversities to risk, loss of life, 
or conflict altogether.  Third, opposing states (or groups of states) with similar or, 
conversely, asymmetric capabilities are likely to anticipate high costs, casualties, and 
risks from direct interstate conflict instead choose indirect strategies of outsourcing 
in many cases.  This is often the case with nuclear or advanced powers, but also with 
smaller states.  A common example of nuclear parity is Pakistan and India, both of 
which have supported insurgencies to undermine the other.  In a non-nuclear exam-
ple, Ethiopia and Eritrea both supported insurgencies in the other during the 
territorial dispute that followed Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia.  
States may also outsource in secret to avoid domestic and international politi-
cal constraints.  During the Cold War, U.S. support of the Permesta rebels against the 
communist government of Indonesia under Sukarno was an operation that required 
secrecy to avoid international reprisal that likely would have made the operation im-
possible.  Similarly, outsourcing can diminish the perceived role of the state.  Policy 
makers for Operation Enduring Freedom chose outsourcing in part to create a sense 
of legitimacy and, thereby, diminish local outrage and reprisal to Western interven-
tion.   
 
7.3 Implications of the research 
The impact of a declining value of interstate warfare and an increasing effectiveness 
of insurgencies is argued here both to constrain and enable the strategies of state and 
non-state actors.  For non-state actors, an increasing utility of insurgencies elevates 
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(or enables) the potential of those groups to accomplish goals; therefore, the emer-
gence of transnational insurgencies has resulted in increasing non-state actor 
activities of initiating and supporting insurgencies.  The data demonstrate that as in-
surgencies have expanded to the transnational level, from 1950 to 2010, as their 
effectiveness has increased and the capabilities have expanded.   
State actors, on the other hand, are constrained by a declining value of direct 
methods and an increasing effectiveness of indirect methods.  Formal modelling de-
veloped in this study demonstrates how state decision makers may assess anticipated 
gains and the estimated costs, constraints, loss of life, and risks regarding both the 
decision to go to war and the use of direct or indirect methods.  Assuming that states 
pursue their objectives in a rational way, rising trends in costs, risks, loss of life, and 
benefits of direct interstate warfare ‘constrain’ its use, while a rising effectiveness of 
insurgencies ‘enables’ indirect strategies for both state and non-state actors.  There-
fore, as the expected value of direct interstate warfare has declined and the expected 
value of indirect methods has risen, states have increasingly incorporated indirect 
methods by outsourcing to insurgent groups.   
This study finds that there are also a number of factors idiosyncratic to a giv-
en conflict that influence state (and non-state) actor support for insurgencies.  These 
factors include the specific objectives of a state and the character and capabilities of 
the potential insurgent groups that a state may support or incorporate into a cam-
paign.  The character of an insurgency involves the interests and skills of an 
insurgent group or groups.  The extent to which the skills of insurgent groups diverge 
from those of the supporting state can weaken or undermine the expected benefits of 
outsourcing.  In some cases, insurgencies possess specialised knowledge and abilities 
that enhance their effectiveness as an option to direct interstate warfare.  However, if 
the skills of the insurgency are less than those of the supporting states, the state is 
found to incur a greater risk of failure by not using its own forces.   
Additionally, the greater the divergence of interests between the state and the 
insurgency, the more likely that the goals of the state will be compromised or fail 
altogether.  This was found to be the case in Operation Enduring Freedom.  During 
the invasion of Afghanistan the Northern Alliance was very effective in overthrow-
ing the Taliban, which was a common enemy of both the U.S. led coalition and the 
participating insurgent groups.  However, these groups did not have similar interests 
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in the capture of Al-Qaeda members or the development of a stable state following 
the invasion.  The loss of key al-Qaeda members (including bin Laden) at Tora Bora 
and Anaconda demonstrates the problem of both diverging interests, as well as skills, 
between the state and the insurgency. 
The expected value of direct and indirect methods is found also to depend in 
part on the goals of the states.  State objectives vary greatly and affect the use of di-
rect and indirect strategies.  In some cases, states support insurgencies to weaken (or 
influence) a rival state, its allies, or other states that intervene in a conflict, or may 
seek to change the leadership of a state to be less divergent with their own interests.  
States may also have direct interests within a target state, such as ethnic, historical, 
economic, and ideological linkages.  Additionally, states sometimes pursue (or claim 
to pursue) humanitarian or ideological interests such as the spread of democracy, 
communism, or religion.  
This study evaluates the impact of short-term and long-term state objectives 
on the choice of strategy.  Short-term objectives include weakening a rival state, its 
allies, or other intervening states.  These short-term objectives are often appropriate 
to strategies of outsourcing because the character of the insurgency is less critical or 
even irrelevant to success.  Conversely, long-term interests, such as building a stable 
state, promotion of democracy, and humanitarian missions are more likely to be 
threatened by moral hazard and may lead to the use of direct methods.  
The trend of increased state outsourcing to insurgencies and the use of indi-
rect methods will continue through a variety of tactics.  Mao Zedong, for example, 
believed that insurgent warfare is only a stage in the larger campaign, which eventu-
ally leads to the use of direct forces to take territory, as was the case in the Chinese 
Civil War.  Similarly, states often employ both direct methods and outsourcing in 
different campaigns, such as with the U.S. led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
States also combine direct and indirect methods either by employing different meth-
ods in different situations, such as the Bush Administration’s use of direct methods 
in Iraq and indirect methods in Afghanistan, or by combining methods together (e.g. 
conventional air power and outsourcing to insurgencies) as was the case in the 2011 
multi-state coalition in Libya. 
Other tactics that incorporate both direct and indirect methods are being de-
veloped and will likely continue to expand.  Russian development of what is referred 
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to as ‘New Generation Warfare’ is an example of evolving direct and indirect tactics 
involving insurgent groups.  The purpose of New Generation Warfare is to over-
throw external states without the use of a direct military campaign.  Russian 
campaigns in 2014 in Crimea and other parts of Ukraine exemplify New Generation 
Warfare.  The strategy involves a combination of direct and indirect methods: first, 
indirect political warfare is waged through the use of propaganda, special operations 
infiltration of government offices, and bribes and intimidation of political leaders; 
second, the use of special operations forces and private military contractors em-
ployed in conjunction with local opposition groups; third, the use of more direct 
methods, such as air power and the establishment of no-fly zones, and the use of 
long-range weapons and precision artillery (Bērziņš 2014, p. 6).   
In conclusion, the choice of state and non-state actors to engage in indirect 
methods by means of insurgencies is influenced by the increasing effectiveness and 
capabilities of insurgencies and the declining value of direct interstate warfare.  Ad-
ditionally, factors that are unique to each conflict, such as state objectives and the 
character of insurgent groups, also influence the use of direct and indirect strategies. 
Therefore, it is likely that the predominance of transnational insurgencies and indi-
rect methods of state outsourcing to insurgencies will continue.  However, this is not 
expected to lead to a severe decline in direct interstate warfare because there exist 
many scenarios in which states will seek objectives that are either better served by 
direct methods or cannot be attained by indirect methods. Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, and 
Clausewitz all described the strategic use of both direct and indirect methods in war-
fare. Therefore, like much of the history of indirect warfare, outsourcing to 
insurgencies is an indirect method that will likely to be employed in conjunction with 
direct warfare through a variety of tactics.  In this sense, outsourcing to transnational 
insurgencies is strategically similar to indirect methods of the past, but its character 
and the character of insurgencies have changed.   
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